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2ABSTRACT
There is a wealth of theoretical as well as empirical society-oriented 
research which is generally discussed under the rubric of sociological 
theories of the State and which, unfortunately, at present is not made 
full use of in the study of International Relations. The thesis aims to 
create the conditions that will enable us to ’tap’ this material for 
the benefit of the study of international relationships.
The thesis provides evidence that analyzing politics in terms of ’the 
State* directs out attention to a single central problem, the 
interrelation between the governing institutions of a country and other 
aspects of that society. Modem theories of the State discuss the 
nature of the political process which is the process by which societies 
organise themselves. Therefore, the political process itself is located 
at the centre of the analysis. International interactions are then 
classified into two categories: formal interactions which are defined 
as all those emanating from the governing institutions of a country, 
and informal interactions, which encompass all other types of 
interactions.
’Informal interactions’, that is, private trade and investment, the 
flow of ideas, immigration, the dissemination of techniques and 
technologies, etc. create a substratum of unmeditated links among what 
appear on the surface as independent, separate societies. Although 
varied and chaotic in their origins, they are much more predictable in 
their social effects. A significant portion of them conform to two 
simple patterns, named respectively horizontal and vertical links. The 
first pertains to cases whereby, in one form or another, a group of 
people residing in one formation are linked directly to a group 
residing in another, thus resulting in an ’informal’ vertical tie 
between the two social formations. Horizontal links are links of 
competition. They are based on the principle that competitors tend to 
modify their behaviour to improve their competitive position. Both ties 
effect structural changes within social formations that reverberate 
through their ’domestic’ political processes. These links are the 
principal channels by which ’domestic’ political processes are 
’externalized* and in turn ’internalized* on a world scale —  they are 
the primary forms by which International Relations and the domestic 
political processes are inter-linked.
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7INTRODUCTION
In a recent issue of Time magazine, the president of Columbia, Mr. 
Virgilio Barco Vargas, sought to defend Columbia's appalling record in 
narcotics control by attributing at least part of the blame to the 
United States. "The consumption of drugs in the United States" he 
argued "has become one of the fuels for violence in Colombia... Every 
time a North American youngster pays for his vice in the streets of New 
York, Miami or Chicago, he becomes a link in the chain of crime, terror 
and violence that has caused us so much damage and pain."* If not 
totally convincing, there is nothing unusual about this remark. It is 
framed within the conventional language of politics; Barco's rhetoric 
and political aims are fairly transparent; the 'informal* links between 
states which are suggested appear to be common knowledge; and it 
emanates from a decision-maker, a favourite oracle of truth for 
traditional International Relations.
And yet, this remark is interesting because in its unassuming 
way, it coincides with the three principal thanes of these work:
a. criticism of the three main orthodoxies of International Relations: 
Realism, pluralism and structuralism.
b. criticism which is based not on any new research or chance dis­
covery, but rather, as I shall argue, is implied in the vast literature 
of sociological theories of the State, development studies, social 
history, political geography and political anthropology —  to name some 
of disciplines I shall be drawing upon.
c. the suggestion that much of this research can be organised in such 
a way as to constitute an alternative framework for the study of 
international relationships. Consequently, inspite of the implied 
criticism of the current frameworks, this work will not develop as a 
c rit iq u e but will suggest an alternative framework for the study of 
international relationships.
Barco's comment is of particular interest to the student of Interna­
tional Relations, not least because th e re  is  n o th in g  unusual about i t . 
For whereas it appears unambiguous, the links between states which are 
suggested far exceed current theoretical frameworks. Consequently, 
through its analysis it is possible to see both the accomplishments as
8well as the inadequacies of existing theories of International 
Relations.
At one level, Barco’s utterance may be slotted into the dominant frame 
of reference of the discipline. For Columbia —  by this the readers of 
Time magazine understand a bounded territorial entity with population 
and government —  is a sovereign State. And president Barco is speaking 
as the person who is currently invested with this sovereignty. As such 
he is responsible in the eyes of the ’international community’ for 
whatever happens within the territorial boundaries of this country. 
When it has detrimental effects upon the population of another country, 
as is currently the case with drug trafficking, the issue becomes 
’political’. Since now the decision-makers of the United States must 
become involved —  and indeed, dutifully, Time magazine presents its 
readers with the official response of ’Washington’. The solution to the 
problem, it is suggested, lies in the hands of the two governments and 
they will argue their case the best they can, hopefully, through the 
medium of diplomacy. However, the ultimate resolution of the problem 
lies in the hands of the Colombian state, that is, Colombian governing 
institutions: the Colombian army, its judiciary, bureaucracy, treasury, 
etc.. These institutions will have to implement any agreement that 
might be reached.
This is the ’political’ world of clearly demarcated collective 
entities. There is apparently no particular difficulty in sliding from 
one meaning of the term ’Colombia’ (or the ’United States’) to another. 
And Time magazine provides good examples of a sophisticated language 
packed with subtle meanings which has developed in modem political 
sciences. In some situations ’Colombia’, ’Bogota’ and president Barco 
are considered to be equivalents, in others, they are quite distinct. 
The reason for this lies in the distinction between domestic and 
international politics. Within the domestic sphere, ’society’, 
’government’ and ’president’ are distinct qualities. The president may 
have difficulties in controlling the army; he may be a dictator and 
therefore an exploiter of his own society, the government in Bogota 
might be considered as an illegitimate regime, and so on. However, in 
international politics these distinctions do not matter. The State and
9its regime coalesce into one unity.
But if the practice of separating politics is perhaps dubious, it has 
proved valuable in explaining certain phenomena. The dominant theory of 
International Relations probes into the nature of the relations between 
States. It accepts the existence of sovereign and absolute social 
entities who recognise no authority beyond their own and become 
legitimate in the eyes of others simply by the recognition other states 
accord than. These unities possess an inherent will, or logic, the 
reason of State, and they pursue their aims which are primarily the 
remorseless aggrandizement of their power. Since the reason of State is 
the sole guide to their policy, the interests of the state are the only 
guarantee of its undertakings —  which means that there is no 
guarantee. The result an anarchic and dangerous * system of states *. 
And indeed, the discussion in Time magazine renders support to the 
theory of power politics. Since clearly, a decision-maker of one 
country is trying to score a propaganda point against another and he 
uses all available means at his disposal to do so. Politics, it 
appears, is a struggle for power.
Barco’s remark may be also interpreted by the theories of Interdepen­
dence. An enormous growth in communication and transportation and 
hence, the establishment of a world market, revolutionized the nature 
of politics, domestically and internationally alike. Consequently, 
There is barely a political issue left purely ’domestic’ because of the 
advent of interdependence, and drug trafficking is a case in point: as 
long as governments try to deal with problems independently under the 
pretence that their countries are (still) exclusive domains, there can 
be no solution. The only viable alternative is the one proposed by 
Barco, namely, an international approach to a transnational problem.
Interdependence and transnationalism, * question the territorial 
exclusivity of social units, and hence of the separation of politics 
and the autonomy of international politics which underpins the Realist 
theory. The issue was seen initially in terms of a "world crisis of 
authority" (Rosenau). That is, the erosion of traditional loci of 
sovereignty (Goodwin, 1974) and the emergence of new political units.
10
However, these initial observations were never translated into a fully- 
fledged theory of International Relations. According to Ernest Haas, 
Interdependence theories did not try to create a general theory, but
simply aimed to elaborate and describe modem * patterns of interdepen-
4 5dence’. In that sense, regime theory is only the next logical step.
However, from description and empiricism this branch of post-realism 
slides into voyeurism. The theoretical link between technology and 
interdependence was never discussed fully, so there was no exploration 
of any structural processes.
This is more or less as far as traditional theories of International
c
Relations enable us to illuminate Barco1 s utterance. On another level, 
it may be interpreted further according to dependency and world-system 
theories: Barco describes familiar relationships between poor and rich 
countries in a capitalist world-economy. The poor country, Colombia in 
this case, is virtually destroyed as it becomes the supplier of cocaine 
to the 'rich kids’ of its giant neighbour. The essential link in this 
sad tale is money, or —  as some would have it, capitalism. In a 
capitalist market, where everything can be bought and sold, the poor 
may lose everything, including their dignity. The links of crime that 
Barco is talking about is only another instance of the catastrophic 
effects of the capitalist mode of production and the insatiable search 
for profit.
9
Theories of imperialism and dependency present,therefore, an alterna­
tive framework for the study of international relationships. Instead of 
the rigid partition of the globe into national societies possessing 
inherent wills, they point towards a series of ’structural’ relation­
ships on a world scale which in their view are feu: more important than 
the formal conduct of politics. Within this global environment there 
are political groupings which aim to comer and distort the free flow 
of commodities and goods. In Wallerstein’s words:
’’The structure of historical capitalism has been such that the 
most effective levers of political adjustment were the 
state-structures, whose very construction was itself, as we 
have seen, one of the central institutional achievement of 
historical capitalism. It is thus no accident that the control 
of state power, the conquest of state power if necessary, has
11
been the central strategic objective of all the major actors 
in the political arena, throughout the history of modem 
capitalism” (1974, p.48).
Thus, the apparent ’will* of States is nothing but a mask for purely 
class interest. Consequently, the relations between States and 
international politics is of secondary importance.
The issues which are raised in this literature are important, as 
witnessed by the growing number of marxist and liberal writers involved 
in it. However, as I shall demonstrate later in the dissertation, both 
dependency and world-system theories offer only a partial framework for 
the analysis of international relationships.
However, the hidden complexities in Barco’s remark are not exhausted 
yet, let us, therefore, analyze it in greater details. As a statement 
of facts, Barco recounts two stories. He relates individuals’ ac­
tivities in separate geographical areas to each other. But these are 
not activities of the type we ordinarily associate with International 
Relations, these are mere kids paying for their vices, i.e. politically 
unaware individuals whose vices result, according to Barco, in a chain 
of ’international’ crime. The activities themselves have no ’meaning’ 
within the Weberian Sociology which still dominates the theories of 
International Relations. As a result, there is no place for them in the 
traditional literature. It is when they are repeated frequently, that 
these activities become politically and socially significant. They then 
create a chain, an international ’chain of crime’. The implied 
suggestions is that only when ’societal* activities become a problem,
q
then they become ’political’. Which in turn indicates the existence of 
a problem of ’demarcation’ between the political and non-political 
types of International Relations. An issue we virtually hear nothing 
about in traditional literature. Furthermore, it is also suggested, in 
contrast to the Realist position according to which politics is an 
autonomous sphere of activity, that in fact social and political 
activities are indistinguishable.^
12
This notion is braided into another complaint. The behaviour of 
depraved American kids, caused by the breakdown of American society, 
precipitates the collapse of Colixnbian society. Thus a symptom of 
decadence in one society is ’ exported’ through the medium of money to 
another, where it fuels an intrinsic propensity for violence. The 
story, however, can be reversed: Columbia’s history of violence and 
anarchy threatens now to engulf its more powerful and prosperous 
neighbour. But the narcotic trade did not simply forge a static link, 
a mere connection between the two societies. This chain of crime is 
like a channel through which many things are passed. The chain is a 
medium, an informal link, which attaches the fate of different 
societies to each other. It is the persistent reference to the realm of 
’informal’ relations and ties between societies which is the real 
significance of Barco’s utterance. And this is precisely the area 
neglected by traditional International Relations.
**
As we have seen, the various schools of International Relations have 
sensed many, but not all of the aspects mentioned above. Nevertheless, 
no comprehensive framework capable of dealing with all of than has 
emerged. Furthermore, it should be appreciated that Barco’s remark by 
no means covers all of what we would like to know about international 
relationships. But considering that there is barely a discipline left 
in the natural sciences and social sciences that can boast a general 
framework, this cannot be considered as one of the major problems 
facing the study of International Relations.
More significant perhaps, there is no dearth of theoretical research, 
nor for that matter, is there any lack of fresh new angles to discuss 
the phenomena of international relationships, however, achievements of 
one school of thought are accomplished at the price of the internal 
consistency of another: each fresh approach posits itself as an
a lte rn a tiv e to the previous ones.** In other words, the various ap­
proaches that we do possess are inconmensurable.
If that was not enough, the real significance of Barco*s remark —  and 
that is why we went to the trouble of discussing it in some detail and 
to emphasise that there is nothing unusual about it —  lies principally
13
in his ability to shift effortlessly from one mode of thought to 
another, surpassing within the space of a few sentences the very 
boundaries of the theories of International Relations. Present research 
in theories of International Relations cannot do this. In actual fact, 
where theoretical research have split into ’islands of theories’, 
analyses of concrete situations encounter no such difficulties. In 
International Relations, therefore, the cleavage is not simply between 
theory and theory, nor is it simply between theory and practice, but 
between two types of theories: the tacit theoretical frameworks which 
underlay the more pragmatic analyses and the abstract generalisations 
which are ultimately based upon them.
Theory is not simply a series of generalisations and abstractions, it
12is also a way of ’seeing’ the world. Consequently, all thought is 
implicity or explicitly theoretical i.e. it is impossible to think 
beyond the boundaries of theory. The split between tacit and analytical 
theories of International Relations therefore signifies a failure on 
the part of the theoreticians to heed and follow empirical research.
This is perhaps the real problem that faces the theory of International
13Relations It suggests a series of unpleasant implications.
1. It suggests that analytical theories do not function as a guide to 
policy for the ruling classes, nor for the dominated class’s organisa­
tion. Decision-makers, in other words, make use of other theories.
2. If that is so, what function do current analytical theories do have? 
There has always been the irritating suspicion that theories of 
International Relations are nothing but ideological cloaks for certain 
interests.^
3. Above all we need to understand the purpose of generalisations and 
abstractions in order to appreciate what is missing when they are 
unsuccessful: while the human brain is perfectly capable of deducing 
and digesting extremely complex relationships on a tacit level, 
formalisation and generalisation are tools for transcending and 
extending this level. In the words of one of the vehement critics of 
this methodology "<w>e may agree that abstract notions and principles 
can be connected more easily than practical (empirical) concepts" 
(Feyerabend, 1987, p.67).^ In other words, the methodology proved 
enormously successful because it is eminently useful.
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Thus for instance, it is within our daily experience that objects tend 
to fall on earth. However, Newton’s observation that everything, 
absolutely everything fall, pointed towards a universal but intangible 
force which compels them to do so. The theory of gravity, in turn, 
initiated a whole new sets of discoveries. Similar example can be found 
in the history of social thought. MacPherson (1951) has demonstrated 
in the context of Thomas Hobbes’ work that Hobbes aimed to deduce 
general patterns which explain the basic motion of hunan bodies. Once 
he thought he had found them, it enabled him to formulate some striking 
conclusions concerning the place of the individual in society which 
were not at all evident on the tacit level. Marx’s work presents 
another case. Marx’s ’scientific’ discovery was that exploitation i.e. 
the wholesale and permanent transfer of material goods from one class 
to another, was not accidental or a survival of feudalism (Casanova, 
1971), but a pivotal process an understanding of the social system. 
Hence the class struggle, which in most cases can be observed only in 
thought, is the ’motor force of history*. This striking discovery 
directed Marx towards the field of ’economics’, where he believed the 
heart of the process of exploitation in modem societies lay, and it’ 
enabled him to deduce general tendencies in the capitalist mode of 
production (Albirtton, 1986; Sekine, 1980; Uno, 1980).
Thus, the formalisation of tacit knowledge allows us to examine our 
direct experience carefully and then to transcend and perhaps enrich  
it. The same urge informs this work, which may be defined in the most
general terms as an attem pt to create  a form al fram ew o rk  which p erm its
lfius an extensive treatm ent o f  in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s h ip s.
**
The definition of the ’problematic’ of this work is of course far too 
vague and general to prescribe any specific route for investigation. 
Let us return, therefore, to International Relations theory. I argued 
that current theoretical interpretations fail on three accounts:
a. the lack of an overall framework;
b. theories that we do possess are incommensurable;
c. Tacit theories of International Relations are far more advanced than 
analytical theories.
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On the face of it these are three distinct issues, in reality they are 
one and the same. My argument is that an incorrect concept of the State 
is at the heart of them all. Let us begin with the incomnensurability 
of present theories of International Relations.
We may divide the discipline of International Relations into four, 
perhaps five schools of thought.
a. Realism and neo-realism (Aron, Bull, Carr, Krasner, Morgenthau, 
Northedge, Schwarzenberger, Waltz, Wight)
b. Neo-Marxist or the structural approaches (Braudel, Ehmanuel, Frank, 
Wallerstein).
c. What I will describe as annexes to Realism: Interdependence, 
transnationalism and regime analysis, as well as the large majority of 
textbooks of international political economy. They are defined here as 
annexes to Realism because they accept Realist conclusions but strive 
to add, modify, or adjust them to contemporary conditions (Cooper, 
Gilpin, Hanrieder, Keohane & Nye, Skocpol, Strange)
d. Individual works whose methodologies have not been developed into 
schools of thought. (Burton, Deutsch, Kelman and Mansbach and Vasquez).
e. Historical sociology. (Eisendstadt, Hall, Mann, McNeill).
Since a brief analysis of the last two would necessitates a large part 
of this work, I will have to limit myself to a short discussion of the 
three main traditions, namely, realism, pluralism and structuralism. My 
point is that none of the above mentioned groups, including to two 
concluding ones, have treated the concept of State adequately.
**
A) Realism and Neo-Realism: Realism and its recent manifestation, Neo-
17Realism, boast two great achievements. The first can be measured when 
contrasted with what might be branded as pre-Realist literature. The 
great moral and theoretical problem faced by political thinkers in the 
nineteenth century was defined by Hegel. Willke explains:
"Rejecting all the theories of the social contract as a way to 
restructure and organize the resulting complexity, Hegel 
rigorously presents the problem: What is there to represent 
the identity of society in the face of the diversity of its 
parts? And he comes up with his famous (and many say: in­
famous) answer: the State as the sphere of universal altruism" 
(1986, p.458).
16
Hegel regarded the State as both the epitome of rationality and its
10
essence as power (Hegel, 1952; 1975). As Rupert Emerson observed; 
"Hegel's state is held together not by force but by the spirit of 
order. It is a spiritual structure, the highest embodiment of reason, 
the guardian of liberty." (1928, p. 11). At the same time, in its 
external relations the State must assert its individuality:
"the primary absolute right of the State is that its sovereign 
independence be recognized, and the relations between States 
is that of Powers whose difficulties must ultimately find 
solution on the battlefield" (Ibid, pp. 14-15).
However, Hegel's solution to the problems inherited from the social 
contract theories occasioned new difficulties: The 'spiritual' State 
conflicted with its concrete and rather brutal manifestations. Jacob 
Burkhardt, in his Reflection on H is to ry (first published 1905, but 
consisting of lectures delivered from 1868 -1885) puzzles over the 
paradox in German political thought in the nineteenth century. His 
conclusions are less favourable:
"Utterly regardless of all religion, the privilege of egoism, 
which is denied to the individual is bestowed on the state. 
Weaker neighbours are subjected and annexed, or in some way 
deprived of their interdependence, not in order to forestall 
hostilities on their part, for that hardly costs a thought, 
but to prevent another taking than and turning than to its own 
political ends, and once on th a t road, th e re  is  no s topping, 
th ere  is  an excuse fo r  e v e r y th in g ,... The next step is that 
things are done in advance, without any reed, motive, on the 
principle: 'If we take it in time, we shall avert the danger 
of war in the future’. Ultimately a permanent appetite for 
territorial 'rounding off' is created, which devours whatever 
happens to lie convenient and can be laid hands on" (1943, pp. 
67-8).
Thus, in contrast to Hegel and the German theorists of power such as 
Fichte, Treitschke, Gumplowitz and Meinecke who saw the quest for power
as the natural and justifiable posture of the state-person in world
19politics, liberal thinkers such as Burkhardt and Sorel regarded it as 
an immoral activity. They noticed moreover the systemic pressures in 
international politics. However, they remained vague on the fundamental 
question of whether these immoral activities are inherent in the State
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—  which paradoxically, seem to have been implied in the Idealist 
interpretation —  or whether they are grounded in the system of State.
It was left to Morgenthau (1967) to present a solution to the problem: 
politics is about power and power only because (and this is the real 
significance of his assertion) in  in te rn a tio n a l p o litics  a ll in te res ts , 
w hether good o r bad, a re  tran s la ted  in to  pow er. Morgenthau demonstrated 
then, that noble as the motives might be, in the international arena 
they are transformed into a brutish struggle for power. He succeeded in 
generalising and presenting a logical sequence which compels states to 
behave in a particular manner. The great achievement of Realism, 
therefore, was the demonstration that the struggle for power is 
inherent in a system lacking an overall legitimate authority. The moral 
drama evident in so much of nineteenth century literature was not 
solved, it was simply forgotten. In the light of the experience of the 
two world wars, morality was now equated with * realism* (which came to 
denote pragmatism) in world politics.
Furthermore, in shifting the onus firmly onto the ’system of states’ 
Morgenthau’s Realism presented the discipline of International 
Relations with a second achievement, or, as I shall argue in a moment, 
an apparent achievement. Like any other discipline, the study of 
International Relations seeks to define its uniqueness vis-a-vis 
others. Intuitively it seems that international relationships sure 
different from domestic politics, but how exactly should we define this 
distinction ? Nineteenth century Prussian thinkers discussed interna­
tional relationship® but did not create a separate field of Interna­
tional Relations because for them politics was by and large inter- 
20national affairs. In contrast, through the same ingenious device 
Morgenthau was able to agree with his predecessor and yet to demonstra­
te the viability of a separate field of international politics. All 
politics is a struggle for pxwer, he argued (1967, p. 2) in that sense 
International Relations are not unique. But there are different types 
of ’units’ struggling for p>ower, individuals and groups, on the one 
hand, and States on the other. It follows, he argued, that there are 
two types of politics, domestic and international. With this ingenious 
formula Morgenthau was able to separate what he himself considers to be
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one and the same.
It is the distinction between internal and external politics that
countenance, it is generally believed, a separate study of Internation-
21al Relations. It also sanctions the definition of the field as an
22investigation into the nature of the relations between states. The aim 
of the theories of International Relations —  at least as they were 
formulated by its eminent proponents —  was to uncover general patterns 
or laws of politics (Carr, 1939; Morgenthau, 1964) i.e. general 
patterns for the relations between these entities. However, this 
formula, so essential to Realist thought, begets a series of insur­
mountable complications. One unfortunate consequence is that the very 
notion of politics acquires a new meaning. In International Relations 
politics is regarded as a struggle for power, whereas in domestic
politics it is defined invariably as the "authoritative allocation of
23values for a society" (Easton, 1953, p. 129). In other words, whereas 
in International Relations politics is a unique practice, in political 
science it is a structure or a level, a particular type of activity
9J
which is defined in term of other activities.
Since in International Relations politics was severed from other social 
processes, it came to be thought of as an intractable and immutable 
social activity. Thus the practice of international politics is 
represented as a game in which both the rules and the goals are known
or
in advance. In other words, there is no evolution in the system. But 
in order to support the contention that politics is inimitable, the 
units that interact must also possess an unchanging nature. In turn, if 
the units do not change, then internal politics is of no significance. 
Thus we end up with a study priding itself on its realism and prag­
matism being forced to replace the concrete acts of states with an 
abstract world where all States are unitary entities endowed with 
similar needs and wants.
This in turn has led to a series of other problems, The unity of the 
State and politics on one hand, and the denial of internal politics on 
the other, implies that non-state activities must either be denied or 
relegated to the realm of insignificance. (After all, the State, which
19
is an abstraction, cannot be conceived as a unitary phenomena, 
possessing its own unique goals, while elements which reside in it are 
not part of this unity). We arrive therefore at a position where 
Realism, while capable of explaining one element of Barco's remark, 
does so by denying and excluding the various levels of informal 
activities on a world scale. Thus Realism works only by denying all the 
other approaches in International Relations. Once we accept any idea 
from one of the alternatives, a basic tenet of Realism is bound to be 
questioned.
**
It might be argued that, on the contrary, the great majority of post­
realist studies in International Relations have in facts broken up the 
'billiard ball' model of the State and consequently have been heavily 
involved in an attempt to grapple with the chain of informal interac­
tions among societies. To a certain extent this is true. To the 
exclusion of neo-realism, the prevailing view in International 
Relations have been that Realism:
i. fails to appreciate the intimate relation between domestic and 
international politics; and
ii. fails to account for the interrelationships between politics, 
economics and culture on the international plane.
Thus successive approaches aimed at developing a larger framework for 
the study of international relationships. They failed, however, as 
mentioned before, to produce an overall framework for the study of 
international relationships. Why is that ?
An overall framework for the study of politics must, even if it is 
premised upon the separation of politics, as a minimum rely on a 
consistent and congruent concept of society, or to use modem terminol­
ogy, a coherent theory of the State. It is this crucial point which has 
eluded practically all subsequent approaches. Now, it is true that 
whereas traditional studies of International Relations paid little 
attention to theories of the State, modem scholars make a point of 
clarifying their ideas about it. However, this does not mean that the 
underlying theory of the state has improved. As will be demonstrated in 
the chapter one, traditional realists possessed a clear, if now judged 
erroneous concept of the State.
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Realism is strongly influenced by the Romantic and idealist theories 
which held sway in the nineteenth century. These theories found their 
way into International Relations* literature via the English neo- 
Hegelians (Greene, Bousanquet, Figgis) and through major figures such 
as Emerson and Sabine into American political science. In the idealist
and Romantic traditions, the State is seen as a person (although the
27notion of personality varies from writer to writer). Only when viewed 
as such does the Hobbesian theory which applies to individuals and 
their place in society appear to be relevant to the study of interna­
tional relationships (MacPherson, 1951). Hence the prevalent inter­
pretation of international politics is that it is a struggle among 
personalised entities and, hence, the notion of a synthetic * society of 
States *.
As we have seen, this perception does not allow for non-state ac­
tivities. It is probably because of this that the underlying theory of 
the State underwent an important if largely overlooked transformation 
in the last two decades. Doubts over the choice of the State as the 
unit of analysis of International Relations used to generate puzzlement 
marred with resentment among traditional Realists. For they accepted 
without question the division of the world into States as one of its 
basic attributes. In recent versions the puzzlement 1ms been replaced 
by an argument. The claim now is that the State is (still) the major 
international acto r by virtue of its monopoly over the means of 
violence. In other words, in contrast to the organic image typical of 
the idealist sociology of the nineteenth century which emphasise the 
will of the State, modem International Relations* scholars elect to 
call upon the Weberian sociology in order to justify a similar 
position. As well known, in Weberian sociology politics is only one 
type of activity (Weber, 1978, p.54) and therefore there are no 
difficulties in accounting for the variety of non-state activities.
However, if the division of the world into States is interpreted as a 
’political* division, why should we define International Relations as 
the study of the relations between States ? In other words, what is
uniquely international? The Weberian categories are notoriously
28static, and the notions of politics and economy, when viewed from this
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perspective becomes truly stultified. On top of that, whereas the 
employment of Weberian categories cannot aid much in political 
analysis, the Realist theory of International Relations becomes 
incoherent. For as long as the State is seen as a person, the Hobbesian 
analogy is relevant, but when the State is conceived merely as a set of 
institutions claiming legitimacy and monopoly over the means of power, 
there is nothing intrinsic about relations between States.
But perhaps the most serious criticism of the theories of Interdepen­
dence is that they fail to pierce through the * surface* phenomena of 
interdependence. It is not very difficult to see why: many of the
phenomena which precipitate what appears on the surface sis interdepen-
29dence are located at the informal interactions level. Traditional 
International Relations has neglected these links concentrating instead 
upon the activities of decision-makers. But even if the informal links 
are neglected, their effects cannot be ignored. The empirical evidence 
suggests that some processes in one social formation trigger similar 
processes in others: It points towards certain correlations, and ’ inte­
rdependence* was the term chosen to describe these correlations. 
However, without a clear understanding of the underlying links, it is 
impossible to explain the dynamics of these correlations, and the 
mechanism by which one * polity* affects the other cannot be isolated.
All in all, the attempt to superimpose a complexity upon Realism is
bound either to fall upon itself —  as many have ended back in the
30realist fold —  or it is incoherent. Pluralists are unable to account 
for what Realists have already achieved, but they are incapable of 
further developing the study of informal interactions in International 
Relations.^
**
In the last two or three decades interesting * structural* approaches to
32the study of international relationships were developed. Here the 
location of a country within the matrix of the world-economy takes 
precedence over the formal conduct of politics. Braudel, Frank and 
Wallerstein, to name the most prominent figures, succeeded in relating 
within a coherent conceptual framework what historians knew for a long 
time but were unable to articulate, namely, the relationship between
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geographical location, trade routes and social structure on the one 
hand and prosperity and poverty on the other. Consequently, the notions 
of a centre and periphery, and in particular of the intimate relations 
between them proved popular.
The great achievement of the structural approaches was to locate 
underlying, unsuspected, patterned relationships between social 
formations. More specifically, these writers re-activated the old link 
between politics and economy. In the words of Chase-Dunn "What many 
theorists understand to be simple resource flows between largely 
unconnected societies are considered by other theorists to be control 
structures which link superordinate to subordinate units in the same 
interactive system" (1980, pp. 132,3). The neo-classical concept of the 
division of labour, held Frank, when seen in  a w ider social context, may 
not be as favourable to full social and economic development as 
believed by liberal thinkers. For the division of labour spawns 
powerful groups whose interests lay with underdevelopment.
It is interesting to note that this contention of Dependency thinkers,
which, as recent research has demonstrated cannot be posed in such
simple terms, nevertheless is the direct opposite of the Realist
interpretation which locates international politics at the level of the
State. There is by now enough research which proves beyond a shade of
a doubt that there is no inherent connection between States, power and
economic development or underdevelopment. There is, however, definitely
a correlation between States’ policies —  internal and external —  and
34their ruling classes.
Nonetheless, if the issues are real, the representation from a
3 5
theoretical point of view is rather weak. In the liberal tradition,
international political economy quite simply supplements the formal
36realm of international politics. Same occurs in the Neo-marxist 
tradition, although in more elaborate guise. In the works of Frank 
(1967; 1978b) and Wallerstein (1974; 1980) the laws of capitalism and 
class struggle are simply transferred from the societal to the global 
level. This is particularly obvious in the work of Wallerstein who does 
not merely transfer the theory of class struggle to the centre-
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periphery complex, but adds to it the notion of the semi-periphery 
which is quite clearly analogous Komhauser ’ s (1967) middle strata els 
the 'shock absorbers' of the social system.
When the theory of societal development is transposed to the global 
level the result can be no other than the dissolution of society as a 
unit of analysis. The reason is that politics, economics and ideology, 
which are essentially theoretical concepts and make sense only in 
relation to each other, are now regrouped instead of the societal level 
at the global level. They loose therefore, their heuristic value on 
the societal level, and so society itself loses its theoretical sig­
nificance. We are again faced with the fundamental problem of defining 
the uniquely international. If Realism was able to do so, but at some 
cost, the structural approaches require an even heavier price, they 
discuss informal interactions but are unable to account for non- 
International Relations. This is perhaps the fundamental problem. The
result is that whatever was gained in structural analysis is immediate-
37ly lost in political analysis.
The dissolution of the state/society complex els a unit of analysis has
38in turn hindered Neo-Mar?cist in pursuing their ideas further. For 
while they were able to demonstrate the socio-political context of 
certain 'economics’ ideas, they were incapable of pursuing the matter 
to its logical conclusion, namely, linking it with the domestic 
political process. This statement needs to be qualified:
a. That initially the link was not made should not come els a total
surprise, for in the nineteenth sixties theories of the State were els
yet undeveloped and could not therefore be of much assistance. However,
with the publication of Nicos FoulantzELs' P olitica l Pow er an d  Social
Classes (1973 <1968>) this has changed. Poulnatzas' structuralist theory 
39of the State made ELn explicit connection between the level of the 
structures, i.e. the economic structure of societies and their class 
structure, and the political scene. It offered therefore a conceptual 
scheme which could be incorporated into dependency theory.^
b. In more recent times the French theorists of the school of regula-
41tion undertook to extend, develop and relate the structuralist messELge
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(heavily peppered with cybernetics) to dependency theory, they
43conceived the nation-state, therefore, as a self-regulating machine. 
The French school of regulation, however, is primarily concerned with 
the specific success of capitalism in various stages, and International 
Relations while acknowledged, are treated as an auxiliary device. The 
suggestion is that a ’successful' mode of regulation tend to be 
’exported’ all over the world.^
Moreover, dependency and imperialism by no means provide a complete
portrait of the structural relationships on a world-scale. The
international division of labour is a static concept, for it refers to
a state of affairs and not to the dynamic process that caused it. Left
alone, therefore, the notion lacks internal dynamism, and theories of
dependency remain sterile and static and are unable to account for any
fundamental changes in relations of dependency. The division of labour
is of course a corollary development to capitalist competition on a
world-scale. And so we need to incorporate the notion of competition in
45a structural scheme.
When all is said and done, the many issues remain half-baked. There are 
three related shortcomings to the Neo-Marxist literature:
i) They concentrate only of one type of structural relationships on 
a world scale,
ii) No comprehensive attempt to relate even these relationships to 
the theories of the State.
iii) Consequently, no articulation of their relationships with the 
global political structure.
It goes without saying that unless these issues are resolved there can 
be no comprehensive theory of International Relations.
**
An analysis of the three main schools of thought of International 
Relations, Realism, pluralism and neo-Marxism, reveals that they have 
mishandled the concept of the State. This does not constitute a proof 
that an incorrect theory of the State is the sole cause of their 
incommensurability, but it does point to a common denominator. Let us 
move to the essential problem, namely, the nature of international 
relationships.
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The relationships which were revealed in the examination of Barco’s 
remark are not restricted to cocaine dealers. In fact, a large majority 
of commercialy cultural or spiritual, hence political relationships on 
a world scale belong to this variety. It appears, indeed, that the 
large majority of international relationships are not conducted among 
clear-cut, coherent social units (or societies), nor do they take place 
simply within an empty shell of the world-economy, world-society, or 
whatever term is in fashion. They are conducted by and large —  and in 
due course we shall have to explain the expression ’by and large* —  in 
some * in-between* zone. Where societies are not truly discrete, within 
a divided and yet global context and by individuals, companies and 
groups profoundly influenced by their societies. Thus, at least on the 
level of appearance, it seems that on one dimension the world is truly 
divided among social entities and groupings, and this is significant 
and fundamental. On another the international setting behaves as one 
unit, there is a world-market, a certain world culture, etc. and then, 
there are many other types of unities, all superimposed upon each 
other.
But as I write these words one may already suspect that this superim­
position of so many dimensions and levels is more likely to be evidence 
of the difficulties encountered by an observer, than an intrinsic 
property of the phenomena. This somewhat disjointed representation is 
the effect of the tools of analysis we possess in order to explain and 
simplify what appears to be something and its opposite: closeness and 
separations which are not radical; an amorphism which is not complete. 
Nothing seems to be as clear-cut and easily adaptable to the division 
of labour among the branches of the social sciences. There is no 
simple, self-enclosed * society* amenable to sociological inquiries 
which relates to other societies through its governing institutions and 
therefore receptive to the eyes of International Relations* scholars. 
Nor does the partition into economics, politics and culture (or 
ideology), creates discrete systems that can be examined separately by 
economists, political scientists and anthropologists.
The problem, then, is to deal with the relativity of social phenomena. 
And we need to do so with minds which are habitually attracted to
26
simple, clear cut phenomena and things. Where even the grammatical 
structure of our language presents them, as Bohm demonstrated, as if 
"action arises in a separate entity, the subject, and that, in cases 
described by a transitive verb, this action crosses over the space 
between them to another separate entity, the object" (1980, p.29). 
Hence we tend to clear up the rough lines, to amend the ambiguity. We 
adopt the methods of abstraction, generalisation, simplification and 
dissection in order to construct them mentally into approximations of 
the amorphous configurations they possess in reality. Mathematically, 
we do not conceive of a circle as a ring, but as an infinite progres­
sion of angles. And this is a paradigm for all sciences.
Thus, the first issue that faces us here is how to study the Interna­
tional Relations of units which are discrete only to a degree. But this 
is only one facet of the problem. In actual fact, this clear-cut 
representation of the world typical to traditional International 
Relations boasts its own history and its own rationale. It essentially 
relates to what I call the ’nationalistic* perspective of the current
social sciences, The excessively partisan view which centres upon the
46unit, the nation-state. Nationalistic perspectives perceive interna­
tional relationships essentially as constra in ing1 the freedom of the 
national entity. And duly, the notion of constraint is woven through 
all major discussions in International Relations: Realism portrays the 
international system as a constraint upon individual government action; 
Interdependence theories represent it as a limited ability to decide; 
dependency and world-system as the external constraint upon develop­
ment. The international system is glanced through parochial eyes and 
consequently, it should not come as a total surprise that contributions
to the understanding of the dynamics of international relations are 
47limited.
The nationalistic perspective defines the ’problematic ’ of traditional 
International Relations. In traditional political analysis the concept 
of ’State’ is regarded as sufficient, if somewhat flawed and schematic, 
not because the effects of the external world are unknown or ignored, 
but because it was believed, if only implicitly, that the effects of 
the external world do not follow any universal pattern and therefore
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they are not open to generalisations. Thus political scientists 
believed that both domestic political processes and international 
politics may be thought of as ’ systems ’ hence allowing for theorisa­
tion. However, the links between than being so elusive, there can only 
be a study of both realms as if they were external to each other.
Thus from a nationalistic point of view, the terms of reference were 
defined as a search for generalisation within the bounds of society. 
And as the external world was conceived as constraint, the study of 
International Relations aimed to generalise the nature of this 
constraint. Consequently, the system of states or the world-economy are 
discussed as if they are external to the localised political system. In 
spatial terms this is evidently absurd. For the world economy as well 
as the territorial dimension of world politics comprise precisely the 
areas of the national territories which are left out of the discourse. 
One may argue, of course, that the whole is more than the sum of its 
parts, i.e. that the world-economy, or the system of states, are more 
than mere aggregates of national-economies and world-politics. I 
happily go along with such a view. However, one should not forget that 
the parts have to be seen in terms of this whole. This re la tio n  between  
the p a r ts  and whole in  In te rn a tio n a l Relations has rem ained, to a ll in te n t  
and p u rp o se , an unknown qua lity .
The relation of the parts to the whole cannot be discussed as long as 
we perceive a veritable partition between the two: it is impossible to 
overcome the 'nationalistic’ perspective without transcending the 
separation of politics which underpins the theories of International 
Relations as well as the majority of political science. In fact, the 
three issues, namely, the relativity of the units, the nationalistic 
perspective and the partition of politics support each other. The 
relativity of the units is not confronted as long as the separation of 
politics is taken for granted and as long as the nationalistic 
perspective prevails. In its turn the ’nationalistic' perspective is 
not challenged if the cohesiveness of the social unities and the 
splitting of politics is accepted. Whereas the separation of politics 
is sanctioned by the solidity of the social units and the prejudices of 
the nationalistic perspective.
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But, theoretically speaking, in this interdependence of issues the 
separation of politics holds the key. It may be taken as the cause, as 
well as holding the ultimate solution to these three problems. It is 
the cause because it led to separate development of the two disciplines 
of political science; it holds the key to the solution because it 
points, just as the analysis of the incommensurability of present 
theories of International Relations did, towards a blind spot in the 
theories of International Relations.
It is now possible to define the aims of this work more accurately: It 
aims to surmount this blind spot in modem theories of International 
Relations. In other words, it aims to create the conditions that will 
enable us to appreciate the dynamics of societal development within the 
global context and, conversely, to enable us to understand the dynamics 
of global development as the manifold accumulation of the dynamics of 
these individual societies. Or to put it in another way, it aims to 
create a bridge between localised theories of politics i.e. modem 
theories of the State, and globalised theories of politics, e.g., the 
study of International Relations.
**
A theoretical bridge between the theories of the State and the study of 
International Relations can succeed provided two conditions are 
fulfilled: First, the two fields of study, domestic and international 
politics, must share the same basic concepts of * State’, ’politics’, 
’power’, etc.. Second, the relations between the ’internal’ and the 
’external* should be open to generalisation. In fact if the second 
condition is not met there is no point in going to the trouble of 
examining the first. However, the order of exposition is not necessari­
ly the same as the order, of thought. Consequently, the dissertation 
will be divided roughly into two parts, the first discusses general 
questions pertaining to an attempt to create a bridge between the 
theories. The second elaborates a series of concrete suggestions that 
bring about such a link.
At this point we may summarize the main contentions of this work. There 
are basically three options for forging this link: either to commence
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on the basis of the theories of the State and propose a new framework
for International Relations. Conversely to modify the theories of the
48State on the basis of current International Relations theories. Or to
formulate a wholly new framework which does not rely on either of the 
49two. It is already clear from the preceding discussion that the 
preference here is for the first approach. The second is rejected 
because in my estimation political sociology is more advanced stage 
than International Relations. And the third because there is fax too 
much precious material in the two fields to be simply discarded. In 
any case the third approach is not truly feasible. We shall therefore 
present a framework for the study of international relationships as it 
appears from the perspective of modem theories of the State.
As noted above, a unified conceptual framework requires a certain 
homogeneity in its concepts. In contrast to the current situation, we 
need to arrive at a point where both Political Sociology and Interna­
tional Relations share in the same basic concepts. However, concepts 
are not mere representation on an abstract plane of the world as it is, 
concepts (in one of their complex functions) create in our mind the 
possibility of Seeing* things. Therefore, such a state of affair, can 
be achieved only through a radical change in our notion of what 
constitutes the bulk of international relationships, what the ’problem­
atics * of International Relations are, and indeed what International 
Relations are.^
But no less importantly, modem theories of the State emphasise the 
overall social structure as their starting point. By and large, they 
are, as Skocpol termed them Society oriented* (Skocpol, 1979). In 
spite of some serious controversies, politics is still regarded 
essentially as a practice with a particular function within the overall 
social structure. This * function*, or rather functions, is not 
intrinsic to the political system —  if anything it is the reverse, 
politics is defined in terms of its function in relation to economics, 
ideology and social organisation.^ Thus, modem theories of the State 
emphasise a relationship and not a state of affairs, they take the 
relationship between rulers and ruled as their starting point, and they 
lay strong emphasise upon the overall socio-economic conditions of a
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bounded entity.^
As a corollary to this, a * society-oriented * study of international 
relations must put the onus on what will be dubbed here ’informal 
interactions’ —  all those interactions between societies which do not 
work their way through the conscious application of policy by govern­
ments . Societies are not truly discrete entities. In the words of 
Lipietz, "there is no metaphysical distinction between internal and 
external conditions"(1987,p. 18). Hence, instead of the state/society 
and world-system units of analysis I propose to regard modem societies 
as essentially localised political processes —  nothing more, nothing 
less. These political processes are tied through the informal links by 
millions of fasteners.
My argument is that as long as the political process and informal 
interactions are discussed separately, the sphere of informal interac­
tions appears chaotic and disorderly. However, when they are seen in 
conjunction, in their interaction with the domestic political process 
the informal links form simple patterns. Once the p»tterns of interac­
tions of the political processes and the informal links are properly 
charted, there is no need to spjeak of a world-market, or civilisation 
in meta-physical terms. The vertical and horizontal patterns of 
informal interactions present us with the concrete and quantifiable 
manifestation of this ’globalisation’.
But here again the issue is complex, for a study that aims to create a 
bridge between the two sets of theories cannot replace one simplistic 
view of the world as divided among clearly sealed social entities, with 
another where ’px>litics’ and ’economics’ ’occur’ internationally. The 
very concepts politics, economics, and ideology are in themselves very 
much ’society-bound’ and lose some of their meanings when applied to a 
global context. Furthermore, such a global perspective contradicts the 
very starting point of the theories of the State; the localised, and 
regular conduct of interactions. Thus, the notion of causation and 
determination (of politics over economy, of the global over the 
national, etc.) must be set aside.
Nonetheless, it is impormissible to commence by attributing same a
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priori reasons for the state’s behaviour. On the contrary, if there are
indeed recurrent patterns in international politics, we need to a r r iv e
a t them on the basis o f  theories o f the S tate. Consequently, we cannot
accept that State or societies are naturally competitive, cooperative,
etc. Nor can we regard their posture as an attribute of sovereignty or 
53statehood, We shall assume,therefore, although we are unable to prove 
it at this point, and it will remain as an assumption throughout this 
work, that the concrete postures of States —  their competition, 
cooperation, interdependence, dependency, etc. are the global summation 
of the dynamic interrelation of the informal links, the domestic 
political process and formal politics.
The problem, however, is how to create such a framework. So far the 
tendency in social investigation was to discuss any one of the 
conceptual tools, political process, or one of the two types of 
informal links independently. Thus, for instance, in Dependency theory 
the various vertical ties, on their levels, the economic, political and 
ideological, are all conflated into one link which is named ’depende­
ncy*. Conversely, the relations of competition or interdependence, 
there is generally no attempt to articulate precisely which element or 
level in the social formation is actually in competition with which 
level in another. However, apart from a few theoretical works, there is 
an enormous number of political and social analyses —  too many to 
mention, which have already overcome this hurdle, but which unfor­
tunately have not enjoyed enough consideration in the theory of 
International Relations. This is the raw material of this work.
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NOTES
1. Time, September, 16, 1989.
2. Barco modified his argument. The fault lies, he argued latter,
not only with the producers, but also with transit and consumer 
states, they all need to agree on some unified preventive 
measures. He added in Le Monde "confortablement installes dans la 
tranquillity d’un salon sophistique de cet elegant quartier de 
New-York ... contributent a l’assassinat du peuple colombien”. Le 
Monde, 2 oct, 1989.
3. ’Transnationalism’ was coined by Raymond Aron in Peace and War 
(1966) and has enjoyed a growing popularity since. On Interdepen­
dence See Bock & Fuocillo, 1978; Keohane and Nye, 1972, 1978; 
Modelski, 1979; Scott, 1982; Tavitian, 1986. For criticism see, 
Calleo and Rowland, 1973.
4. Prof. Ernest Haas in personal communication.
5. Interdependence paved the way to what 1ms become to be known els
regime analysis, a framework which aims to deal with the 
complexity of International Relations by arguing that issues, or 
areas of activities, create international regimes. International 
relations is the sum total of these regimes at any particular 
moment. See Ashely, 1986; Keohane, 1984; Kransner, 1983; Jackson, 
1987. The heuristic value of regime analysis cannot, however, 
extend beyond the boundaries of the regime. The world is seen as 
an amalgamation of regimes, but because this theory is not 
connected to the theories of the State, it is impossible to 
develop a coherent and concise framework of political analysis on 
their basis. For criticism of the concept see: Strange, 1983.
6. The expression 'traditional International Relations’ will refer 
henceforth to all those approaches which define their subject- 
matter the study of the relations between States. The reasons for 
this definition will become progressively clear as the work 
unfolds.
7. On dependency and imperialism see: Amin, 1974, 1976, 1977;
Arghiri, 1972; Berberoglu, 1984; Bukharin, 1972; CEDETIM, 1978; 
Fann & Hodges, 1981; Frank, 1967, 1978b; Frobel, Heinrichs, 
Kreye, 1980; Lenin, 1977; Patanaik, 1986; Petras, 1978; Pieterse, 
1989; Rhodes, 1976; Warren, 1980.
8. On the Weberian sociology see: Bendix, 1960; Freund, 1968; 
Giddens, 1972; Mommsen, 1987; Weber, 1978, and chapter 5.
9. Burdeau in fact defines the domain of politics as the area of 
insoluble problems: "La specificity du politique ne ressort pas 
seulment de sa finality; elle se ryvfele aussi a travers la nature 
des probiymes qu’il est appeiy a aborder... .si le groupe de peut 
pas, par le jeu de ses mycanismes spontanys, applanir les 
difficultys qu'il rencontre, c’est parce qu’elles ne comportent 
pas de solutions. Par consequent, ce qu’il transfere au politi­
que, ce sont des probieemes insolubles" (1980, vol.I, p.144).
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10. The subject will be discussed below.
11. Those claiming to extend and elaborate the current perspectives 
(Interdependence, transnationalism, and regime analysis), have in 
fact undermined what they have sought to extend. That is why 
Gourevitch, 1978 and Waltz, 1979 are so insistent that Inter­
dependence adds nothing to the discipline of International 
Relations.
12. On theory see and intellectual horizons see: Feyerabend, 1987; 
Foucault, 1966; Poulantzas, 1973.
13. On tacit theories see: Mumford, 1964; Polanyi, 1958; 1959.
14. See Calleo & Rowland, 1973 and Strange, 1983. On Dependency see 
Warren, 1980.
15. Paul Feyerabend* s F arew ell to Reason (1987) is interesting in this 
respect precisely because Feyerabend is very suspicious of this 
'new* method. The ’rise* of rationalism in ancient Greece he 
explains "is fascinating example of this attempt to transcend, 
devalue, and push aside complex forms of thought and experience" 
However, he admits "<f>urther help came form the discovery (which 
seems to have occurred seme time between Xenophanes and Par­
menides) that statements composed of concepts lacking in details 
could be used to build new kinds of stories" (p.66-7)
16. I will remain on the whole at a general theoretical level, only 
occasionally discussing the concrete implication of the suggested 
framework. This is not because there are no concrete implica­
tions, on the contrary, there are. However, it will be wise to 
devote a whole work just for the theoretical implications of such 
a framework.
17. On neo-Realism see the collection in Keohane (1986). As I believe 
that a true understanding of the Realist tenets can be found only 
in a detailed examination of its historical evolution, neo­
realism only confuse the issue by adding another layer which then 
needs to be pealed off. Elaboration in chapter one.
18. The linkage between virtue and power goes back to Renaissance 
thinkers (Skinner, 1978). On Hegel see Charles Taylor (1979).
19. The subject will be discussed in greater detail in chapter one.
20. See among others, Hegel 1952, 1975; Meinecke, 1962; Treitschke, 
1916.
21. In the words of Strange and Tooze: "It is generally accepted that 
the original justification for international relations as a 
separate discipline - if there was one at all- rested on the 
presimption of the separability of domestic politics and foreign 
politics" (1981, p.4).
22. Typical in this respect is Raymond Aron: "International Relations 
is the science of peace and war and should be the basis for
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diplomacy and strategy... states are the focus because they 
monopolise the means of violence'1 (1966, p.6).
According to Holsti, "nation-states are the essential 
actors not only because they share legal attribute of sovereignty 
and because many norms and practices are designed to protect 
their independence, but because they are the actors that engage 
in war and are essential in organising the norms and institutions 
which provide more or less stability, security, order, and peace 
for the system."( K.J. Holsti,1981, p.9).
For Bull, "the starting point of international relations is 
the existence of states, or independent political communities, 
each of which possesses a government and asserts sovereignty in 
relation to a particular portion of the earth’s surface and a 
particular segment of the human population." (1977, p. 16).
Northedge reiterates the same point: "Our focus will lie 
upon the state and its official controlling authorities... .Gover­
nments representing sovereign states, however, dead with one 
another at many levels: the political, economic, commercial, 
financial, cultural and so on. We are proposing in this book to 
abstract their mutual dealings at one level only, the political" 
(Northedge, 1976, p. 15).
Hie subject will be discussed further in chapter three.
23. "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way 
through the landscape of international politics is the concept of 
interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the 
link between reason trying to understand international politics 
and the facts to be understood. It sets politics as an autonomous 
sphere of action and understanding apart form other spheres." 
(Morgenthau, 1967, p. 5). Michael Mann concurs "<m>odem 
(Western) state is not single but dual. Its domestic life 
separable from its geo-political" (1987, p.59).
24. "II faut entendre par la qu'il n’y a pas de fait politique qui ne 
soit, en mane temps, un fait social et qu’il n’y a pas davantage 
de ph6nom6ne social qui ne soit suceptible de revetir un 
caractere politique. Par consequent, aucun crit&re object if ne 
permet de distinguer les faits politiques de ceux qui ne le sont 
pas"(Burdeau, 1980, vol.I, p.136). See also Easton, 1953.
25. Martin Wight is typical, he picks up from history three ’ideal 
type’ examples of 'systems of States’ and goes on and elaborate 
a whole theory of International Relations based on this ideal 
type representation, see Wight, 1977.
26. Of the ten most popular works mentioned in Vasquez ’ (1983) 
survey, some do not even have entries on the state in their 
index, and none discusses it in any length.
27. "Hegel went further in asserting the real, organic, independent 
personality of the State. Not only was the State not a contrac­
tual relationship between a number of individuals, but it was 
itself an individuality, independent and superior to all other 
individuals (p. 11) .... Rarely in post-reformation Germany are 
writers to be found denying the formal validity of this concep­
tion of the State as a sovereign person" (p.32) (Emerson, 1928).
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28. I cannot but concur with Bienkowski's judgement "Weber’s work 
undoubtedly broadened our knowledge of social development and 
contributed to the systematization of several problems. It should 
be noted, however, that Weber’s fundamental work, W irtschaft und  
Gesellschaft, did not play the role in the development of the 
social sciences which he hoped it would. Although there are 
frequent references to Weber’s definitions, he did not create 
the basis for a continuation of his approach .... One reasons for 
this is undoubtedly his failure to perceive the motive forces of 
social development, which is revealed clearly in his treatment of 
institutional forms, in the fact that he could see neither the 
essence of the dynamic forces not the internal contradictions of 
capitalism which he considered the fined, rational stage of 
socied development" (1981; p.83).
29. Discussion of the interrelation between informal and formal 
interactions will be delayed to chapter ten.
30. The evolution of Robert Keohane from Interdependence to Realism 
is quite interesting in this respect. See Keohane and Nye, 1972, 
1977 and Keohane, 1984,1986.
31. More detailed examination of these contention is found in chapter 
five.
32. It is important not to confuse the structuralism of dependency 
and world-system approaches with Waltz’s branch of structuralism. 
The structuralism in International Relations generally denotes 
the first group whereas members of the second are named neo­
realists.
33. Interesting works on the subject were done in particular Canada, 
an advanced country part of the group of Seven (G-7) which 
nevertheless exhibits many of the attributes of dependency. For 
a useful summary see Brym, 1989.
34. As difficult as it may to articulate the concept of ruling class 
and define it in concrete situations. For a recent thorough 
discussions see: Bottomore and Brym, 1989; Wright, 1985.
35. Braudel’s suggestion do not fall into this trap, his work will be 
discussed in chapter two.
36. Hie modem theories of International Political Economy tend to 
superimpose a more complex world upon the simplistic picture 
presented by Realism. Keohane and Nye (1977) say as much, Gilpin 
(1981) views the issue as if we possessed already a satisfactory 
’static’ theory of International Relations and we need now simply 
to add to it the dimension of change, Strange (1988) presents the 
problem as if ’politics’ needs to be peppered into the study of 
economics. They all accept therefore the Realist portrayal 
International Relations.
37. At the same time it is quite clear in the case of both Frank and 
Wallerstein that centre and periphery are references to social 
formations. In other words, they dissolve society and yet use it
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as a basic notion, ending up with a basic contradiction. I am 
indebted to Prof. Mann for pointing out this contradiction to me.
38. "imperialism is not a notion that can form the object of any 
explicit definition that originates from economic concepts. 
Imperialism can only be grasped on the basis of a fully developed 
theory of a state, capable of studying the significance of 
intr-state relations in all these mediation and showing that 
these express the most complex form of capitalist socialization. 
Marx interpretation of the wage relation predicted a frontal 
struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat that would spill 
over national frontiers and break up state institutions. The 
study of imperialism must involve analysis of the networks of 
asymmetrical political influences between states, the conditions 
of their reproduction or disappearance, and their roots in the 
most general determinants of the wage relation" (Aglietta, 1979, 
p.30).
39. The term structuralism or structure greatly varies in use. I will 
employ the traditional connotations as it developed in linguis­
tics. Structuralism stems from the famous distinction of De- 
Saussure (1959) between diachrony and synchrony. De Saussure 
argued that language is a living system and should be inves­
tigated as a structure separately from its evolution. Struc­
turalism then aims to discover the necessary relations between 
components that make a system into a system (whether language, 
literary text, religion or society).
Structuralism is at an epistemological impasse: If one
concentrates on the relations between components (say of a social 
system) than i. who or what assures that these relations remain 
constant ? where, in other words, are the genes or the codes of 
the social system? b. Even more difficult, who is to assure, in 
an a priori fashion that the change of components will follow a 
prescribed route so that the relations between them remain 
constant? Conversely, by banishing the subject and discussing 
’relations’ structuralism excluded, from the outset the agent of 
change. In other words, without ’telos’ of some sorts, the system 
is total abstraction.
The problem however is compounded because at present only 
structuralism is capable of dealing with the basic, and generally 
accepted as valid, principles of the synchronic unity of 
components in a system. The only viable and effective solution 
which currently holds is to accept the abstraction of the 
structuralist enterprise and supplement it with notions such as 
’conjuncture’ or ’analysis’. Structuralism then is basically a 
framework of discussion, it discusses processes and not a state 
of affair. Poulantzas theory of the State (1973; 1979) is
essentially a structuralist enterprise in the sense that it 
elaborate a scheme for the study of the political process. This 
theory underpins the effort in this work.
On structuralism see Albirtton, 1986; Althusser, 1969, 
1970a; Davis, 1959; Gellner, 1987; Hillier & Hanson, 1984; 
Kurzweil, 1980; Lefebre, 1971; Levi-Strauss; 1973).
40. See John Taylor (1979) for an attempt to make this connection 
explicit. Much is made of the inconsistencies and circularity of
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Poulantzas' structuralism (See Brym, 1989, for a sunmary). 
However, the important elements of Poulnatzas' for this work are 
his overall scheme for the study of the political process and not 
any one of his admittedly more problematic contentions. The issue 
will be discussed in chapter seven.
41. "The term mode of regulation refers to the ensemble of institu­
tional forms, networks and explicit or implicit norms which 
assure compatibility of market behaviour within a regime of 
accumulation, in keeping with the actual pattern of social 
relations, and beyond (or even through) the contradictory, 
conflictual nature of relations among economic agents and social 
groups." On the French school of regulation. Aglietta, op. cit. 
Boyer, 1986, Lipietz, op. cit.
42. "There are fundamental reasons for thinking that the cohesion of 
social relations under the rule of wage relations necessarily 
involves the framework of the nation, contrary to the illusions 
of general theorist the equilibrium cannot be without the rule of 
law, it is not by the economic itself the organization of the 
capitalist class within the bourgeoisie state, and the develop­
ment of the structural forms in which it is expressed are 
indispensable for the expanded reproduction of capital across 
society as a whole. It remains no less true that the internation­
al expansion of capital forms part of this expanded reproduction, 
and that a gap is left if this is not studies in detail. Such a 
study demands knowledge of the general tendencies of capitalist 
development within the different nations, and careful attention 
to the relations between states" (Aglietta, op. cit.p.22)
43. "The state is in fact the archetypal form of all regulation. It 
is at the level of the State that the class struggle is resolved; 
the State is the institutional form which condenses the com­
promises which prevent the different groups making up the 
national (or at least territorial) community from destroying one 
another in an endless struggle (the point is not that struggles 
come to an end, but that they rarely destroy classes). (Lipietz, 
op. cit. p.19).
44. "Regimes of accumulation and modes of regulation are chance
discoveries made in the course of human struggles ... So the 
history of capitalism is full of experiments which led nowhere: 
aborted revolutions, abandoned prototypes and all sorts of 
monstrosities." (Lipietz, op. cit, p. 15). On regulation and 
International Relations see Jessop, 1987.
45. "The central issue of the Marxist conception of the capitalist 
system is the articulation of the laws of capitalist accumulation 
and the laws of competition" (Aglietta, 1979,p. 17).
46. For the historical roots of this view see Kreiger (1977)
discussion of Ranke. See the survey of Strasser and Randall, 1981 
and Black, 1987.
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47. Historically, transnationalism and the fragmentation of Europe 
into localised political structures went hand in hand. In other 
words, the dissolution of a universal legitimate powers such as 
the church and the Holy Roman Empires and the emergence of 
unities with the ultimate ability to rule and decide their fate 
occurred at roughly the same period. And it corresponded to a 
leap in international trade. That does not constitute a proof 
that European States can be understood only in a transnational 
context. However, it appears that arguments about the recent 
'erosion of sovereignty' are simplistic.
48. This has been the aim of a new sociological school of thought 
which include Skocpol (1979), Mann (1986) and Hall and Ikenberry 
(1989) among others. For a sophisticated and intriguing statement 
see Michael Mann's chapter three in the second volume two of the 
Sources o f  Social Power (to be published). This school of thought 
will be discussed in chapter one.
49. Wallerstein, (1974; 1980) and Burton (1965) are cases in point. 
Wallerstein will be discussed in chapter two.
50. I have discussed the subject more fully in Palan, 1988.
51. The issue will be discussed in chapter three.
52. See: Apter, 1973, Dunleavy and O'Leary, 1986, Lipset, 1959, 
Poulantzas, 1979.
53. There is a myth fuelled by Kenneth Waltz (1954) that in Interna­
tional Relations we may chose among three levels of analysis, 
individual, state and system of states. Here, In this context 
Hegel’s intuition holds firm. The 'individual* as a unit defines 
the State (or the nation) as a complementary unit. And these two 
define the totality or the system of State. In other words, 
individual/state/system of states are of the same matrix: the 
State defines, or points towards some smaller frameworks of 
analysis, call them individuals, and larger units of analysis.
Now, if we would like to ask questions such as why there is 
war, peace, diplomatic activity, etc, instead of asking why there 
is violence or harmony. In other words, if we ask questions about 
decisions of statesmen and not about social activity in general 
and we would like to answer them in  genered why should decision­
makers decide on going to war, the answer will probably be 
located at the level of the system of states. It is not a truism, 
but it is almost predicated given the nature of the question.
CHAPTER ONE —  STATE-CENTRED SCHEMES: REALISM1
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There are basically two methods of research in International Relations: 
the majority of International Relations scholars adopt state-centred 
schemes, others prefer economic groupings, or social classes, as their 
units of analysis. It will be argued in the two opening chapters that 
whereas both approaches offer important insights, their choice of units 
of analysis results in an analytic cul-de-sac. In chapter three I shall 
present an alternative definition of the unities in International 
Relations which enable us to conceive of States and classes con­
comitantly.
In traditional International Relations, international relationships are 
interpreted on the basis of State’s needs and will. As States are 
essentially abstractions, the real subjects of State-centred schemes 
are decision-makers or statesmen. And indeed, it is not difficult to 
see that State-centred schemes draw on the work of Nicolo Machiavelli 
and more generally on the tradition of the ’mirror-for-princes* 
(Skinner, 1978) writers, who were pre-occupied by questions such as how 
should a prince maintain his state and achieve honour, glory and fame 
(Skinner, 1978, chpt.5). Realism presents the logical outcome of a 
system of States based on such premises. Hence, in the final analysis 
the Realist interpretation of events is only as good as its premises.
In International Relations the tendency has been to regard the concrete 
activities of statesmen as evidence of the goals of ’States’. Conse­
quently, the aim of honour and glory, typical to medieval and post- 
medieval aristocracy, assume ontological attributes when they are 
transferred from flesh and blood princes to abstract State. That States 
(by that we may provisionally understand modem socio-political units) 
are fundamental to any discussion of social life is not denied, Nor do 
I wish to deny the existence of power politics —  quite the contrary. 
But I question whether interpretation of international relationships on 
the basis of the intrinsic properties of the State is admissible.
The contention of this chapter is that the concept of State (and 
consequently the definition of the discipline as 'the study of the
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relations between States *) is in  p rin c ip le not a very good starting point 
for the study of international relationships because States are not 
discrete entities and therefore however one wishes to define them they 
do not exhaust all conceivable forms of international relationships. 
Thus, a theory of the 'relations between States' of necessity oscil­
lates between one illegitimate position whereby State are effectively 
equated with their societies, and another illegitimate position whereby 
States are equated with governments. The result in both cases is the 
denial of the domestic political process.
There are two versions of Realism which may differ in their premises, 
but are identical in their conclusions. According to classical Realism 
States' activities on the international scene spring directly from the 
very essence of the political community. The State is thought of as an 
organic entity, a person, and International Relations is understood by 
analogy as a 'society' of these person-States. Modem realism or Neo- 
Realism, on the other hand, conceives of the State in Weberian action- 
based categories as an autonomous social actor. Both traditions arrive 
at similar conclusions in respect to their interpretation of interna­
tional politics because they agree on the fundamental point that States 
tend to behave uniformly and a in predictable manner on the interna­
tional front. In the Waltz' words: "The differences (among states) are 
of capability, not of function. States perform or try to perform tasks, 
most of which are common to all of them" (Waltz, 1979,p.96).
1.1. The Realist Theory of the State
The Realist interpretation of world politics makes sense provided we 
accept certain notions concerning the relations between rulers and 
ruled, politics and economics, etc. In other words, it is implicit a 
theory of the State boasting four distinct traits:
i) The State and its population share in the same aspirations, 
therefore;
ii) the State/society complex may be thought of as a unitary being;
iii) The unitary character of the State/society is invested in the
official arm of the State. Consequently the 'State’ in Interna­
tional Relations is in fact its decision makers;
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iv) The State is a teleological device ’ progranmed’ to realize the 
'common good* or the 'national interest'. International politics 
is the realm of interactions of self-propelled entities.
How Realists arrive at such an unconventional theory of the State? 
Unfortunately, there has never been a truly penetrating inquiry into 
the intellectual origins of the discipline of International Relations/ 
The convention 1ms it as a uniform intellectual tradition spanning from 
the work of Thucydides to the present era (Carr, 1946; J.M.Smith, 1986) 
without any attempt to situate Realist thought in dialectical relation­
ship to contemporary events. Thus, the Greek response to the Persian 
menace, the failure of the Italian city-state system to repel the 
French and Spanish armies, the English 'Glorious Revolution’, the 
ancien regime's dynastic rivalries and modem nuclear age politics, are 
all encompassed under one homogeneous and universal experience. 
Naturally, the notion of thought developing according to its own rhythm 
and yet reflecting historical circumstance is absent.
In contrast, I will presently argue that the realist theory of 
International Relations was the natural continuation of the Idealistic 
and Romantic traditions prevailing in nineteenth century Germany. And 
it makes perfect sense only as long as the assumption of the organic 
materiality of the State, linked as it were through the concept of 
individual freedom to its population is accepted/
The modem Realist theory assembles under one roof various traditions 
of theories of the State: to schematise somewhat, we may say that the 
first attribute originates in the 'organic' tradition stretching from 
Aristotle through the medieval ages (Gierke, 1900, chpt.4) to the late 
nineteenth century (Treitscke, 1916; Meinecke, 1962; Spencer, 1971); 
the second and third are derived from legal theories and the Romantic 
tradition; and the fourth is obtained from a rather convoluted 
interpretation of the 'social contract'. The following discussion is 
not meant as a detailed account of the historical origins of Realist 
thought. Many prominent figures such as Spinoza and Kant will be 
absent, while others will be mentioned only in passing. The point is 
to demonstrate some unsuspected connections between the Realist theory
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and other philosophical traditions.
1.1.2. The French Liberal Tradition and Dynastic Politics
The French revolution exerted a tremendous impact all over Europe, it 
forced political philosophers to reconsider their positions, and in 
this turmoil the roots of modem Realism were laid. There were two 
diametrically opposed reactions to the revolution: the French liberals 
who were in favour of it and the German Idealist and Romantic thinkers 
(very much influence by Burke) who, if admired Napoleon, were generally 
against the ’rule of the multitude’ which in their view it generated 
(Aris, 1965).
Liberals were well aware of the practice of power politics and felt an 
aversion towards it. Carlyle judgement is typical:
"Wars” he says "are not memorable, however big they may have 
been, whatever rages and miseries they may have occasioned, or 
however many hundreds of thousands they have been the death 
of, ... If they are found to have been the travail-throes of 
great or considerable changes, which continue permanent in the 
world, men of some curiosity cannot but enquire into them, 
keep memory of them. But if they were travail-throes that had 
no birth, who of mortals would remember them? Unless, perhaps, 
they feats of prowess, virtue, valour and endurance they might 
accidentally give rise to, were very great indeed ... Wars, 
otherwise, are mere futile transitory dust-whirlwinds stilled 
in blood; extensive fits of human insanity, such as we know we 
are too apt to break out" (Carlyle, F re d e ric k  the G reat, Bk. 
XII. c. xi, as quoted in Davis, 1914, p.148).
I have already mentioned Burkhardt similar contentions (Introduction, 
p. 14). But it was left to the French liberals to establish with 
remarkable clarity the international component of Realist thought (in 
contrast to Hobbes and Machiavelli who uttered only scattered remarks 
on the subject). Indeed, Albert Sorel’s chapter ’The way of Politics* 
in his Europe and  the F rench  Revolution (1969, first published in 
1885), is still one of the finest expositions of the tenets of Realism. 
Sorel anticipated the current theory with one vital difference, he 
understands power politics to be a fair description of the internation­
al ]?olitics of the aneien regime, b u t o f  the ancien regim e o n ly. Thus
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in contrast to modem Realism he locates the practice of power politics 
in specific historical context. What was it? To Sorel the answer seemed 
obvious. Contrary to the mambo-jumbo dispensed so eagerly by the social 
contract theoreticians, States of the ancien regime were undemocratic 
and, as a result, totally irresponsible both in their internal affairs 
as well as in their external policies. This accounts for the chaotic 
nature of international politics:
M<i>n the public law of the ancient regime there was one 
fundamental conception, that of the State; it dominated and 
governed politics (p.37) .... The State is an end in itself.
It is sovereign; it recognises no authority beyond its own 
(p.42) .... If raison d’6tat was the rule of policy aggran­
dizement was its object .... <Thus> the idea of the greatness 
of the State was closely linked with that of its extent ....
The principle and the object of politics thus posited, rules 
of conduct can be deduced from them. The chief is that one 
must always be fit and prepared for action and ready to seize 
any opportunity" (p. 45).
The originality of Sorel lies in outlining the relation between the 
nature of the State of the ancien regime and the type of international 
relationships which it generates. For him power politics is a disease 
afflicting irresponsible regimes. Modem Realism ’transcended* Sorel*s 
suggestions in three respects. First, the character of the system of 
states is now thought to determine the nature of the States (Waltz, 
1979). Second, power struggles which to Sorel were typical of the 
ancien regime, are regarded now as an imminent quality of a n y system 
of states. In other words, it is no more associated with the non- 
democratic nature of the state. Thirdly, the humanist notion of 
’virtue’ is played down nowadays and is replaced instead by a much 
narrower evaluation of the nature of power.
Liberalism represented one possible avenue of development of the theory 
of International Relations. It is quite conceivable that were this 
avenue to develop, modem theories of International Relations have paid 
greater attention to the relationships between domestic and interna­
tional politics, and not insist on their separation. In contrast, the 
modem theories have chosen to draw largely from the nineteenth century 
reactionaries who have neglected the study of domestic politics.
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1.1.3. The Social Contract
It should be recognized at the outset that the domestic political 
process is not simply a neglected area of International Relations, it 
is rather a suppressed area. The theoretical ploy which sanctions this 
manoeuvre can be pinpointed with some accuracy. It has to do with the 
assumption, or better, presumption, that States participate in 
international politics for specific purposes. The implications are that 
international politics are external to the domestic political process, 
and that States possess some quasi-ontological needs and wants which 
compel them to participate in an exoteric domain. Because of the 
combination of the two, it appears as if the study of domestic politics 
is irrelevant for the discipline of International Relations.
The idea of an intrinsic ’will* of the State coincided with a major 
shift in attitude towards it. (Machiavelli’s notion of reason of State 
developed slowly towards their contemporary meaning (Meinecke, 1962)). 
Whereas classic liberals such as Sorel distrusted the State, modem 
Realism descends from a tradition which elevates the State and regards 
it as a positive social force. Thus, Northedge, for instance, defines 
international politics as follows:
"We define international politics as those mutual dealings of 
governments representing sovereign States which involve 
considerations of status, standing, power and prestige of the 
States vis-a-vis each other and which concern the general 
welfare of peoples as an object of governmental action" 
(Northedge, 1976, p. 19).
Gilpin argues that:
"the primary external function of the State is to protect the 
property rights and personal security of its members vis-a-vis 
the citizens and actions of other states" (Gilpin, 1981,
p.16).
And Krasner if more restrained, agrees nevertheless with the fundamen­
tals:
"the national interest is defined inductively as the preferen­
ces of American central decision-makers. Such a set of
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objectives must be related to general societal goals, persist­
ing over time, and have a consistent ranking of importance in 
order to justify using the term ’ national interest’" (p. 13).
A careful examination of Realism reveals more intricate and unsuspected 
lines of connections: The playing down of the connection between the 
domestic structure and international politics coincides with a 
teleological conception of the State. In turn, the teleological 
conception of the State is associated with the rise of a positive image 
of the State. Conversely we may trace this development in the opposite 
direction: it may not come as a total surprise to discover that the 
positive image of the State corresponds to the suppression of politics. 
(A theoretical manoeuvre which incidentally possesses its own unique 
and interesting history: it used to be thought that small states are 
less quarrelsome than big ones because they consist of fewer factipns 
and groups. Nowadays it is almost the opposite, and indeed the 
acceptance of pluralism within clearly defined ’rules of the game* is 
thought to be the best guarantee for long-term success). The suppres­
sion of politics is preparatory to the teleological conception.
It is important to realize that the ideas of the quasi-ontological 
properties of the State do not rise from a realistic observation of day 
to day politics, but originate in the rich literature of the social 
contract, to which, indeed, it bears an uncanny resemblance.
According to Otto Gierke the earliest mention of the social contract 
was at the Council of Paris and Worms at Paris 829 A.D. (Ullmann (1975) 
and Nisbeth (1974) date it much earlier), where it was stated that the 
ruler’s mandate was "to rule the Folk with rightouseness and equity, to 
preserve peace and unity" (1900, p.142 n,125). Similarly, Guilelmus 
Occam contends "a plenitudo potestatis incompatible with the best Form 
of Government, which should promote the liberty and exclude the 
slavery of the subjects" (cited in Gierke, p. 142, op. cit.). And in the 
same fashion, Jean Bodin, who is credited as the father of the modem 
doctrine of sovereignty, makes a clear distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate rulers:
"When Samuel told the Hebrews in his speeches: do you want to
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know what the customs of tyrants are? It is to take your goods 
for their own pleasure, and take your women and children, 
abuse and enslave them" (Bodin, 1986, p.195,). A good prince, 
however, ’’takes account of the wishes of the people in the 
task that God entrusted to him” (Ibid. p,196, my transla­
tion) .
Sarpi concludes in words echoed four hundred years later by Hedley 
Bull: The duties of the ruler consist of ’’vigorous defense of ’the 
life, honour, and property’ of his subjects” (Quoted in Bouwsma, 1968, 
p.437).
The Realist theory of the State undoubtedly draws on the ideas of the 
social contract philosophers. Nonetheless, it is highly significant 
that only specific elements from the social contract tradition are 
discussed. In contrast to early Renaissance Humanists such as Marsiglio 
and Bartolous who in the context of the republican city-states 
developed a rudimentary theory of popular sovereignty (Skinner, 1978, 
p.65), International Relations scholar prefer the later ’mirror-for- 
princes * thinkers who have changed the priorities and ’’contended that 
the essential business of government consists of maintaining the people 
not so much in a state of liberty as in security and peace." (Ibid. 
p. 123). At the same time the later thinkers peddled around the 
dangerous notion that "the qualities which deserve admiration in a 
prince may be different from those which deserve admiration in a 
private citizen” (Ibid. p.125).
But above all, it is significant that whereas the social contract 
theories presented an earlier catalogue of the attributes of the State 
which we find in modem Realism, generally speaking, these theories 
were not meant as information about the nature of the State, rather, 
they were prescriptive propositions concerning the responsibilities of 
rulers and ruled. They may be the ideological cloaks in a long and 
protracted struggle over the definition of the modem political 
formation, a struggle that can certainly be dated back to Renaissance 
humanism.^ But no one was foolish enough to believe that their
19
societies were actually a social contract. Consequently, to present 
the social contract as a fair description of politics perverts the very 
essence of these theories —  which take for granted the division
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between rulers and ruled. It was this component of the social contract 
which had to be brushed aside in order to fit into Realist schema.
1.1.4. The State as an organism
Hie second source of Realist thought, now emptied of the radical 
components of the social contract,, consisted in the consolidation of 
the State into a monolithic whole and in investing its unity with its 
formal apparatus. This could be achieved only when the dichotomy 
between rulers and ruled as well as between individuals and their 
societies was scaled down. Hie first prerequisite was accomplished when 
the State was imbued with teleological properties. The second underwent 
a more tortuous journey. The principle by which the suppression of the 
cleavage between individuals and their societies could be postulated 
had been demonstrated already by Plato and Aristotle. The new version 
recalled their ideas. But it was left to the German conservatives, 
beginning with Kant, to forge an alternative interpretation of the role 
of the State which at once posed it in a positive light and at the same 
time attributed to it the quasi-ontological properties mentioned 
above.^
Hie German political philosophers, and particularly the nineteenth 
century Prussian thinkers, were faced with two related items. First, 
in contrast to the English and French who were already well on their 
way in confronting the theoretical problems posed by Bodin’s doctrine 
of sovereignty, the German thinkers were still thinking of sovereignty 
in terms of the divine right of kings (Sabine & Shephard, 1928, 
p.xxiv). In the aftermath of the French Revolution they had to confront 
the emerging R echtsstaat where anyone, including the king, was governed 
at least in theory by the law.
Second, before the revolution the conventional wisdom, not least 
nourished by the achievements of Prussia-Brandenburg, was that power 
derived of the ability to gather indifferent peasants, preferably from 
distant lands, detach then from civil life, train and drill and inarch 
them on to the battlefield (M.S. Anderson, 1988). Thus an authoritarian 
State seemed to be the best political arrangement. The French revolu­
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tion, and in particular the astonishing success of the Napoleonic 
armies, changed all this because proved the depth of national feeling 
and exposed an unsuspected source of social power 'bottled* somehow in 
the 'spirit* of the people. The question was how to uncork it. Hegel 
provided the most coherent and comprehensive solution, although he was 
only following the precepts of the Romantic thinkers before him.
Hegel argued that there were points in history when States and
societies coalesced and became similar to organic unities. In these
unusual events individuals gain the utmost freedom and States achieve
greatness.^ Hegel was particularly interested in these unique events
and aimed to derive his whole philosophy of history on their basis. But
this is beyond our interest here. The significant point is that for
15Hegel States and societies were p o te n tia lly united as one. It is 
important to understand this idea. It is usually thought that Hegel 
conceived of the State as an organic unity, and there are countless 
citations to corroborate this view. However, as he himself points out 
in a revealing statement:
"If we stop for a moment to consider the political implica­
tions —  that a state will be well constituted and internally 
powerful if the private interest of its citizens coincides 
with the general end of the state, so that the one can be 
satisfied and realised through the other .... But for the 
state to achieve this unity, numerous institutions must be set 
up and appropriate mechanisms invented, and the understanding 
must go though prolonged struggles before it discovers what is 
in fact appropriate .... the moment a t  which the  sta te  a tta in s  
th is  u n ity  m arks the most flo u ris h in g  p erio d  in  its  h is to ry , when 
its virtue, strength, and prosperity are at their height’1 
(1975, p.73, my emphasis).
Hegel not only elaborated a theory of the State, he also defined the 
'problematic' of International Relations for nineteenth century 
Prussian thinkers. Rivalries, wars and competition among states were, 
according to him, one of the instruments by which States achieved their 
coveted unity. It was also one of the ways by which Reason asserted 
itself in historical conditions. Consequently, they were potentially 
positive events in world history.
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Hegel himself, as already mentioned, was deeply influenced by the 
Romantic tradition. According to Aris,
"<t>he true propagator of the idea of the State as an organism 
was ... Friedrich Schleiennacher, whose thought expressed the 
fundamental change in the general attitude towards the State 
as well (p.291).... Schleiennacher, like all the Romantics, 
strongly denounced those thinkers who conceived of the State 
as an artifice or a makeshift to secure the greatest measure 
of happiness. In a typically Romantic way he viewed the State 
under the metaphor of a work of art. This led him to the 
conviction that individual and community are dependent on and 
mutually determined by one another. To give oneself to the 
community becomes the ethical duty and the individual feels 
that life in the community enhances his own strength. The 
State is not a creation of men, it is an organic part of the 
process of culture and presupposes a strong desire for unity 
among its members "(Aris, 1965, p.300).
Here, the connection between teleology and the will of the State 
becomes evident.
1.1.5. The State as a legal person
The Romantics, however, were isolated in the Prussian intellectual
17scene. They are important in as much as they constitute a vital link 
between the old social contract theories and the more influential 
Idealist and, in particular, the historical juridical schools which
were closer to the conception of the State as a person. The Juristic
18school marked a new way of thinking about the problem of sovereignty. 
The starting point of earlier juridical schools of thought was an image 
of the State in term of power. Thus sovereignty was thought to reside 
in specific agencies of government. The juristic theoreticians denied 
this line of reasoning. They recognised that
"the powers exercised by governments vary from time and place, 
that the agencies in which government is organised are matters 
of historical circixostances and therefore from the point of
view of logic largely accidental The study of political
organisations is therefore empirical through and through ... 
This empirical study, however, is controlled by the intellec­
tual necessity of assuming the unity of the subject of the 
study. The state therefore must be conceived as a unity, this 
unity being, as Jellinek says *a form of synthesis necessarily 
imposed upon us by our consciousness1 it points toward a unity
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behind the empirical agencies of government. This is the state 
itself, a collective person, to which alone ultimate authority 
belongs and whose being consists solely in the fact that it is 
the repository of political and legal authority” (Sabine & 
Shephard, 1928, p.xxxi).
As Labland concludes
”<f>rom the conception of the state as a juristic person in 
the eye of public law, i t  follow s th a t the possessor o f  the  
s ta te 's  a u th o r ity  is  the s ta te  i t s e l f' (quoted in Sabine and 
Shephard, Ibid. ,p.xxxii, my emphasis).
This is perhaps the first time when an abstract entity which is 
recognized as such is endowed nonetheless with concrete political will. 
The Juridical school therefore signals a fundamental shift in the 
theory of the State which led eventually to the modem Realist theory 
of International Relations. According to this school, it is the State - 
- not the people, the prince, or select institutions —  which is acting 
in the political sphere. Politics therefore does not involves humans 
struggling to achieve their interests, but States aiming at asserting 
their ’individuality’.
Let us pause for a moment and reflect upon this development. From 
purely juridical perspective the theory makes sense because the 
reception of the Roman law entailed an acceptance of the State as a 
legal person. However, the juridical historical theoreticians aimed to 
overcome the irritating situation whereby the sociological and 
juridical conceptions of the State vary. By a clever line of argumenta­
tion they strove to consolidate the State into a unified whole and 
invest this unity with the decision-makers. A relatively recent 
statement of this position was delivered by Hans Kelsen (1945).
The problem, says Kelsen, is that according to the traditional view
"<t>he relation law and State is regarded as analogous to that 
law and the individual. Law —  although created by the State - 
- is assumed to regulate the behaviour of the State .... <the 
result is that> just as there is the juristic concept of 
person beside the biological-physical concept of nan, a 
sociological concept of State is believed to exist beside its
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juristic concept and even to be logically and historically 
prior to the latter” (p.182).
Like the historical jurists of the nineteenth century, Kelsen aims to 
demonstrate that underlying and in fact propping the sociological 
conception of the State, there is a unified conception. He defines the 
State as follows:
"a community created by a national legal order. The State as 
juristic person is a personification of this community or the 
national legal order constituting this community" (1945,
p.182).
He claims, then, that the State is essentially a national legal order -
- or in short, the law. This view is quite similar to some sociological 
positions. For instance Gumplowitz defines the State as follows:
"The State is a social phenomenon consisting of social 
elements behaving according to social laws"
H ow ever, Gumplowitz goes on immediately to say
"<t>he first step is the subjection of one social group by 
another and the establishment of sovereignty; and the soverei­
gn body is always the less numerous. But numerical inferiority 
is supplemented by mental superiority and greater military 
discipline " (1899, p.199).
Thus, in Gumplowitz work, the legal unity of the State is superimposed
—  by force that is —  upon the plurality of society. The State is 
essentially a format of class-society.
Kelsen does not accept this. He therefore denies, to all intent and 
purposes, the plurality of society. Furthermore, he suggests that the 
decision-makers who act in the name of the State constitute the
’personofication* of the legal community and, therefore, effectively as
19the State. Thus he is faced with a theoretical difficulty: if the 
State is an intangible ’legal person’, where its powers come from? 
Translated into legal discourse, the problem takes on this dimension:
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"If the State is the authority from which the legal order 
emanates, how can the State be subject to this order and, like 
the individual, receive obligations and rights therefore?" 
(Kelsen, 1945, p.197).
To solve this, Kelsen contrives a clever play on the two meanings 
associated with the term State. The socio-economic unit he labels the 
’ formal ’ State and the State apparatus is termed the 'material' State 
(ibid, p. 194). In doing so, he creates an internal dualism which he 
seems to think solves the problem:
"law is created by the State only in so far as it is created 
by a State organ, and that means, as law is created according 
to law. The statement that law is created by the State means 
only that law regulates its own creation" (Ibid, p. 198).
Once the problem appears to have been solved, Kelsen is able to 
demonstrate that the juristic conception of the State underlies all 
sociological theories because they take for granted the existence of 
some unity. But the logic is circular. In Kelsen's conception, the 
State is the legal order, and, therefore, whatever the State does is 
presumed to be legal. In other words, the 'fiction' of legality, which 
doubtless anyone who is acting in the name of the State will naturally 
uphold, is taken at face value and thus the unitary character of the 
State cannot be questioned. In the words of Schmidt:
"The state is nothing else than the legal order itself, which 
is conceived as a unity, to be sure....The state, meaning the 
legal order, is a system of ascriptions to a last point of 
ascription and to a last basic norm. The hierarchical order 
that is legally valid in the state rests on the premise that 
authorizations and competence emanate from the uniform central 
point to the lowest point...The basis for the validity of a 
norm can only be a norm; in juristic terms the state is 
therefore identical with its constitution, with the uniform 
basic norm. The catchword of this deduction is u n ity..." 
(1933, pp.18,19).
Kelsen therefore arrives at precisely the same complications which 
plagued the nineteenth century juristic school. Sabine and Shephard’s 
conclusion therefore is an apt description of his position:
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"In the end there is no solution except to permit the adjec­
tive to set up as a substantive on its own account. Sovereign­
ty inheres only in the state, and the state is merely a 
personification of sovereignty. The personality of the state 
is exhausted in the attribute, since the state-person has no 
reality except as a juristic or political entity" (1928, 
p.xxxii).
1.1.6. The State as a person
The conception of the State, Rupert Emerson once remarked, "pass 
through three stages of fiction, hypothesis, and dogma" (1928, p.29). 
From the Juristic theory it was only a small step to the assertion that 
the State is a real person. Blutschili (1885), an influential thinker 
at the time but largely forgotten today, went in this direction. For 
him,
"<t>he State is in no way a lifeless instrument, a dead 
machine; it is a living and therefore organised being" 
(p. 18).:20
If one ever wondered why precisely States in international politics 
seek power and prestige. Blutschili has a firm answer:
"To extend the reputation and the power of the State, to 
further its welfare and its happiness, has universally been 
regarded as one of the most honourable duties of gifted men"
(p.22).
Nowhere among the German thinkers is the progression of this logic more 
evident than in Heinrich von Treitschke’s P olitics (1915). Treitschke’s 
work provides a graphic illustration of the debt owed by Realism to the 
theory of the State as a person. Its exceptional coherence, furthermore 
clarifies some of the ambiguities of modem Realism.
Treitschke defines the State as follows:
"The State is the people, legally united as an independent 
entity (p.3)....<it is> broadly speaking, nothing but the 
necessary outward form which the inner life of a people 
bestows upon itself" (p. 12).
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He aims to distance himself from the social contract and in particular 
from the Manchester school of Political Economy which celebrates this 
revolting notion of individuals busy with their own little affairs:
"If we simply look upon the State as intended to secure life 
and property to the individual", he asks "how comes it that 
the individual will also sacrifice life and property to the 
State ?"(p.14).
It is rather the other way around, the State has its own personality
"primarily in the juridical, and secondly in the politico—  
moral sense" (p.15).
Treitschke takes rather seriously the age-old organic metaphor:
"Treat the State as a person", he says, "and the necessary and 
rational multiplicity of States follows ... Just as in 
individual life the ego implies the existence of the non-ego, 
so it does in the State. The State is power, precisely in 
order to assert itself as against other equally independent 
powers. War and the administration of justice are the chief 
tasks of even the most barbaric States (p.19).
Thus, he concludes "The State is the public force for Offence 
and Defence, It is, above all, Power which makes its will to 
prevail... .The nation is not entirely comprised in the State, 
but the State protects and embraces the people’s life, 
regulating its external aspects on every side" (p.22).
21These are the familiar themes of Realism in raw form. Meinecke
reiterates the same ideas in somewhat more refined way:
"Raison d’etat is the fundamental principle of national 
conduct, the State’s first Law of Motion. It tells the 
statesman what he must do to preserve the health and strength 
of the State. The State is an organic structure whose full 
power can only be maintained by allowing it in some way to 
continue growing; and raison d*6tat indicates both the path 
and the goal for such a growth" (Meinecke, 1962, p.l).
And again, "the well-being of the State and of its population 
is held to be the ultimate value and the goal; and power, 
maintenance of power, extension of power, is the indispensable 
means which must - without any qualification - be procured 
(Ibid, pp.2,3).... <thus> power belongs to the essence of the 
State; without it the State cannot carry out its task of 
upholding justice and protecting the community" (Ibid. p. 13).
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These words are echoed by another twentieth century ’Prussian’ thinker:
"<P>rotection of the nation against destruction from without 
and disruption from within is the over-riding concern of all 
citizens. Likewise, loyalty to the nation is a paramount 
commitment of all citizens .... nothing can be tolerated that 
might threaten the coherence of the nation. Interests, ideas, 
and loyalties which might not be compatible with the concern 
for the unity of the nation must yield to that concern .... 
This concern imposes an ever present limitation upon the kind 
of issues which will be allowed to separate A and B .... All 
conflicts within a nation are thus limited as to objectives 
pursued and means employed” (Morgenthau, 1967, p.486).
We arrive then at a theory of the State which is wholly conmensurable 
with the theory of international politics. The true origins of the 
Realist theory of the State is precisely this German Idealist’s 
synthesis of spirit and power, the domestic political process is denied 
because the Prussian thinkers did not acknowledge, nor did they wish to 
recognize, the political process which they associated with the rule of 
the multitude and factionalism. They preferred rather to think of 
politics as the manifestation of immutable laws of motion —  a 
reactionary world of political thought finally shattered with the 
demise of Nazism as both the careers of Meinecke and Schmitt have 
demonstrated.
The ultimate organic metaphor, however, is to be found in the work of 
Hedley Bull. For him, not only are States persons, but international 
politics is principally about the survival of the species. What are the 
goals of the system of States he asks ?
"First, th ere  is  the goal o f p re se rv a tio n  o f  the system and  
society  o f  S tates its e lf ... The society of States has sought to 
ensure that it will remain the prevailing form of universal 
political organisation, in fact and in right” (Bull, 1977, 
p. 16 emphasis mine).
In Bull’s work, not only socio-economic units are endowed with organic 
attributes, but their system also is an organic system.
Kenneth Dyson (1980) presents three traditions of theories of the State 
which he calls might, law and legitimacy. The Realist theory of the 
State is an assemblage of select elements from the three traditions:
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Might —  The state is a ' person*
Law —  The State is a legal person
Legitimacy —  The legal person is the unifying organ of society,
The * state' is the 'people* and the people are the
state. The State therefore is an organic entity.
Once the State is seen as an organic unity. The logic unfolds in the 
opposite direction :
Legitimacy —  an organism's basic intuition is the survival
instinct and more generally its overall welfare. The 
State functions accordingly 
Law —  The state does so by upholding the law
Might —  The state does so by defending the territory.
1.2. The Road to Neo-Realism
Machtstaate theories may be correct or incorrect, but their portrait of 
international relationships is wholly compatible with their conception 
of State and politics. Modem thinkers, on the other hand, have sought 
to maintain the theory of International Relations but to replace the 
theory of the State which underpins it. Many reasons may be cited for 
this, not least among them was the defeat of Germany in the two World 
Wars. There are other reasons which, indeed, may account for the
differences the so-called English school of International Relations 
(Manning, White, Bull, Northedge) and the (dominant) American version. 
The English school draws heavily upon the Neo-Hegelians (T.H.Green, 
Bousanquet, Figgis), and carries a peculiar 'idealist' tinge to its 
'realism'. The Americans, on the other hand, partly due to the federal 
structure of the American State and partly to their more pragmatic, 
less speculative attitude are inclined to regard the ’ international 
system’ with less respect.
The process of concealment of the origins of the present Realist theory 
of international politics can be traced back to the work of Max Weber. 
A firm Realist in his international outlook, Weber was convinced that
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22the State was not an organic entity but an 1 artificial* construction.
He retained therefore the international component of Realist theory but
replaced the theory of the State which underpins it. Unfortunately, in
his own work there are only cursory renarks concerning international
politics and consequently the viability and coherence of such a view is 
23not discussed.
Action sociology dominates modem International Relations literature 
first and foremost because it commands the American intellectual scene. 
It offers, nevertheless, two great advantages. Weber rejected metaphys­
ical theories of the State because he rejected metaphysics in general. 
Thus, instead of speculating about the role and functions of the State 
he prefers to follow natural scientists and deal only with what we 
definitely know about them, namely, that they are organisations 
executing certain social functions and operating in a prescribed 
manner. In his own words,
"the primary formal characteristics of the modem state are as 
follows : it possesses an administrative and legal order
subject to change by legislation, to which the organized 
activities of the administrative staff, which are also 
controlled by regulations, are oriented, this system of order 
claims binding authority, not only over the members of the 
state, the citizens, most of whom have obtained membership by 
birth, but also to a very large extent over all action taking 
place in the area of its jurisdiction. It is thus a compulsory 
organization with a territorial basis" (1978, p.56).
These known characteristies of the modem State may not exhaust our 
knowledge of it —  Weber never denied, for instance, Marx’s claims, 
but they are, according to Weber, the only truly scientific tools of 
analysis. It so happens that this definition of the State also ascribes 
certain ’international’ functions to it and as a result sets Realist 
logic rolling again. Modem Realism, therefore, can deny its affilia­
tion with metaphysical theories of the State and maintain that, on the 
contrary, a realistic theory of the State is at the root of the realist 
theory of International Relations.
The predilection towards dry empiricism instead of speculative 
philosophy enhanced a more pragmatic attitude to the study of interna­
tional politics. It was George Schwarzenberger of all people who
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provided the basic formula:
"In order to include in the term in te rn a tio n a l a f fa irs all 
matters which sure relevant for the purposes of international 
studies, a simple test has to be applied. We have to ask 
ourselves whether, and to what extent, these matters are 
relevant from the point of view of in te rn a tio n a l so c ie ty as a 
whole" (Schwarzenberger, 1951,p.4).
In this self-congratulatory empiricist formula (Ibid, p.5), it is the 
’international society*—  whatever that expression might mean —  that 
determines the ’units* that are significant to international politics. 
What is the basis for such determination ? It is up to the individual 
to decide; some happen to think that States are by far the most 
important ’social actors’ and grant only cursory treatment to other 
’units’; others may wish to include transnational corporations and 
international organisations (Keohane and Nye, 1977); others again 
(Burton, 1965) refuse to make any such value judgement and include 
under the rubric of ’international society’ all possible social actors.
Leaving aside the epistemological difficulties associated with action 
methodology, its significance (at least in the manner by which it was 
incorporated into the study of International Relations) lies in the 
denial of the uniqueness of States as a social actors. Thus States are 
regarded as if they were commensurable with say, multinational 
corporations, transnational organisations or even to the ’market’ 
(Strange, 1988). It is curious that both Idealist and hyper-real 
conceptions of the State arrive at precisely the same conclusions 
concerning their activities in the international scene. However, as I 
will presently argue, it is not totally surprising, for both theories 
share one thing in common, and this is the denial of internal politics.
The theory that the State is just another type of social actor is, of 
course, a theory of the State, a theory in which 'the State’ is an 
identifiable social group. It implies, therefore, the rejection of all 
other theories of the State discussed in the previous section and a 
fresh assemblage from the three traditions of theories of the State. 
Theda Skocpol (1979), among others (Austen & Silver, 1979; Block, 1977;
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Halliday, 1987; Krasner, 1978; Mann, 1984) advocates this. She claims 
that:
i. "The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socioecono- 
mic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, 
policing, and military organisations headed, and more or less well 
coordinated by, an executive authority" (1979, p.29).
ii. States derive their autonomy because they "stand at the intersec­
tions domestic sociopolitical orders and transnational relations within 
which they must manoeuvre for survival and advantage in relation to 
other states" (1985, p.8).
The 'autonomy of the State’ school therefore appropriates from each 
tradition the following characteristics:
Might —  The domination of a large group by a small one.
Law —  The State is "a compulsory political organisation ...
<whose> .. administration successfully upholds the 
claim to the monopoly of the leg itim ate use of 
physical force in the enforcement of its order" 
(Weber, 1978, p.54).
Legitimacy —  an act of trickery or 'false consciousness'.
Let us examine these contentions one by one. My aim is to demonstrate 
that this theory cannot account for domestic political process and to 
ask why that is. Michael Mann (1984) discussed the theory in some 
detail and it is best to turn to his work. The autonomy of the State 
must stand in relation to s cane thing or someone. Accordingly, Mann poses 
it in relation to 'civil society'. Unfortunately, the concept of civil
or
society is ambivalent, to say the least. For one, it is bound up with 
the notion of an 'original contract' and 'state of nature' (Hume;1947; 
Foulantzas, 1973). Secondly, the modem notion of 'society' is 
tailored, historically as well as analytically, to the matrices of the 
nation-state (Hall, 1985, p.29). Indeed, Mann himself rejects "a simple 
antithesis, common to ideologies of our own time, the state and civil
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society, public and private property.” On the contrary, he sees "the 
two as continuously, temporarily entwined” (1984, p. 130).
In other words, identification of the State as a separate group cannot 
be sanctioned on an empirical basis, it is rather, a th eo re tica l d ev ice. 
Who then is ’the State’? The question does not make sense because the 
State is not re a lly an identifiable social group. We should therefore 
expect a theory to explain precisely why we should regard the State as 
a separate social group. Here we are presented with an ambiguity, for 
at one and the same time the State is identified with a ’real’ social 
group, the ’states elites’, on the other hand, the group ’emerges’ and 
constitutes itself not by real power struggle but through analytical 
reconstruction. According to Mann, the State (and presumably the 
State’s elite) gains power by performing some useful tasks:
"The four most persistent types of state activities are :
1. The maintenance of internal order....
2. Military defence/aggression, directed against foreign 
foes....
3. The maintenance of communications infrastructures....
4. Economic redistribution: the authoritative distribution of 
scarce material resources different ecological niches, 
age-groups, sexes, regions, classes etc.” (pp.120,121).
In other words, the State is a separate social entity because of its 
social functions. This theory may be disputed on two points. First what 
about States that do not perform these tasks? African States have been 
carefully examined in the context of the theory by Jackson and Rosberg 
(1987a; 1987b) and their conclusion was that according to the Weberian 
theory African states are not real states. Secondly, while many modem 
States certainly perform the tasks listed by Mann, they also perform 
other tasks, perhaps even more persistently. According to Braudel,
"<t>he state was there to preserve inequality, the cornerstone 
of the social order. Culture and its spokesmen were generally 
on hand to preach resignation to one’s lot...the desirable 
solution was for the ’organic* mass of society to evolve 
peacefully” (1979, II, p. 515).
And Foulantzas adds ”<the> globed ro le  o f  the s ta te  is  a p o litic a l 
ro le . The state relates to a ’society divided into classes’ 
and to political class domination, precisely in so far as it 
maintains, in the ensemble of structures, that place and role
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which have the e ffe c t (in their unity) of dividing a formation 
into classes and producing political class domination" (1973, 
p. 51).
We are presented with conflicting theories. They both, however, provide 
a fair representation of some aspects of the State. The crux of the 
matter, nonetheless, is that to all intents and purposes, the Skocpol- 
Mann argument expel what was perhaps Marx’s greatest achievement: the 
location of relations of exploitation at the centre of the social 
vortex (Casanova, 1978). To Marxists, and indeed to all of the theories 
surveyed so far, the state (or the political system) plays a pivotal 
role in a class-divided society because it is not distinct from it; for 
the theories of the autonomy of the State, the State is external to the 
play of forces in ’civil society’. The latter invent, or rather 
recalls, if implicitly, The Hegelian sense of two separate analytical 
’spaces’: the space of civil-society where class struggle (and other 
struggles) is conducted; and the ’proper’ space of the state (Willke, 
1986).
There is, of course, nothing new about this separation. Indeed, it is 
as old as liberal thought itself, which always opted to regard the 
development of the State as the development of an ’idea’. Correspond­
ingly, in one form or another, it always entrusted the ’cultural 
system’ (Parsons, 1961; Sorokin, 1941b) with the task of maintaining 
the homeostatic aspects of society. However, the ’autonomy of the 
State’ school is unique in that it consciously aims to permeate Marxist 
concepts with liberal thought (and vice versa). The mixture turns to 
’ pharmakon ’ when the relations social classes and the States are 
discussed. Because Skocpol and Mann are forced to reduce the play of 
force to an opportunistic coning together of social groups in tentative 
alliances. Thus Skocpol agrees that "states usually do function to 
preserve existing economic and class structures". However, unlike the 
primary functions of the State, the reasons cure that it is
"normally the smoothest way to enforce order. Nevertheless, 
the state has its own distinct interests vis-a-vis subordinate 
classes. Although both the state and the dominant class (es) 
share a broad interest in keeping subordinate classes in place 
in society and at work in the existing economy" (Skocpol,
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1979, p.30).27
In contrast to that Once the historical scope is widened we can see 
that:
a. The State was always associated with stratification. There is a
debate among political anthropologists as to whether pristine states
28developed as class states or whether stratification occurred later.
They all agree, however, that once this format appeared it always
29remained, as Braudel puts it, on the side of * order*.
b. The State was invariably associated with a class rule. In Marxist 
writings it is customary to differentiate between Instrumentalists 
(Miliband), and Structuralists (Poulantzas). The Instrumentalists 
demonstrate the close connection between ruling classes and political 
power. Structuralists argue that society is structured so it facilita­
tes hierarchical ordering and exploitation.
What does the association of the ruling classes with the State mean in 
practical terms? The association of the State with the ruling classes 
means, according to Poulantzas, that the State is structurally 
determined to operate for the benefit of the 'strategic interests' of 
these classes (Poulantzas, 1973, pp.229-254). Indeed, he argues, the 
State (i.e. the state apparatus) is 'relatively autonomous’ so that it 
can articulate the strategic interests of the ruling classes even if it 
has to do so sometimes against their own immediate interests or 
apparent interests (Ibid., pp. 255-324).
What are the strategic interests of a class ? That depends, of course, 
on which class we have in mind. In Absolutist Europe, to take one 
example, the ruling classes consisted of the landed warrior class. They 
were supplemented, abetted or resisted by the courtiers, the low 
nobility, the various noblesse de robe, hidalgos, the emerging middle 
classes: financiers, lawyers, long-distance traders, etc. And this 
whole edifice of the 'supporting classes' (Ibid, pp.240-5) exploited 
the working classes: peasants, free-holders, journeymen, small-time 
merchants, proletariate, etc. One thing was agreed by all, these 
multitude had to be kept in their place. The working classes therefore, 
constituted the 'background' of the political process, but a very
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active and menacing background, without which nothing in the foreground 
could be understood. The working classes were rarely part of the 
*political scene*, but they were not absent from the picture.
Now, the high nobility, a remnant of the middle ages, were nobility
because they fought, and they were hankering for a fight (Anderson,
1974). But due to changing circumstances: improvement in techniques of
firearms, organisation and defense coupled with qualitative increase in
trade, the stakes were constantly spiralling upwards. The nobility, in
order to assume their traditional role, had to be associated with
larger and larger political frameworks (Elias, 1939), i.e. there were
fewer kings, princes, dukes and military orders to chose from. Each of
these framework was headed by a family. These families became stronger
not because they simply wanted to (though they certainly did), but
because with the escalation of costs, they needed to stabilise their
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financial resources (in this they were abetted by the estates. Much is 
made of the haggling process and the general hostility between estates 
and kings (Hintze, 1975) , shadowing the fact that the estates were on 
the whole supportive of the enterprises). Gradually, as will be 
demonstrated in the ninth chapter, the logic of a competitive system 
asserted itself: The * States* which catered to the original aims of 
their ruling classes, namely fighting wars of conquests and loot, were 
transformed, precisely in order to fight their wars into organisations 
that could subdue their very own 'ruling classes*. They did so first 
because they had now the means to do so. They acquired the finances to 
support a standing army and a bureaucracy that replaced, or attempted 
to replace, the traditional role of the nobility. Secondly, since the 
constant need for more money, meant sooner or later that the State 
would have to 'tap* the nobility’s finances, either directly in the 
form of a tax or indirectly by expropriation. Thirdly, by co-opting 
these classes into the State through the massive sale of offices.
In all these instances, the exquisite 'war machines* were transforming 
themselves, unwittingly, unconsciously, and apparently against the 
wishes of those who mattered, into something akin to economic corpora­
tions. Does it mean that the State has intrinsic interests ? I do not 
think so. It is precisely the outcome of society-based organisations
64
competing with one another, which permits, and indeed forced these 
states to take initiatives beyond the narrow pressures from inside. 
Since competition is fuelled by — and must ultimately rely on —  a 
sound economic foundation, it assures that the organisations that have 
managed to operate for the long term interests of their ruling classes 
will be the ones which generally come out on top. At the same time the 
competition assures that the others will have sooner or later imitate 
the successful ones. Thus ultimately these developments can be 
explained only within the framework of a society-oriented research, if 
modified by the theory of informal interactions.
Turning to the study of international relations, if states are regarded 
as identifiable social groups, then they form a relatively small part 
of the overall international milieu. By the same token, relations 
between states constitute a limited chunk of International Relations. 
The international context is an agglomeration of inter-state and 
transnational relations, wherein transnational interactions are the 
significant factor. It appears therefore that, paradoxically, Skocpol’s
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version of the * Realist* theory of the State hinges upon the viability 
of a theory of ’transnational relations’, a fit which other realists 
are eager to denounce as futile (Waltz, 1979, p.95).
The State-centric approach then, is able to deal only with a select 
number of phenomena. It is important, nonetheless, to examine Skocpol’s 
reasons for rejecting society-oriented theories. The contention is that 
"when pluralists focused on the determinants of particular public 
policy decisions, they often found that governmental leaders took 
initiatives well beyond the demands of social groups or electorates" 
(Skocpol, 1985, p.4). Krasner makes a similar point.
"A statist paradigm views the state as an autonomous actor.
The objective sought by the state cannot be reduced to some 
summation of private desires. These objectives can be called 
appropriately the national interest. For a statist approach 
explanation and description involve (a) demonstrating empiri­
cally that American central decision-makers have sought a 
consistent set of goals - for this study, in the area of 
foreign raw materials investments" (1978, p.5).
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It is still to be demonstrated that such initiatives are taken well 
beyond the demands of at least some social groups, however, it is true 
that many important decisions are made by policy-makers against the 
wishes of at least some important segments in society. But is this a 
proof of the failing of society-oriented theories? Practically all 
modem society-centred theories from elitist to pluralist to modem 
Marxist accept and indeed, argue, that the State apparatus must 
maintain a certain distance, or a * relative autonomy* from any one 
single class. Furthermore, they all take it for granted that in normal 
cases, policies whether internal or external, exhibit a certain 
continuity.^
Sociological theories nevertheless fail to deal with the international 
links. At this point it is possible to demonstrate only the principle 
that lies behind an alternative to Skocpol*s. I shall return back to 
this subject in chapter ten. The work of Nicos Poulantzas (1973) is a 
good starting point. Poulantzas, who was trained as a lawyer and not as 
a sociologist (Jessop,1985, chpt.l), was well aware of the legal 
theories of the State. But in contrast to their excessive formalism, he 
strove to distinguish the ability to act autonomously and the condition 
of being autonomous. He opines that the capitalist state can success­
fully perform its task as a class state precisely by maintaining a 
certain autonomy (Poulantzas, 1973, pp.125-141). But this relative 
autonomy is no mere appearance, the autonomy of the State apparatus is 
inscribed in its institutional framework. It is consequent upon the 
separation of politics from economics, which in itself resulted from 
the separation of the workers from the means of production. This 
autonomy, according to Poulantzas, permits the State to unite otherwise 
pugnacious and quarrelsome ruling classes and at the same time divide 
the working classes. In other words, it is precisely this apparent 
autonomy of the state apparatus which belies the class nature of the 
State.
Thus, Poulantzas is able to demonstrate that the class nature of modem 
States takes on the appearance of impartiality which is then thought of 
by the theoreticians of the autonomy of the State as a true nature of 
the State. In other words he demonstrates that the supposed impar­
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tiality and functionality of the State serves the purpose of class
To sum up, under close examination the theory of the 'autonomy of the 
State* creates more theoretical difficulties then it actually solves. 
Indeed, both versions of the primacy of the State fail to come up with 
decisive arguments for
i. the primacy of the State, and
ii. the separation of domestic from international politics.
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NOTES
1. It is useful to distinguish in theoretical research between 
hypotheses which require empirical corroborations and schemes 
which are merely conceptual tools. In this chapter I ask whether 
any of the frameworks, the or schemes, which take the concept of 
State as their unit of analysis are useful to the study of 
International Relations.
2. The equation of statesmen or decision-makers with the States is 
common. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin argue that "<t>o rid ourselves of 
the troublesome abstraction "state". It is one of our basic 
methodological choices to define the state as its official 
Decision makers. State action is the action taken by those acting 
in the name of the state" (Snyder,Bruck & Sapin, 1962 p. 65). For 
Gilpin "the state is 'an organisation that provides protection 
and (welfare)...in return for revenue" (1981, p. 15). However, 
soon enough we hear that the State is really those in authority: 
"The state i.e. those particular individuals who hold authority" 
(ibid. p. 16).
Holsti alma to transcend this schematisation by presenting 
three levels of analysis, in the third he maintains "we may study 
international politics and foreign policy by concentrating on the 
actions and behaviour of individual statesmen. This is the usual 
approach of diplomatic historians, based on the sound point that 
when we say that 'states’ behave, we really mean that policy 
makers are defining purposes, choosing among courses of action, 
and utilising national capabilities to achieve objectives in the 
name of the State" (1977, p. 18). Nonetheless, the relations 
between these levels is never explained and the State therefore 
is treated for all intent and purpose as the decision-makers.
Keohane and Nye argue that "traditionally the state 
regarded as an actor with purpose and power, the basic unit of 
action ; its main agents are the diplomat and soldiers. Yet... a 
good deal of intersocietal intercourse, with significant 
political importance, takes place without government control" 
(1972, p.X). In other words, the State is still equated with its 
decision-makers.
One of the best exposition of the 'decision-makers' 
approach is outlined by D.C. Watt: "Historically speaking, the 
study of international history originated in the study of the 
relations between states; in particular, of the relations between 
the major European states in the nineteenth century and of the 
culmination of these relations in the First World War....Their 
preoccupation with the concept of the nation state, however, 
proved inadequate in itself to sustain the wight they wished to 
put upon it. Their successors, particularly since the Second 
World War, have come to look behind these formal constitution­
al-legal structures to the realities which underlay them, the 
sociopolitical groups which exercise power within individual 
states and maintain linkages with each other and with their 
supposed political rivals, both within their boundaries and 
across them. Once historians began to concentrate on the 
so-called decision-makers and their political alternatives, their 
attention was increasingly drawn to the exploration not only of 
what divided them from their presumed opponents but of what they
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shared in cannon.... The distinguishing mark of the international 
historian, however,.... has been a bias towards the study of 
international crises, and towards the role and responsibility of 
individual decision-makers in those crises.... The international 
historian today is concerned to understand why, at given moments 
in time, identifiable individuals in positions of power, 
authority or influence chose, recommended or advocated one course 
of action rather than another" (Watt, 1984, pp.2,3).
Watt explains very well the merit of such approach for 
historical investigations. Indeed, his description may also 
clarify why it is not a particularly useful as a theoretical 
framework. The international historian 1ms a bias, he says, 
towards crises and the role and responsibility of individual 
decision-makers. When enough of these investigations are 
compared, it might be possible —  if that is of any interest —  
to come up with more general statements about the sort of 
responses one may expect decision-makers to make in particular 
situations. However, these tendencies are only statistical, that 
is, they can only tell us that in a large proportion of cases up 
to now, such and such was done. Such an investigation can never 
link these crises, as well as the actions of decision-makers, to 
an overall dynamism of international relationships.
3. Traditional Realism holds to the view of the ontological unity of 
the State. Modem Neo-Realism, on the contrary, maintains the 
ontological separation of State from society. However, both view 
the State essentially as an a c to r endowed with intrinsic will and 
goals and arrive ultimately to the same conclusions in respects 
to State*s activities in International Relations.
4. In a recent book Hall and Ikenberry (1989) have outlined their 
version of the Realist theory of the State. Unfortunately, their 
realist state is nothing but an ecclectic aggregation from a 
variety of sources of all those ideas about the State which do 
not conform with their notions of the liberal and Marxist tradi­
tions. This is not sufficient as a theory of the State.
5. It is impossible to present here the full richness of this 
tradition as it spans from Rousseau to the Nineteenth century, On 
Hegel see Charles Taylor,1979. See also Aris, 1965; Droz, 1963; 
Schmitt, 1986. On some of the conceptions of the State as a 
person in International Relations see Waltz, 1953.
6. "There is one prejudice which must be put aside in setting out 
this history <The French Revolution in European politics> It is 
the representation of Europe under the ancien regime as a 
regularly constituted community of States, in which each directed 
its conduct by principles recognised by all, where respect for 
established law government International Relations and treaties, 
and good faith marked their implementation" (1969, p. 35). See 
Wight, 1977, for contrasting view.
7. "Conquest, the starting-point and the goal of these enterprises, 
is limited only by the conditions necessary for success. The 
abuse of force frustrates its purpose. To conquer requires 
strength; to keep what is conquered requires justice and wisdom"
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(Sorel, 1969, p.57). Thus, power-politics maybe the starting 
point, but it requires concomitant 'virtue* on the part of those 
in authority. On 'virtue* in Renaissance political thought 
see Meinecke, 1962 and Skinner, 1978, chpt.5.
8. In the definition, the international political system is 
supposedly an 'abstraction* (Ibid, p. 18) of governments dealings 
in International Relations. However, only foreign policies of 
specific types, those allegedly concerned with the general 
welfare of peoples are considered by Northedge to be part of what 
he calls international politics. He presents therefore implicitly 
a sequential picture whereby International Politics is a 
procession of States entering when they wish to further "the 
general welfare of peoples" and presumably exiting when they have 
concluded their business.
But why should we define International Politics on such 
narrow grounds? What about, for instance, all those foreign 
policies which do not fit into this narrow definition? Harold 
Laski, by no means a radical, for instance maintains that: "There 
has been no State in history in which the consistent effort has 
been towards the unique realisation of the common good" (Laski, 
1968, p.41). If Laski is correct, than Northedge has virtually 
depleted International Politics of its content and discusses some 
imaginary or ideological realm.
9. "<Q>ue Samuel dist au peuple en sa harangue: Voulez vous s'avoir, 
dit-il, la coustume des tyrans? c'est de prendre les biens des 
suject pour disposer leur plaisir, prendre leurs femmes et lers 
enfans pour en abuser, et en faire leurs esclaves... .Autrement ce 
bon Prince Samuel se fust dementi soymesme: car it rendit compte 
au peuple de la charge que Dieu avoit donn£e" (Bodin, 1986, 
pp.295,6).
10. "Machieavelli ... repeatedly asserts that the chief duty of a 
ruler must be to attend to his own * security and strength *, while 
ensuring at the same time that his subjects are 'stablised and 
made secure'" (Skinner, 1978, p.123).
11. It must be understood that I am simplifying and schematising 
considerably a rich tradition. Humanism has to be seen in the 
context of the crisis of feudalism and the emerging new mode of 
production. For their part, Renaissance thinkers were defining, 
perhaps for the first time in human history, a positivist cosmol­
ogy which contrasted with the medieval (and other pre-capitalist 
cosmologies) hierarchical and all-embracing cosmologies (Bala- 
ndier, 1988; Mumford, 1964).
The historical significance of Renaissance humanism, says 
Bouswma "lies in the fact that it reflected this set of essen­
tially sceptical attitudes ... it rejected the possibility of 
systematic knowledge in favour of a kind of intellectual 
pluralism" (1968, p.9). He adds "Renaissance humanism adapted 
this vision of man to politics; it tried to solve the problem of 
adjustment to a reality that was.... beyond human grasp.... It 
saw no absolute structure in the nature of things, no clear 
gradations of ultimate value, thus, the believe emerged that the 
republic, that is self-rule, was the most appropriate form of
70
government to the human condition" (Ibid, p.9). On the subject 
see Chabod, 1958, Pockock, 1975, and Skinner, 1978.
12. See Barker, 1947, Cranston, 1968, MacPherson, 1951.
13. "It became obvious very soon that this negative attitude towards
the State was untenable since it was in contrast to the economic 
and social development. The French revolution and its heir 
Napoleon taught the nations that the State which abolished the 
last remnants of feudalism and relied on its national forces 
developed a particular strength which the states, which still 
retained the ancien regime, could not withstand. The revolution­
ary onslaught on Germany brought home to the people the fact that 
they were inextricable bound up with the fate of the State"
(Aris, 1965, pp.291,2). On the subject see Willke, 1986.
14 "A nation consists on the one hand of distinct moments which 
combine to give it its general character; on the other, it also 
embodies the opposite principle of individuality, and these two 
principles together constitute the reality of the Idea. In a 
nation or state, everything depends on the nature of these two 
elements" (Hegel, 1975, p.76).
15. On similar Rousseau’s rather similar position, see in Waltz, 
1954.
16 Schelling was the first thinker to present the State as an
organic being: "By viewing life as a work of art in which divine 
reason revealed itself, Schelling came to consider the State as 
an organisation in which each member was just as indispensable a 
part of the whole as any part in a work of art. .... <he> began 
by describing the State as a mechanism and as a mere means to an 
end, but soon proceeded to a mystical concept according to which 
’the constitution of the State was the image of the constitution 
of the realm of ideas ’ ... The State is according to this view 
not a means to the realisation of an end but an end in itself" 
(Aris, 1965, 289).
17. On the Romantic tradition. See Aris, op. cit; Droz, op. cit; 
Emerson, 1928; Schmitt, 1986.
18. Unfortunately much of the discussion is in German and I was able 
to use only secondary sources and translations. Among the 
juridical school included are Savigny, von Gerber, Labland, 
Rosin, Preuss and Jellinek. For brief discussion See: Sabine and 
Shepherds (1922). On the work of Savigny see Klenner, 1989, 
Toews, 1989.
Otherwise, Dyson (1980), Jellinek (1904) and Schmitt (1933) 
are excellent sources.
19. Sabine and Shepherds (1922) provide an admirable exposition of 
what was really at stake in the debate between those who favoured 
the metaphor of the person (Treitschke, 1916) over the organic 
metaphor. See also Spencer, * The Social O rganism’ in Spencer 
(1981) and Strasser & Randall (1981).
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20. But make no mistake, "In calling the State an organism .... We 
are thinking rather of the following characteristic of natural 
organisms:
(a) Every organism is a union of soul and body, i.e. of material 
elements and vital forces.
(b) Although an organism is and remains a whole, yet in its parts 
it has members, which are animated by special motives and 
capacities, in order to satisfy the various ways the varying 
needs of the whole itself.
(c) the organism develops itself outwards from within, and has an 
external growth, (p. 19) ...Hie constitution is likewise the 
articulation of the body politic. Every office and every 
political assembly is a particular member with its own proper 
functions..... Its functions have a s p ir itu a l character .... they 
serve life, and are themselves living" (Blutschili, 1885,p.20).
21. The story of Meinecke is more complex as he shifted his position 
considerably during his life. On Meinecke see: Sterling, 1958 and 
Hughes, 1977.
22. "Whether or not an organisation exists is entirely a matter of 
the presence of a person of authority, with or without an 
administrative staff. More precisely, it exists so far as there 
is a probability that certain persons will act in such a way as 
to carry out the order governing the organisation" (Weber, 1978, 
p.49).
23. His discussion centres on the role and inclinations of statesmen 
(Weber, 1978, p.911).
24. The presentation of the issue as if it was between the 
State as an actor and the State as an arena is highly 
misleading but typical of Skocpol's approach, these two 
versions belong to gin empiricist tradition that not all 
follow. Thus, she poses Marxists like Poulantzas on a 
manufactured empiricist plane as if he is moving towards 
a conception of the State as an autonomous actor (Skocpol,
1979). Furthermore, the only political theorists who 
conceive of the political process as an arena are the 
structural fundtionalists, but they have specifically 
rejected the concept of State (see Easton, 1953 and 1981).
25. See Hume (1947); Keene, (1987a), Poulantzas (1973), Urry (1981).
26. "The basic functions of the 9state* are: the enactment of law 
(legislative function); the protection of personal safety and 
public order (police); the protection of vested rights (administ­
ration and justice); the cultivation of hygienic, educational, 
social-welfare, and other cultural interests (of various branches 
of administration); and, last but not least, the organised armed 
protection against outside attack (military administration)" 
(Weber, 1978, p.905).
27. Other advocates of the theory have encountered the same difficul­
ties and come up with the same answers. According to Strange, 
"<t>he protectors —  those who provide the security —  acquire a
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certain kind of power which lets them determine, and perhaps 
limit, the range of choices, or options available to others. By 
exercising this power, the providers of security may in c id e n ta lly  
acquire for themselves special advantages in the production, or 
consumption of wealth and special rights or privileges in social 
relations" (Strange, 1988, p.45 emphasis mine).
There is no need to demonstrate here that the so-called 
’ protectors ’ from the old Euorpean aris tore racy, to the Hausa in 
the Hausa-Falani co-federations, to the security forces of 
Cauecescu, are * political* as much as they are ’ economic * ruling 
classes.
28. See: Claessen & Skalnik, 1978; 1981; Cohen & Service, 1978; Haas, 
1982; Krader, 1958; Mann, 1986, chpt. 2.
29. "When we talk of established order, this means the state, the 
foundation of society, cultural reflexes and economic structure, 
plus the cumulative weight of the multiform development of the 
whole" (Braudel, 1979, II, p.503).
30. That is precisely the term she uses to describe her theory (1979, 
p.31).
31. See Dunleavy and O’Leary op. cit on the subject. Also Bottomore, 
1964; Nisbeth, 1974.
32. The notion of relative autonomy of the State makes no sense, 
because in Poulantzas view the State is not an actor. It should 
be read therefore the relative autonomy of the state apparatus. 
For a historical research on the subject see, Friedmann, 1984.
33. In any case, it was always agreed, at least with Mann’s, that the 
autonomy of the state is qualified : "The organisational autonomy 
of the state is only partial; indeed in many particular cases it 
may be rather small. General Motors and the capitalist class in 
general, or the Catholic Church, or the feudal lords and knights, 
or the US military, are or were quite capable of keeping watch on 
states they have propped up (Mann, 1984, p.125).
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CHAPTER TWO —  CLASS-BASED SCHEMES OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
It is generally agreed that no distinct Marxist theory of International 
Relations exists (Berki, 1971). By default, the various fragments of 
Marxists thought which touch upon issues of international relationships 
(or appear to touch upon issues of international relationships), such 
as imperialism, super-imperialism, uneven development, unequal 
exchange, under-consumption, international division of labour, subsump­
tion theories, etc., have come to be thought of as the Marxist theory 
of International Relations. However, lacking a distinct international 
perspective, when added up they naturally emphasise the traditional 
preoccupation with social classed and therefore create the impression 
that the Marxist theory of International Relations is nothing but an 
extension into the International sphere of the theory of the class 
struggle.
We may divide the various class-based theories of International 
Relations into two groups. Among traditional Marxists, international 
politics is understood to be essentially a contest between ruling- 
classes. Thus according to Therbom "<f>oreign policy may be defined as 
the external pursuit of the policies of a given class" (1980, p.97), a 
claim which he then qualifies by saying that "capitalist foreign policy 
is not only modelled on the internal relations of the bourgeoisie ... 
the capitalist state is a representative of the national public, and 
strictly nationalist factors play a role in the formation of foreign 
policy alongside the dominant contradiction between different national 
capitals" (Ibid. p.98). This view is echoed by Mary Kaldor who writes: 
"Political conflict, that is to say conflict between nation states, 
arise out of economic and social conflict.... Political conflict, 
therefore, in so feu* as it occurs, must be treated as the externalisa- 
tion of domestic conflict" (Kaldor, 1981,p.10).^
One group of Marxist thinkers, then, accepts the division of the world 
into nation-states, but presents a rather simple picture in which class 
struggle is encamped, so to speak, within the geographical area of the 
social formations and overflows national boundaries in the form of
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political struggle. This view as it stands offends two precepts of 
modem Marxist thought. To begin with, modem Marxist theories of the 
State do no longer accept such theories of the State. Secondly, modem 
capitalism is as transnational as it is national and therefore does not 
conform to any simple dichotomy between domestic politics and interna­
tional relations.
Neo-marxists, in contrast, commence from the opposite direction. They 
follow Marx'8 lead and assign a central place in the evolution of 
capitalism to the world-market (Frank, 1967, 1978; Harris, 1983;
Wallerstein, 1974,1980). However, an equally important component of 
Marx's thought, namely, the function of political superstructure and 
'civil society' dissolves in the process. With the result that the 
State is regarded in purely economic and deterministic terms.
Without devoting too much time to the details of their suggestions, it 
is interesting to note that both groups find themselves holding views 
far more radical than they bargained for. Thus sophisticated thinkers 
such as Therbom, Kaldor and Mandel are forced to present a rudimentary 
image of International Relations, knowing very well that the State is 
not merely the 'executive committee of the bourgeoisie'. Neo-marxists 
are compelled by the logic of their own theoretical framework to 
present a uni-dimensional world economy and yet discuss it along the 
lines of central and peripheral States, i.e., on the basis of the 
division into political unities. While it is not easy to understand why 
this occurs, it is quite clear that the relation between the concepts 
of social classes and political structures are at the root of the 
problem.
The issue we are faced with is how to incorporate Marxist perspicacity 
into the study of international relationships. I shall contend in this 
chapter that the theory of class struggle is essentially, but not 
exclusively, society-based. Consequently, it is important to retain a 
society-centred research. Such a framework, however, should not 
prejudge in any way (a) the insights of Neo-Marxism, and (b) the fact 
that class alliances and class relationships extend far beyond nation­
al borders. The second point will be discussed in the latter half of
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the dissertation. This chapter is intended to demonstrate that 
exclusively class-based theories of International Relations are incohe­
rent in  p r in c ip le. In demonstrating this I will be drawing heavily on 
Mark’s own work. Although Marx never articulated a theory of Interna­
tional Relations, his philosophy and methodology contain ideas which, 
in my view, warrant a rejection of simple class-based schemes for the 
discipline. Nonetheless, a full-scale discussion is totally out of the 
question here, and it is therefore possible to present only negative 
conclusions: that social classes and societal unities are inseparable 
in Marx’s thought and therefore cannot be posed as alternative 'units 
of analysis’ for the study of International Relations.
2.1. Marx latent theory of International Relations
It is not immediately evident quite what is wrong with the view that 
relations between States represent no more than the outward manifesta­
tion of ruling-classes competition. Admittedly, there is nothing 
d is tin c tiv e ly  M arx is t about it: the economic causes of wars were already 
proposed by anthropologists of whom Marx, and especially Engels, were 
so fond at the end of their lives (Bloch, 1983); Mao’s theory of the 
laws of war (Mao, 1975) is nothing but Clauswitz’s ideas wrapped in 
class struggle garb; And while no one ever accused Mr. Ludwig 
Gumplowicz of espousing Marxism, he is by far the most forceful 
exponent of the ’Marxist’ theory of foreign policy. In his view,
Mthe activities of the state as a whole originate in the 
sovereign class which acts with the assistance or with the 
compulsory acquiescence of the subject class. The movement is 
from within out; it is directed against other states and 
social groups. Its object is always defence against attacks, 
increase of power and territory, that is, conquest in one form 
or another" (Gumplowicz, 1899, p,117).
As Gumplowicz happened to be an important Realist thinker, it is no 
wonder that this allegedly Marxist theory of International Relations 
resembles the Realist theory.
The origins of this simplistic Marxist approach, it must be admitted, 
may easily be traced back to the work of Karl Marx himself. It does not
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appear in any full-fledged discussion, but can be discerned in his 
general attitude towards the topic (which, incidentally, was often left 
to the * expertise* of Engels). Marx’ s many scattered remarks on 
international relationships seem to fall into four categories:
i. To begin with, much of his thought on the subject developed as 
reaction to specific events. He was prompted by his fellow Marxists to 
formulate responses to contemporary issues of war, foreign policy and 
colonialism. In this, his position was that of an interested observer: 
wars are evil and more often than not the affairs of the bourgeoisie. 
The working classes, however, are caught in the cross fire and need to 
give their support to one of two unpalatable alternatives. Thus, when 
Napoleon Ill’s troops attacked Prussia, he supported Liebknicht’s 
absenteeism. (Letter Engels to Marx in Ramsgate, August 15, 1870; Marx 
to Engels in Manchester, August 17, 1870, in Marx & Engels, (1975)).
ii. Whenever Marx formulated general statements concerning internation­
al affairs, more often than not he compared them to domestic affairs. 
In so doing he facilitated a candid treatment of International 
Relations in Marxist circles. Accordingly, in the Communist M anifesto  
he says that
"In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by 
another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by 
another will also be put an end to. In proportion as the 
antagonism between classes within the nation vanishes, the 
hostility of one nation to another will come to an end" (1973b, 
p.85).
And again, in one of his India articles: correspondingly
"<t>here have been in Asia, generally, from immemorial times, 
but three departments of Government: that of Finance, or the 
plunder of the interior; that of War, or the plunder of the 
exterior; and finally, the department of Public Works" (1968, 
p.37).
iii. Nevertheless, he often emphasised that any serious study of 
Capitalism requires an understanding of the dynamics of the world 
market. In his words, the
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"...<t>hree cardinal facts of capitalist production: 1)
Concentration of means of production in few hands 2) Organisa­
tion of labour itself into social labour 3) Creation of the 
world market" (Capital, III, 1971, p,266).
Indeed, the world market was the subject to be of the sixth and final 
volume of Capital (Mandel,1970, p.28). The relations between the 
world-market and capitalism are developed on a dialectical basis:
"The world market itself forms the basis for this mode of 
production. On the other hand, the immanent necessity of this 
mode of production to produce on an ever-enlarged scale tends 
to extend the world market continually, so that it is not 
commerce in this case which revolutionize industry, but 
industry which constantly revolutionizes commerce. Commercial 
supremacy now connected to large industry" (Capital III, 
p.333).
And again,"Modem industry has established the world market, 
for which the discovery of America paved the way. This market 
has given an immense development to commerce, to navigation, 
to communication by land. This development has, in its turn, 
reacted on the extension of industry; and in proportion as in­
dustry, commerce, navigation, railways extended, in the same 
proportion the bourgeoisie developed, increased its capital, 
and pushed into the background every class handed down from 
the Middle Ages" (Manifesto, 1973, p.69).
At the same time, he maintains that the 'historical task’ of capitalism 
is to complete the transformation of the globe into an homogenous 
economic system for the eventual socialist transformation.
"Hie bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world 
market given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reac­
tionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the
national ground on which it stood the bourgeoisie keeps
more and more doing away with the scattered state of the 
population, of the means of production, and has concentrated 
property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was 
political centralisation. Independent, or but loosely connec­
ted provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and 
systems of taxation, became lumped together into one nation 
... A simi lar movement is going on before our own eyes. Modem 
bourgeois society with its relations of production, of 
exchange and property, a society that has conjured up such 
gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the 
sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers the
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powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his 
spells" (Manifesto, 1973, pp.71,2).
iv. Consequently, a fourth and perhaps most important element of Marx’s 
thought lies dormant. This latent theory of International Relations 
places the whole issue in a different light. First, it is clear that 
for Marx both the Capitalist and the Socialist modes of production are 
intrinsically * international * or * transnational ’. As a result it became 
a paradigm among socialists to presume that the revolution must be 
international.* Second, since Marx holds the view that one of the 
‘historical missions* of capitalism was the creation of a system of 
states, he appears to be arguing that International Relations of the 
capitalist era, which are relations between states, prepare the way for 
the next stage whereby the state will wither away, and a new global 
arrangement based on * communities’ will prevail. In his words,
"National differences, and antagonisms, between peoples, are 
daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the 
bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world market, to 
uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of 
life corresponding thereto.The supremacy of the proletariat 
will cause them to vanish still faster. United action, of the 
leading civilised countries at least, is one of the first 
conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat." (Manif­
esto, 1973, p.85)
Taken together, these two propositions, namely, the transnational 
character of modes of production and the transiency of the State, form 
the core of what amounts to a la te n t theory of International Relations, 
a perspective according to which the type, quality, unities, hence the 
d efin itio n  o f  In te rn a tio n a l Relations are historically determined and 
reflect the predominant mode of production. In the work of Marx these 
assertions stand as axioms, yet it is not clear what their place in his 
overall theoretical framework is. We may begin investigating these 
propositions by asking why the new socialist world order will not be 
simply a homogenous world system, but will consist of a new arrangement 
of communities.^
2.2. Social Classes and Political Structures.
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The question is particularly interesting because of the socialist 
context. In Marxist literature, the relations between social classes 
and the State are usually discussed in functional terms. The State is 
regarded as the regulator of class struggle, the 'executive committee' 
of the ruling classes, or as an alienated form of social relationships. 
On this basis as Wallerstein proposed, it may easily be seen to be in 
essence a tool for augmenting one's share in the profits generated
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world-wide. However, in Marx's vision of socialism, there is no need 
for an external and alienated form of regulation. Why then does society 
itself not dissolve and only the State wither away? Marx seems to take 
it for granted that the socialist world will be fragmented into 
enlightened social entities. In other words, social entities are seen 
by him to be in some way more fundamental components of social life 
than modes of production.
This is, of course, very significant for the student of International 
Relations, for it implies that the societies are fundamental to the 
Marxist theory of International Relations. To grasp the significance of 
societies in Marx’s thought, one needs to shift attention to an area 
little discussed by Marxists, namely, to social in te g ra tio n, because 
this is precisely the area of study which should enlighten us on the 
relation between social classes and societal unities.
Is there a distinct Marxist theory of social integration? Hie answer is 
probably both yes and no. Marx's main text, namely C ap ita l, is an 
abstract study of the capitalist mode of production. However, it 
remains unclear what precisely the spatial matrix of this mode is? 
Where does 'capitalism* occur? In Capital there are numerous references 
to a 'capitalist society', however, no indication is given as for the 
nature of this society. Is it the modem nation-states? Is it the 
capitalist world-market? Or is it an abstraction? At times Marx adds 
that the study of capitalism also requires a corresponding discussion 
of the national debt and the State, els well as the world market.* On 
this basis it appears that this 'capitalist society' is in fact the 
modem nation-state. However, since Capital remains incomplete, it is
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difficult to determine what Marx thought about the relationship between 
capitalism and society are.
A different line of investigation is required. Were we to understand 
Marx’s methodological stance, perhaps his sociological theories would 
become more explicit. According to one interpretation, C apita l is a 
theory of ’pure’ or ’ideal-type’ capitalism (Uno, 1980; Albirtton, 
1986). What is the rationale behind such a theory? There are two 
reasons, one historical the other theoretical. In retrospect we can now 
see that the capitalist system emerged in complete isolation from its 
social base. In the words of Bienkowski:
"The capitalist system of production did not originally arise, 
nor was it formed, as a national economic system. It emerged 
as a method of accumulating capital from profits acquired by 
individual capitalists .... What is currently referred to as 
the ’growth of the national economy’, ’the process of in­
dustrialization* , etc., was only a side-product .... Thus for 
the first hundred years it was possible to speak of the 
capitalist mode of production, but there was no such thing as 
the capitalist economic system on a global, national level" 
(1981, p.139).8
’Capitalism’, then, began its career as a relatively autonomous system. 
This in turn made it easier to perceive its special attributes. The 
uniqueness of the Capitalist mode of production, and that was already 
clear in Marx’s lifetime, was that for the first time in history an 
autochthonous system of growth had emerged. In the words of Albirtton:
"The commodity-form 1ms located its source of profit within a 
production process controlled by itself. This gives to 
capitalism a great dynamism since now that its source of 
self-expansion is internal. It can penetrate pre-capitalist 
economies and transform them together with itself into an 
economy that is more capitalist in a world that is also 
becoming more capitalist. The limit would be a global society 
in which all production is the production of commodities by 
commodified labour-power as regulated by the self-regulating 
market. This is what Uno calls ’a purely capitalist society’.
The self-purifying and self-abstracting tendencies 
inherent in reification mean that they can theorise the laws 
of motion of capitalism as laws working with ’iron necessity’. 
Total reification achieves a level of abstraction that sheds 
all contingencies associated with the historical concrete so 
that capital can be theorised as having an inner logic of 
necessary relations" (1986, pp.10-12).
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Albirtton follows Kozo Uno (1980) who argued convincingly that in 
C apital there are in fact three distinct levels of analysis which Uno 
calls respectively the theory of a purely capitalist society, the stage 
theory, and the analysis of history. Uno argues that the theory of 
purely Capitalist society is the main thane of Capital. Its function is 
to reveal how capitalism operates when it is allowed to be most fully 
itself. The point is that
"<w>ith the concept of a purely capitalist society, it is 
possible to understand the working of capitalism entirely in 
accord with its own economic principles without any inter­
ference of extraeconomic force or other alien forces (either 
non-capitalist or non-economic)" (Albirtton, 1986, p.38).
When capitalism is discussed as a pure system it is in fact posed as a 
closed system and its dynamics can be interpreted therefore, with the 
aid of the Hegelian system of dialectic (Sekine, 1980). In other words, 
it can seem to evolve on the basis of its own internal contradictions. 
However, whereas Hegel’s cosmology encompasses the whole universe, 
which can be assumed closed, Marx, in contrast, had to devise a 
theoretically closed system in order to utilize the methodology. The 
study of capitalism, therefore, as least as it is handled in C apita l,
is not a full scale study of society, it is only the study of an
elements of it, so it presumes other social theories!
What are they? Or to pose the same question differently: how did Marx 
conceive of Capitalism within the overall social context? Marx defined 
the Capitalist mode of production in the final pages of the third 
volume of Capital:
"Capitalist production is distinguished from the outset by two 
characteristic features. First. It produces its products as 
commodities.The fact that it produces commodities does not 
differentiate it from other inodes of production; but rather 
the fact that being a commodity is the dominant and determin­
ing characteristic of its products. This implies, first and
foremost, that the labourer himself comes forward merely as a
seller of commodities, and thus as a free wage-labourer, so 
that labourer appears in general as wage-labour. In view of 
what has already been said, it is superfluous to demonstrate 
anew that the relation between capital and wage-labour 
determines the entire character of the mode of production. The 
principal agents of this mode of production itself, the
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capitalist and the wage-labourer, are as such merely embodi­
ments, personifications of capital and wage-labour... Further­
more, already implicit in the commodity, and even more so in 
the commodity as a product of capital, is the materialisation 
of the social features of production and the personification 
of the material foundations of productions ... The second 
distinctive feature of the capitalist mode of production is 
the production of surplus value as the direct aim an determin­
ing motive of production” (pp.?? ).
Capitalism then is defined primarily as an ’ economic* system.
At the same time, Marx never tired to repeat that
"This mode of production should not be regarded simply as the 
reproduction of the physical existence of individuals. It is 
already a definite form of activity of these individuals, a 
definite way of expressing their life, a definite mode o f  
life ." (1963, p.69).
It would be misleading to impute any chronology or determinism to these 
statements. Let us just say that a certain economic system presupposes 
a corresponding social system and vice verca. In Marxist literature, 
however, this is taken a step further —  it is argued, indeed, 
asserted, that the ’economic’ structure of society determines its 
superstructure. In other words, there is a determinism, (not least 
fuelled by Engels himself).
Here, I would like to present a new idea: a distinction between
analytical causality and real causality. I would like to argue that 
Marx did not conceive of the economic system as the engine of social 
evolution, but he saw it as the most promising area of study of the 
social system. If this point is agreed upon we may take it that Marx 
did not evisage determinism in the read, world. He merely saw a totality 
1 in thought *, which, he argued, was best approached by political 
economy. (In his words,"The totality as it appears in the head, as a 
totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which ap­
propriates the world in the only way it can” (Grundrisse, 1973, 
p.101)). The point is that although Marx spent most of his days 
studying political economy, this does not constitute a proof that the 
’economy’ is the centre core of Marxism.
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There is no better place to see this than in the famous Preface, which 
is ordinarily regarded as evidence of Marx the determinist. The 
terminology is important:
"I was led by ray studies to the conclusion that legal rela­
tions as well as forms of State could neither be understood by 
themselves, nor explained by the so-called general progress of 
the human mind, but that they are rooted in the material 
conditions of life, which are summed up by Hegel after the 
fashion of the English and French writers of the eighteenth 
century under the name civil society, and that the anatomy of 
civil society is to be thought in political economy” (1963, 
p.67, my emphasis).
In this paragraph Marx presents three distinct areas of social 
activities: politics and legal relations, civil society, political 
economy. But these are truly an odd trio: legal relations and forms of 
State are empirically validated social categories; * civil society* on 
the other hand is an abstract concept; and political economy is a 
discipline. How these apparently incommensurable concepts relate to 
each other? Marx says that he was led by his studies to the conclusion 
that legal relations as well as forms of State could not be understood 
by themselves —  in other words, he argues in contrast to the Romantics 
that the State is not a person endowed with organic-like qualities; nor 
he adds, and this time he aims his words against Hegel and the 
Idealists, is it the outward manifestation of the progress of Reason. 
But he does not say that the State and legal relationships are in any 
way less important than other social phenomena. Marx, indeed, does not 
tell us what the State is. he shifts the discussion to a different 
plane altogether. He talks not of the State as such —  he talks about 
the form of the State, he talks about it as a comparative political 
scientist would. He maintains that the best way to u n d erstan d these 
relationships, i.e. the best way to understand the form of the State, 
lies in the area which Hegel calls —  after the fashion of the English 
and French writers —  civil society.
The point for Marx is that the explanation of the fo rm of the State is 
* rooted* —  an interesting metaphor —  in the material conditions which
Q
Hegel calls *civil society*. Now, in Marxism after Marx ’materialism* 
has come to denote not * civil society* but the * economy*. For Marx, it
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is the other way around: ’material’ life is ’civil society’, whereas 
"the categories of the bourgeois economics ...are form s o f  th o u g h t 
which are socially valid, and therefore objective" (Capital, I, p. 169, 
my emphasis). He appears to be saying that the ’material' life of the 
'economic’ world is nothing but social relationships under a veil:
"the social relations between their private labours appear as 
what they are i.e. they do not appear as direct social 
relations between persons in their work, but rather as 
material relations between persons and social relations 
between things" (Ibid, p.166).
It is now clear how the three apparently incommensurable categories of 
state, civil society and political economy are interrelated. The area 
of 'economics’ in Capitalism is an alienated and coded form of 
'material life*. It is not a separate world. But precisely because it 
is so, it is the area which holds the greatest potential for unlocking 
the mysteries of this mode of production. However, ’economics’ cannot 
be thought of els an inert category, it is perceived here purely as an 
heuristic device, enabling us to chart the ’anatomy' of material life.
Marx’s scheme therefore, centres not on political economy nor on the 
State, but rather on 'material life’ which he calls 'civil society’. 
’Civil society’ is the core, the basis. B u t C iv il socie ty  is  p re c is e ly  the  
area  least discussed b y  M arx and  M arx is ts  a lik e. Why is that? Civil 
society is at the heart of Marxist thought because Marxism is not a 
philosophy, doctrine or a science as sometimes postulated, but a 
sociology, the sociology of exploitation.^ Thus, what sets Marxism 
apart from any other social philosophies, and gives support and 
rationale to the enterprise in C ap ita l, is the believe that the process 
of exploitation holds the key to the dynamics of social life.
Marx never bothered to explain and elaborate precisely why exploitation 
is at the core of the social process —  he took it almost for granted.^ 
And instead of a theory he presents a metaphor, the famous metaphor of 
base and superstructure. However, this metaphor neglects the area which 
lay in between the infrastructure and the superstructure, namely, the 
s tru c tu re itself, which is what he calls civil society. In The German
Id e o lo g y Marx defines civil society as follows:
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"Civil society embraces the whole material intercourse of 
individuals within a definite stage of the development of 
productive forces. It embraces the whole commercial and 
industrial life of a given stage and, insofar, transcends the 
State and the nation, though, on the other hand again, it must 
assert itself in its foreign relations as nationality, and 
inwardly must organise itself as State" (1970, p.57).
The relations between the structure, the superstructure and the 
infrastructure are far from clear. On the relation between the 
infrastructure and the structure Marx says:
"The form of intercourse determined by the existing productive 
forces at all previous historical stages, and in its turn 
determining these, is c iv il s o c ie ty’.
By scxne interpretations this social area in fact determines the 
economic and nor the other way around (Sahlins, 1976) but that is 
taking it one step too far. In fact, it seems that Marx is saying that 
they are mutually determined.
The State, according to Marx, is not separate from * civil society* , it
12is rather the concentration and condensation of this society. Thus, 
about the programme of the German socialist party to have a * free 
state* he ironically asks
"Free state —  what is this? It is by no means the aim of the 
workers, who have got rid of the narrow mentality of hunble 
subjects, to set the state free.... Freedom consists in 
converting the state from an organ standing above society into 
one completely subordinate to it" ( C ritiq u e  o f  the Gotha 
Program m e, 1976, p. 26).
The State is the ‘condensation* of civil society, whereas political 
economy provides the anatomy the same civil society. Civil society, or 
material life, are therefore at the heart of the Marxist analysis. In 
other words, for Marx, the three categories were not independent or 
separate. They are in fact one and the same. The separation is made for 
heuristic purposes and precisely because * civil society* is the most
general concept, it is least fruitful els a unit of analysis.
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But let us return to International Relations. If * civil society* (or 
society) is the core of Msurxist thought, if MsuTxism is a sociology of 
exploitation, can we simply dispose of the notion of society in 
International Relations? Obviously not. However, nor can we simply 
incorporate the Marxist theory as it stands without considerable 
modification. For the location of contradiction at the heart of the 
social, process presupposes another force which balances it and form 
society as "a going concern" (Aberele, et. sd., 1967) to begin with. In 
other words, the Marxist theory pre-supposes social integration but 
offers no unique insight into it.
As a result, the M arx is t th e o ry  is  essen tia lly  socie ty -based , i t  is  so to 
speak, lan d -lo cked  and  cannot be m indlessly  tra n s fe rre d  to a g lobal 
context. It implicitly presupposes a bounded societal context and 
consequently social classes (the "motor force of history") need to be 
defined in conjunction with politics and ideology. Or rather, they 
should be defined as external to these structures. This, it will be 
remembered, was precisely the claim of Nicos Poulantzas (1974a), who 
distinguished between the level of the structures and the level of 
class struggle, and refused to define social classes purely on the 
beLsis of their place in the production process.^
2.3. The levels of society in an international context
Whatever one wishes to call it, it is clear that Marxism has had little 
to say about the social interactions which constitute the ‘structure* 
apart from some vague affirmation that they Eire determined * in the last 
instance* by the infrastructure. Now, most crucially, the three levels 
Eire certainly interdependent and to that extent they may be inves­
tigated synchronically. However, if we broaden our scope beyond the 
frontiers of any one society, these synchronic ‘levels* reveal 
themselves as components of other ‘systems*. Indeed, from a wider 
angle, there is no necessary temporal or spatial overlap between the 
three levels. Each ‘system* possess its own unique history: the history 
of exploitation may be recounted in terms of successive modes and
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stages of production; the history of the structures (society), as 
admirably laid down by Braudel (1979), obeys its own rhythm, or rather, 
rhythms. The same with the history of various power organisations 
(Mann, 1986). It is clear, therefore, to take one example, that the 
* ideology * of the bourgeoisie or whatever one wishes to call it, has 
not developed historically, nor is it now, simply a * level’ of one 
society. Rather, its origins can be traced back to a time when these 
societies did not exist as such. The same can be said of the * juridico- 
-political * superstructural forms which more often than not are bor­
rowed from other formations (Watson, 1977, chpt.9).
Now, and this is the crux of the matter, as long as one operates on the 
premise of a closed * political unit*, be it State, society, tribe, 
clan, etc., or more seriously, as long as one18 horizons are limited by 
these boundaries, emphasis is naturally laid upon the synchronic 
properties of this unity, if only because the various * levels* 
(Althusser, 1969) or ‘functional systems* and ‘subsystems* (Parsons, 
1961; 1971) Eire cut off from their natural * transnational * habitat and 
appear therefore as ‘levels*, ‘systems* of the social context. Within 
this confined space, it is difficult to resist deterministic theories, 
for there must be some sort of relation of causality between these 
levels. But how is it possible to think of causality which is not 
absolute and complete? How can we describe, within the narrow confines 
of a society, the observation that the levels (economic, politic, 
culture) permeate and influence each other, ‘but not always* and ‘not 
always in the same way*. Indeed, it is very difficult to do so and 
consequently it is far easier to present some schematic and reduc­
tionist theory.
Conversely, once emphasis is laid upon large structures such 'civilis­
ations* or *world-economies*, investigation is pulled towards the 
diachronic pole, if only because in the wider context the various 
’sets’ or ’systems* appear to be merely superimposed one upon the 
other. Within the larger context, the semblance of direct causality and 
determinism is all but gone. However, whatever may be said about the 
relation between the levels at that context, they are not simply a 
‘heap* of social relations.
88
Thus the problem facing the study of International Relations —  or 
indeed, the problem atic  o f  In te rn a tio n a l Relatione —  is that at the 
global context both synchronic and diachronic research face each other 
directly. It is simply impossible to separate them. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, the relativity of the units is something of which we are 
painfully aware in International Relations.
In the light of the foregoing, we need, at least for the purpose of 
this thesis:
1) to re-define the study of International Relations now that the 
notion of * relations between states' has been found wanting; and
2) to locate the nexus around which contemporary international 
relationships are located.
To begin with the first point, it is clear that the definition of 
International Relations has to address the analytical problem caused by 
the failure of the levels to overlap. In other words, it has to address 
the 'artificiality' of political constructions. The notion of 'society' 
emphasises synchronic and homeostatic characteristics. However, the 
study of International Relations is superimposed precisely at the point 
where the synchronic level does not correspond (or apparently does not 
correspond) to the diachronic one. It is fitting therefore to define 
International Relations as an in ves tig a tio n  in to  the im plications fo r  a n y  
single  socie ty  o f  its  being in  a w orld in h a b ited  b y  m any societies. In 
other words, we define it as a study that aims to transcend (not 
replace) the societal-synchronic dimension. It takes societies to be 
relatively discrete entities (or as I shall define in chapter four, 
discrete/indiscrete entities), and investigates both its discreteness 
and indiscretion within a globed context.
How should we approach contemporary international relationships? 
Following in the same vein, we have first to define the nature of 
modem society, and then the implications of its associations with 
other societies. The first of these tasks will be carried out in the 
third and fourth chapters. It will be argued that unlike tribes or 
clans, modem societies are not cohesive or 'organic* socio-economic
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systems. They are essentially artificial constructions whose nodal 
point is the modem concept of sovereignty. The significant ingredient 
of modem sovereignty was recognised already in the sixteenth century; 
it was the exclusive ability to make rules or, els Carl Schmitt (1933) 
calls it, the ability to decide. Beyond this, each society is linked 
to others in a wide Eirray of ’informal’ (i.e. non-govemmental) links. 
Thus, while political decisions are localised and society-bound, 
relations between societies develop in various dimensions which include 
political, trade, immigration, the flow of ideets, fashion, technologies 
and so on. Therefore, it will be argued, the best way to describe the 
nature of modem unities within the international context is not els 
states, nor is the world-economy, but els the p o litica l process. That will 
the subject of the next chapter.
2.4. Wallerstein’s radical approach
There still remains the question of how it is possible to incorporate 
the positive components of Neo-Marxist thought within what is essen­
tially a society-centred theory of International Relations. Perhaps the 
most influential of the Neo-Marxists is Immanuel WsLllerstein (1974;
1980) who presents the world capitalist system els one unit and els a 
result relegates the state-society complex to a secondary position. In 
his words,
"<t>he development of the capitalist world-economy has 
involved the creation of all the major institutions of the 
modem world: classes, ethnic/national groups, households —  
and the ’states’” (1984, p.29).
Instead of pointing out what I consider to be Wallerstein’s logical 
inconsistencies, it will be far more effective to compare his sugges­
tions with that of a few other prominent scholars in order to demonstr­
ate that his concept of the ’world-economy’ overflowed its natural 
boundaries.^
Wallerstein was able to relegate the State to a secondary position, and 
present a uni-dimensional picture of the world capitELlist system by 
combining, and in fact reifying, three separate categories into one;
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that of the world-economy, the world market and capitalism.
Wallerstein defines the global system as follows,
"A world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, 
structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coheren­
ce. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold 
it together by tension, and tear it apart as each group seeks 
eternally to remould it to its own advantage. It has the 
characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span 
over which its characteristics change in some respects and 
remain stable in others... .What characterises a social system 
in my view is the fact that life within it is largely self-co­
ntained" (1974, p.347).
One need look no farther than the work of Braudel to find a society- 
centred theory of the world-economy. Indeed, Braudel disagrees 
precisely on the fundamental point of the place of the world-economy 
within an overall social investigation. According to him,
"It would be a mistake to imagine that the order of the 
world-economy governed the whole of society, determining the 
shape of other orders of society. For other orders existed. An 
economy never exists in isolation, its territory and expanses 
are also occupied by other spheres of activity —  culture, 
society, politics —  which are constantly reacting with the 
economy, either to help or as often to hinder its development 
.... the reality of experience or the * really real * as 
Francois Perroux calls it —  is a to ta lity which we already 
described as society p a r  excellence, 'the set of sets'. Each 
set.. .mingled with the others... .They all nibble at frontiers, 
seek to extend their territory and create their own Von Thunen 
circles" (Braudel, 1979, III, p.45).
Thus in contrast to Wallerstein, Braudel prefers a more modest 
definition of the world-economy. He makes a clear distinction between 
the concept of *w orld-econom y* and of ' w orld  economy*.
'The world economy is an expression applied to the whole 
world. It corresponds, as Sismondi puts it, to 'the market of 
the universe', to 'the human race, or that part of the human 
race which is engaged in trade, and which today in a sense 
makes up a single market*. <whereas> ... A world-economy (an 
expression I have used in the past as a particular meaning of 
the German term Weltwirtschaft) only concerns a fragment of 
the world, an economically autonomous section of the planet
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able to provide for most of its own needs, a section to which 
its internal links and exchanges give a certain organic unity” 
(1979, III, pp. 21,22).
I must admit to having difficulties with the concept of the world 
economy; however, it is clear what world-economies are all about. These 
are relatively self-sufficient geographical areas, not at all 'organic 
systems' but rather ' enormous envelopes ’ containing a variety of 
cultures, polities, societies and economies, linked together by trade 
which moulds than into self-sufficient (or relatively self-sufficient) 
'units':
”The area”, writes Braudel ”is alw ays a sum o f in d iv id u a l 
economies, some poor, some modest, with a comparatively rich 
one in the centre. As a result, there axe inequalities, 
differences of voltage which make possible the functioning of 
the whole. Hence that * international division of labour*" 
(Ibid. p.26, emphasis mine).
Braudel, then, defines the world-economy as a relatively self-suffi­
cient trading area. Thus, in contrast to Wallerstein, for wham the 
tension between the centre and the periphery is the life-blood of the 
system on all its aspects, political, economic and cultural, Braudel's 
still put the onus on society and presents it as a 'set of sets* (1979, 
II, chpt.5) of which, the ’world-economy’ or world time, as he calls 
it, is only one, not necessarily dominant.
” World time ... might be said to concentrate above all on a 
kind of superstructure of world history: it represents a 
crowning achievement, created and supported by forces at work 
underneath it, although in turn its weight has an effect upon 
the base. Depending on place and time, this two-way exchange, 
from the bottom upwards and from the top down, has varied in 
importance. But even in advanced countries, socially and 
economically speaking, w orld  time has n e v e r accounted fo r  the  
whole o f  human existence" (Braudel, 1979, III, p,18).
The crucial difference between Braudel and Wallerstein, therefore, is 
that Braudel's Capitalism and  C ivilisation claims only to be a framework 
for the study of history, and the capitalist world-economy is one 
component in this framework. Wallerstein, on the other hand, presents
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a framework and combines it with a series of hypothesis pertaining to 
the dynamics of the world-economy. However, his hypotheses do not 
require the radical framework he offers and his framework does not 
render essential support to his hypotheses.
When the world-economy is distinguished from the world economy (or the 
world market), the latter should be defined independently. There were 
many efforts in this direction, Ernest Mandel presents a useful 
formula:
"Bukharin correctly defined the world economy as *a system of 
relations of production and corresponding relations of 
exchange on an international scale. But... he failed to 
emphasise... that the capitalist world economy is an articu­
lated system of capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist 
relations of production linked to each other by capitalist 
relations of exchange and dominated by the capitalist world 
market"(1975, pp. 48,49).
Here, the enormous ' envelope* of the world-economy is filled up with 
modes and stages of production one of which is the capitalist mode of 
production. Why then should the notion of an envelope containing the 
Capitalist mode of production be an improvement on the notion of a 
unified Capitalist world-system? On the face of it, there is little to 
separate the two. In the one the CMP is dominant; in the other its 
paramountcy warrants the appellation of the whole system as Capitalist. 
The issue, however, has little to do with the nature of the system as 
such, but is related to the heuristic value of the concept 
* capitalism1, which, as we have seen, is utilized by Marx in order to
explore abstract tendencies and not an historical system.
Capitalism, the world market and the world-economy therefore are three 
different concepts, they are three distinct 'sets*. However, the 
various sets revolve around the primary set, the 'set of sets', or 
society, which in turn has to be investigated in the context of the
sets that make it up —  i.e. within the global context.
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NOTES
1. For example, Ernest Handel’8 The M eaning o f the Second World War 
(1986), powerful and interesting as it is, is nothing but crude 
instrumentalism. Handel’s argument develops as follows: "Capital­
ism implies competition. With the emergence of large corporations 
and cartels - i.e. the advent of monopoly capitalism - this 
competition assumed a new dimension. It became qualitatively more 
politico-economic, and therefore military-economic ....Accor­
dingly, states and their armies involved themselves more and more 
directly in that competition - which became imperialist rivalry 
for outlets for investment in new markets, for access to cheap or 
rare raw materials" (p. 11). And again "Roosevelt had to 
manoeuvre in a more cautious way than Hitler or the Tokyo 
warlords, for inside the USA democracy still prevailed... .But the 
intention to intervene at virtually any cost was not his personal 
choice. It was the American ruling class’s option, as deliberate 
as those to its German or Japanese counterparts" (p. 33).
This type of analysis goes all the way back to Lenin’s 
Im perialism and inspired many tragic miscalculation notwithstan­
ding the infamous Soviet-German pact on the eve of the second 
world war.
As Richard Day (1981) has demonstrated, basing themselves 
on such premises, Soviet analysts anticipated a war between Great 
Britain and United States and could not see the greater threat 
posed by Fascism until it was too late. On the subject see 
Poulantzas, 1974 and * Plutot Hitler que 1 ’ emanciaption populaire ’ 
in ’Bettleheim (1983)).
Mandel’s argument is not false, not at all, but it derives 
its strength precisely from its neglect of a class analysis. For 
the relations between the Nazi state machinery (recent research 
has demonstrated conclusively that the ’Nazi state machinery* was 
quite anarchic) and the German Bourgeois has been a subject of 
inconclusive debate. Nor could we reduce by any stretch of 
imagination the American Bourgeoisie to a homogeneous class (See 
Berghahn, 1986; Lauderbaugh,1980;Piji 1981). There was nothing 
forlorn in the decision to go into war as well as with its 
termination. See also CEDETIM (1978); Valdez Paz (1985).
2. On the modem Marxist theories of the State see: Bobbio, 1988; 
Buroway & Skocpol, 1982; Clarke, 1977; Holloway & Piccioto, 1978; 
Jessop, 1982; 1985; Kazancigil, 1986; Miliband, 1973; O’Connor, 
1984; Offe, 1984; Poulantzas, 1973; 1978b.
3. Treitschke too possesses his own idiosyncratic ’Marxist’ theory 
of International Relations: According to him, "<i>t was at a very 
late stage that the State began to realise that it was something 
more than the tool of a particular class. The conception of the 
theory of High Treason is a symptom of this awakening" (1916,- 
p.53).
4. Plekhanov reports in ’Patriotism and Socialism’ (in 1976) of a 
questionnaire sent to him by Harv the French socialists which 
goes as follows:
"1) What is your view of the statement in the Communist M anifesto  
that the workers have no fatherland?
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2) What actions and what forms of propaganda does internationali­
sm demand from Socialists! in view of militarism, ’colonialism*, 
and their causes and consequences?
3) What part must Socialists play in international relations 
(tariffs, international labour legislation, etc.?
4) What is the duty of socialists in the event of war?" (Ple- 
khanov, 1976, p.84)
5. See Marx, 1963 ’future society’ pp.249 - 263, as well as the
relevant pages in the Communist M anifesto.
6. See Introduction, p.9
7. "The order <of Capital) obviously has to be
(1) the general, abstract determinants which obtain in more or 
less all forms of society.
(2) the categories which make up the inner structure of bourgeois 
society and on which the fundamental classes rest. Capital, wage 
labour, landed property. Their interrelation. Town and country. 
The three great social classes. Exchange between than. Circula­
tion. Credit system (private).
(3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of the state. 
Viewed in relation to itself. The ’unproductive’ classes. Taxes.
State debt. Public credit. The population. The colonies.
Emigration.
(4) The international relation of production, International 
division of labour. International exchange. Export and import. 
Rate of exchange.
(5) The world market and crises" (Marx, Grundrisse, 1973, p.108).
8. "In the United States, perhaps four-fifth of the population was
self-employed in the early part of the nineteenth century. By 
1870 this had declined to about one-third and by 1940 to no more 
than one-fifth; by 1970 only about one-tenth of the population 
was self-employed. We are thus dealing with a social relation of 
extremely recent date" (Bravermann, 1974, p.53).
9. That has been the starting point for the contentions of the
German school of derivation. On the subject see Holloway & 
Piccioto, 1978; Clarke, 1977; 1978; Jessop, 1987).
10. Different strands of Marxism came up with different answers;
marxism is treated as a science, a praxis, a theoretical 
practice, etc. The view here, however, is that Marxism is 
essentially a sociology: "El concepto de la explotacion, tal y 
como aparece en el marxismo, constituye una ruptura muy profunda 
con todas las formas anteriores —  idealistas y materialistas —  
de analizar al hombre.... La explotacion como pecado, la 
explotacion como accidente, eran la caracteristica o la propiedad 
de ciertos hombres que aparecian como explotadores, y la 
caracteristica de otros que aparecian como explotados" (Casanova, 
1978, p. 24).
Exploitation in Marxist thought is m ateria l exploitation by 
that we mean the permanent transfer of surplus-product from one 
social class to another.
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11. What is the basis of such a belief? There is, of course, massive 
supporting evidence to corroborate it. However, ultimately, it is 
based on a conviction, just as other sociologies (e.g.Parsons) 
which assert the primacy of the 'cultural system (1961) Eire.
12. "They all employ the power of the State, the concentrated and 
organized force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of production" 
(Capital 1,1970, p.233)
13. The subject will be discussed more fully in chapter seven.
14. Perry Anderson's judgement of Wallerstein*s work may be a good
starting point on the general project of Neo-Marxism: "A last
word is perhaps needed on the choice of the State itself as a
central theme for reflection. Today, when 'history from below* 
has become a watchword in both Marxists and non-Marxists circles, 
and has produced major gains in our understanding of the past, it 
is nevertheless necessary to recall one of the basic axioms of 
historical materialism: that secular struggle between classes is 
ultimately resolved at the p o litic a l —  not at the economic or 
cultural —  level of society. In other words, it is the construc­
tion and destruction of States which seal the basic shifts in the 
relations of production, so long as classes subsist. A 'history 
from above' —  of the intricate machinery of class domination —  
is thus no less essential than a 'history from below’: indeed, 
without it the latter in the end becomes one-sided (if the better 
side)" (1974, p.11).
For a discussion of Wallerstein * s work see: Janowitz. 1979; 
Pieterse (1989); Skocpol (1979b); Thrisk (1979); Zolberg (1981). 
Szentes (1985).
15. It is interesting to compare that with Wallerstein who writes: 
"The solidarity of the system was based ultimately on this 
phenomenon of unequal development, since the multilayered 
complexity provided the possibility of multilayered identifica­
tion and the constant realignment of political forces, which 
provided at one and the same time the underlying turbulence that 
permitted technological development and political transforma­
tions, and also the ideological confusion that contained the 
rebellions, whether they were rebellions of showdown, of force, 
or of flight" (Wallerstein,1974, p.86)
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CHAPTER THREE —  THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
The idea of 'State*, says Kropotkin, may give rise to two mistakes: 
"There is, of course, the German school which takes pleasure in 
confusing S tate with society. This confusion is to be found among the 
best German thinkers and many of the French who cannot visualise 
Society without a concentration of the State .... On the other hand the 
State has also been confused with Governm ent. Since there can be no 
State without government" (1987, pp.9,10). The problem, however, is 
that if we attempt to follow Kropotkin’s definition of the State, 
namely, that "<t>he State idea ... not only includes the existence of 
a power situated above society, but also of a te r r ito r ia l concentration  
as well as the concentration in  the hands o f a few  o f m any fu n c tio n s  in  
the life  o f societies." (p. 10), then it is very difficult to articulate a 
study of the relations between states.
Sociological, philosophical, legal and geographical theories of the 
State fail to define the State within a global setting and concentrate 
exclusively on whatever happens within the boundaries of society. The 
result is that in International Relations the definition of the State 
invariably falls back on either society or government. The purpose of 
this chapter is to demonstrate that the political process, which is 
the subject-matter of modem theories of the State, is also the most 
satisfying definition of the discreteness of modem societies within a 
global context. In other words, the political process can double as the 
’unit of analysis’ of International Relations.
3.1. How ’Units’ are Determined
Strictly speaking, the ’political process’ is not a unit at all. In the 
empiricist tradition, social ’units’, be they individuals, classes, or 
states, are units of analysis because they are thought to be corporeal. 
That is, we have learned to think of these ’unities’ in ontological 
terms, as pure categories. The purity of the categories is projected 
in an implied discreteness and impenetrability of the ’unities’. Thus 
we arrive at a picture of a fragmented world filled up with physically 
discrete objects.* Sorokin argues that there are essentially three
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modalities of social relationships, which he calls familial, contrac­
tual and compulsory (1941, Vol III, chpt.l). Social organisations 
(including political ones) are different measures of all three. Thus, 
for instance, Germanic tribes were principally familial; feudal 
entities were predominantly contractual, and modem Nation-States are 
on the whole compulsory organisations. In any one period there are at 
most two leading organisations. However, none of these organisations 
ever arrives at a position of exclusivity. On the contrary, these 
social groupings (beginning with the family, through the village, 
military, religious and economic organisations,) co-exist, support, and 
struggle with each other.
Whenever one organisation is privileged over the others, as for 
instance is the case with the State in International Relations, and 
more generally, whenever a social organisation is chosen as the ’unit 
of analysis’, the inevitable result is the derogation and elimination 
of all other social groupings from the narrative. With the inevitable 
result that Realists are forced to consider domestic political 
processes as external to their system. Reification, then, tends to lead 
to the methodological difficulties discussed in previous chapters 
(Ashley, 1986).
However, we are already witnessing the emergence of a new perspective. 
When Wallerstein and Braudel suggested their concept of a ’world- 
economy* , they did not merely propose a different social organisation, 
they shifted the whole debate to a different plane altogether. They 
have resurrected, if under a new name, the oldest of ’civilisation’. 
Here it is not the supposed corporeity of the social grouping which 
defines the unit of analysis, but the spatial boundaries of relatively 
intense social interactions, be they economic or cultural. This global 
context is then packed with various organisations of different shape, 
size and density.
Nonetheless, with all its advantages, such a conception is naturally 
not the best means of discussing the relations between the various 
groups that make up the global context. We need therefore to define the 
’unit of analysis* of International Relations without
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(a) reifying them,
(b) eliminating other social groups from the narrative,
(c) neglecting the global context,
(d) but retaining the centrality of the State/society complex.
This, I would argue, requires a radical shift in the manner by which 
the units of analysis are defined.
3.1.2. Problems in articulating the * unity1 of any social formation
Articulating the discreteness of modem societies is by no means an 
easy task. The problem branches into four separate issues:
A) Societies define their unity and separateness by means of images 
and language. Thus, for instance, the representation of England in the 
sixteenth century as a * commonwealth * (Smith, 1984, p. 42) shows 
uncustomary emphasis on the ’political individual’ (Moreau, 1977): 
Similarly, the Hebrews kept themselves as a people by maintaining 
special customs and practices, all pertaining to the ’original 
contract’ between Abraham and God. Again, the appellation of modem 
societies as nation-states is a condensed term conflating objectives 
and practices. The political organisation (the State), has created, 
sometimes consciously, sometimes not, a nation which in turn strives
to co-habit within the boundaries of the State (the doctrine of
self-determination).
Concepts may take a specifically material form. Kristof recounts that
"Historically, the word ’frontier’ implied what it suggests 
etymologically, that is, that which is ’in front’. The 
frontier was not an abstract term or line; on the contrary, it 
designated an area which was part of a whole .... <whereas>
’Boundary* is a term appropriate to the present-day concept of
the state, that is, the state as a sovereign (or autonomous) 
spatial unit, one among many... .The modem sovereign state is 
bound within and confined to its legal limits. The boundaries 
bind together an area and a people which live under one 
sovereign government and law and are, at least presumably, 
integrated not only administratively and economically but also 
by means of a state idea or ’creed’"( 1969, p. 126, 7).
This is the politico-ideological level of representation of the
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boundaries of society.*
B) The political representation is a blend of what ought to be and what 
is. Thus, we talk of inter-national or trans-national relations knowing 
full well that no nation is a clear cut, demarcated entity. The 
political representations may not necessarily be a true, or even 
accepted to be true representations of the way things are. If in 
political and juridical language the world is conceived sis such, it is 
nevertheless acknowledged, and indeed, urged under the banner of 
* freedom’ that these entities are and should remain open to others. 
Again, one should be aware of the difference between the wish of those 
in power to control and the openness which actually exists.
C) What Foucault calls the spatio-temporal episteme supports and 
distorts our notions of separateness (Foucault, 1966).* The epistdme is 
essentially a paradigm of thought. According to Sack:
"The view of earth space that predominated in the thousand 
years between the fall of Rome and the Age of Discovery was 
derived from the geographic experience of a closed feudal 
society and from the influence of the Catholic Church’s 
interpretation of the Bible ... .Medieval maps of land holdings 
were sketches containing numerous distortions and scales. When 
distant places were collected together within a conceptually 
abstract system it was in conformity with a religious cosmog­
raphy" (1986, p. 129).
In his view, the decisive break with the past occurred with the 
discovery of America:
"Frcxn the territorial perspective, what stands out so starkly 
to modem eyes about the very beginning of the 'Discoveries’ 
is the abstract theoretical nature to the claims of sovereign­
ty over area ....In its scale and intensity, no less than in 
its conception, this approach to people and place has a modem 
ring. It points to an explicit and intense territorial 
definition of social relations" (Ibid. p.127).
Figgis (1916) argues that the rebellion of the United Provinces in the 
sixteenth century led to a new perception of the relation between 
territory and the people. Polanyi (1954), Dodgshon (1987), and Carchedi
(1983) emphasise market relationships in the emergence of this 
episteme. And Poulantzas (1979), in one of his most brilliant if
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difficult passages, demonstrates the link between the outward percep­
tion of the spatio-temporal world and the political organisation of 
society. The common feature of pre-capitalist space, he argues, is that
"it is continuous, homogeneous, sym m etrical, re v e rs ib le  and  
open. The space of Western Antiquity is a space with a c e n tre: 
the polis (which itself has a centre: the a g o ra ). But it has 
no frontiers in the modem sense of the term. It is con­
centric, but, having no real outside, it is also open. This 
centre (the polis and agora) is inscribed in a space whose 
essential characteristies are homogeneity and symmetry, not 
differentiation and hierarchy" (1979, pp.100, 101).
The national territory, on the other hand is different.
"<It>has nothing to do with the natural features of the land. 
It is rather of an essentially political character....The 
individualisation of the body-politic —  as an ensemble of 
identical monades separated from the State —  rests on the 
state framework that is inscribed in the spatial matrix 
implied by the labour process. Modem individuals are the 
components of the modem nation-State: the people-nation of 
the capitalist State is the content of a space whose frontiers 
are the pertinent contours of the material bases of power... In 
fact, the national territory is but the political expression 
of an enclosure at the level of the State as a whole" (Ibid. 
p.104).6
The modem spatio-temporal episteme *objectivise’ phenomena so that 
they appear discrete. It is important to note, therefore, before we 
finally agree that states are indeed compact unities, that modem frame 
of mind is attracted to such a conception of the world.
D) These three levels of representations tend for obvious reasons, to 
be couched in universal terms. However, in practice none of them, or 
even a judicious combination of all three, provides us with an accurate 
description of the cleavage between societies. In reality, the 
cleavage, as well as the internal unity of formation is in a total 
state of flux. The problem, therefore, lies in the most basic tenets 
of our thought: language, concepts and images are not wholly vindicated 
by the shreds of evidence and what can be surmised by pure logic. There 
is a gulf between theory and practice, a gulf which is built into the
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nature of theoretical thought (Polanyi, 1958), and can be apprehended 
by thought. The issue at hand, therefore, is quite complex. There can 
be no talk of a fair abstract representations of the cleavage between 
societies. The best one can hope for is an awareness of the representa­
tional problem and the translation of this awareness to concepts that 
leave, so to speak, space in our imagination for a more chaotic and 
fluid situation than permitted in ordinary language. The closest thing 
to a *unit*, i.e. a relative pole of stability in a sea of change, is 
the * political process*. A model of unity which has evolved in Europe 
and subsequently was exported all over the globe.
3.2. The State. Politics, and the Political Process
The argument so far was that the unit of analysis of International 
Relations must correspond to the true nature of the cleavage between 
modern societies. The unit of analysis and has to be also analytically
Q
effective. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate that modem 
theoreticians of the State have selected the * political process* as 
their unit of analysis. Thus, were we to construct a theory of 
International Relations based on this, it will greatly facilitate the 
transmission of information from political sociology to International 
Relations and vice versa.
3.2.1. The State.
Instead of a universal definition of the State, a definition which is 
either static or merely corresponds to the lowest common denominator 
shared by all states, past, present and future, it will be of feu? 
greater use to demonstrate the inter-dependence of the ingredients 
which make up out conception of the State. Thus it will be easier to 
appreciate the relativity of each individual component, as well as the 
tenacity of its hold over social life. Let us recount briefly the main 
components of the State.
The State is, first of all, an association, i.e., a form of organisa­
tion whereby people live. One of the fundamental questions in Political 
Philosophy 1ms been whether the State is simply a ’political* associa­
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tion, i.e. whether it is an organisation which emerges and persists 
around the personality of a political figure as Weber suggested.*** Or 
whether it is more intrinsic to complex societies. The question, in 
other words, is to what extent the State is an association or merely an 
ag g reg atio n of people.
It is clear that the State is not merely an aggregation of people 
because the population of the State becomes to a certain, if histori­
cally fluctuating degree, interdependent. The principle of association 
varies considerably among States in history, some employed mainly 
familial models, others contractual models and others again used brute 
force. In modem times, the principle of association which has 
functioned best is the law, a set of binding codes of conduct. This led 
many to define the State in conjunction with the law.** However, as 
demonstrated in the work of Foucault (1973), Giddens (1984) and Mann 
(1986), propping up the modem State there are new types of 1 extensive ’ 
and diffused (Mann, 1984, 1986) power relationships, not necessarily 
the law as such.
The State is a teleological device to the extent that it is an 
organisation serving a purpose or purposes. This, it is important to 
note, is quite different from the argument that people have banded 
together in the State in order to achieve certain purposes. In other 
words, the State cannot be derived from its functions, although it 
serves many functions. The only universal, ever-present, function of 
the State (as opposed to the various functions served by government) is
to hold together people locked in unequal power relationships (manifest
12m  its simplest form in the dichotomy between rulers and ruled). The 
State, therefore, is a class-organisation.
Historically, the association functioned at its best when it rested on 
sentiments of justice and love, i.e. on law and nationalism. It 
functions at its worst, when fear and corruption reigns. In any case, 
no State exists for long if it surrenders its monopoly, or at least its 
claim to monopoly, over the means of violence. This permanent duality 
in the nature of the State has led to a great deal of debate over 
whether the strong emotions it generates may be considered intrinsic to
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the association or whether they are merely an effect of a legitimation
principle. Furthermore, as the classical political philosophers never
tired of arguing, individuals in the State are quite different from
individuals in some supposed ’state of nature’. Thus the State and its
population are united in a complex representation which defines their
13ideological separateness.
None of these issues can be discussed, however, without considering the 
State as a te r r ito r ia l association. The concept of territoriality is 
beyond the scope of this work, but as Sack (1981) has demonstrated, 
territoriality is not simply the control of an area, it is a form of 
power relationship. In his words,
"Territoriality neither dispenses with action by contact nor 
violates it. Rather it extends the particulars of action by 
contact to the point where a new principle relating space and 
action seems to emerge; and, which, in turn affects the 
details of action be contact .... we will use the term to mean 
the attempt to affect, influence, or control actions and 
interactions (of people, things and relationships, etc.) by 
asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific 
geographical area. This area is the territory. Territoriality 
makes the territory appears to be filled with power, in­
fluence, authority, or sovereignty. Territoriality can either 
include or exclude actions from the territory” (p.55). Thus,
"an example of territoriality is an attempt at control actions 
by asserting control over an area" (pp.56,7).
Michael Mann (1986) has distinguished four types of ’power’ structures 
which he terms, political, ideological, economic and military. In his 
typology, territorial power structures are termed ’political’. However, 
simply to equate territoriality with politics in the Weberian fashion 
does not really capture the unique dimension of territoriality. 
Territoriality implies that power tactics tend to operate spatially; 
the State, as Marx said, ’concentrates’ social power, it is therefore 
essentially a power machine (Foulantzas, 1973; Jessop, 1985).
In its most rudimentary form, facilitating the concentration of power 
was attempted by a policy of racial or religious homogenization (the 
expulsion of the Jews and the moors from Spain, the eviction of the 
Huguenots from France, the counter-reformation, Jews in Israel, etc.). 
Today the national system of education and the various ’national*
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themes, such as the flag, the national anthem, national colour, 
national sports teams, etc.. serve the same purpose. The goal behind 
these policies is to supplement force with a sentiment of attachment. 
Nonetheless, the major tools of the concentration of social power 
remain as they always have been, they include systems of universal 
taxation, standing armies and police forces.
The territorial dimension of State power explains the inclination to 
claim exclusivity or paramountcy over its territory. However, there is 
a difference, however, as Mann puts it, between content and intent. By 
intent states* hold over their territory is absolute and complete, in 
content it varies considerably. Moreover, it would be incorrect to 
assume that there was a linear progression in the ability and will of 
the State to participate in social life. Modem States are more 
involved with their economies than their ancestors, but they have by 
and large relinquished their claim over spirituality (the law of 
blasphemy, restrictions on sex behaviour, the inquisition, etc.). 
Furthermore, contrary to conventional wisdom, the claim to s o v e r e i g n t y  
is not an essentia l a ttr ib u te  o f s tatehood. In fact, in European history 
it was long time before states found it essential to make such bold 
claims (Skinner, 1978).
Territorial power structures require formal organisations which define 
and uphold the rule. These are organs whose functions are, as Parsons 
puts it, goal-attainment and adaptation. In spite of the fact that a 
State without a government does not function properly, and government 
without a State does not function at all, it is important to keep the 
two notions separately (as demonstrated in the first chapter). Equally 
so, it is preferable to distinguish between form s of states, i.e. their 
regime and formal mode of organisation, from the notion of State itself 
(Palan,1988).
It is convenient, as the discussion above shows to think of the State 
as an object or an actor. However, this fails to capture the essential 
point that society is organised as a State and therefore the State is 
neither society nor government. As Burdeau puts it: "Nobody has seen 
the state, it is not a territory, population or set of institutions,
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nor is it an accumulation or synthesis of these elements, it is 
something that transcends them all” (1970, pp. 13,14, my translation).^ 
When the State is thought of as an object in International Relations it 
is equated with society, and when it is thought of as actor, it is 
reduced to a government.
In my view, the only viable alternative was proposed by Nicos Poulan- 
tzas, it consists of thinking of the State not as an object at all, but 
as a form of social relationship. Thus the 'State* "is neither a thing 
—  instrument that may be taken away, nor a fortress that may be 
penetrated by a wooden horse, not yet a safe that may be cracked by 
burglary: it is the heart of the exercise of political power" (1978, 
p.81).^ It is a 'mode of cohesion* i.e. a form of social relationship 
and its strengths or weaknesses are functions of the quality of the
1C
relationships that have been forged.
This 'relational* definition of the State (Jessop, 1985) sets the tone 
for the tasks of modem theories of the State, namely the study of 
politics. In the twentieth century political science was shifted from 
units to processes, from normativism to structure. The modem theories 
of the State do not tell us that much about the State as such, nor for 
that matter about society, they discuss the manner by which power, 
classes and territoriality are articulated.
3.2.2. What is  po litics?
"A society consists of individuals and groups which communi­
cate with one another .... In any society, communication 
operates on three levels: communication of women, communica­
tion of goods and services, communication of messages. 
Therefore, kingship studies, economics, and linguistics 
approach the same problem on different strategic levels and 
really pertain to the same field" (Levi-Strauss, 1953, p.536).
formal ordering of society —  and it is named the p o litica l level. Thus, 
the political process, to sum up in one sentence, is the process by 
which societies organise themselves by formal means (Clasters, 1974,
p.21).
106
Admittedly this is a comprehensive and therefore vague definition. 
Ordinarily a more limited definition is favoured. Foggi (1978) claims 
that there are essentially two views on the subject: the one held by 
David Easton, that
"within a given interactions context you have * politics' 
insofar els at least some value allocation take place otherwise 
than by custom and exchange” (1978, p.2).
The other was propounded by Carl Schmidt,
"politics is concerned with setting and maintaining the boun­
daries between collectivities, and in particular with protect­
ing each collectivity ’ s cultural identity from outside threat" 
(Ibid. p.6).
The attractions of a narrow definition of politics are obvious. 
Nonetheless, the controversy it arouses may reflect other concerns. 
Belnager (1984) argues that some political scientists are concerned 
with the unique character of politics ("politics is who gets, what, 
when, how" —  Lasswell); others with its function:
"political function is particularly intimately related to the 
collectivity component of social structure. It is essentially 
the facilitation of attaining collective goals and centres on 
the decisions about such goals and mobilisation of social 
resources relative to than, specially integration of the 
relevant collectivities for these goals" (Parsons, 1961, 
p.51).
Lechner (1983) locates the various interpretations of politics in the 
context of the wider notion of the nature of society. It appears 
therefore that these controversies concern the various dimensions of 
the formal organisation of society: the aspect of class struggle, of 
the search for optimal policies, and the aspect of survival. Conse­
quently, we may take politics to be the formal ordering of society.
3.2.2. The State and the modem political prooess
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Poulantzas (1973, pp.99-122) argues that with each mode of production
politics has to be defined afresh . The political process in Mogul
India, for instance, was different from the politics of the modem
state (Hall, 1985). The point is supported by Clasters (1974), who
argues that the social structure of ’primitive’ societies does not
10
facilitate an authoritative format. In other words, there is no point 
in discussing the political process in the abstract, one has to 
identify its matrix in modem formations.
Modem societies, as we have seen, are organised or ’cohere’ in the
19form of states. A state is a particular form of order. Ronald Cohen
contends that the State is distinguished by its ’non-fission’ capabil-
20
ities. Whereas all other types of societies have an inherent limit to 
their physical size, once a certain threshold is exceeded they 
’fission* and a group wanders off, the non-fission capabilities of the 
State permits it to grow indefinitely in size (at least in principle). 
Consequently it accommodates classes, races and peoples, creating the 
possibility of more than rudimentary forms of stratification.
It is generally agreed that as opposed to clans and tribes, modem
21societies are artificial constructions whose stages of development are
well documented. They started off as kings’ and princes’ private
domains, and evolved into pervasive organisations. Very gradually, they
22
were able to monopolise the means of violence ; they nationalised money
and credit (Bom, 1984), they centralised social power, creating in the
23process the national market, the nation (Breuilly, 1982; Poulantzas, 
1979, pp.93-9), and indeed our conception of society (Hall, 1985). If 
societies are ’organised power networks’ (Mann, 1986) whose "central 
problems concern organisation, control, logistics, communication" 
(Ibid. pp.2-3), then modem states may be seen as a superior tool for
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the mobilisation and concentration of social power.
But the very logic, as well as the logistics of this transformation 
have changed the complexion of the issue. State power has become 
infrastrctural (Mann, 1984). The State derives its legitimacy and
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raison d’etre from its organic links with its own society^ to the point
where any attempt at demarcating it from society is arbitrary and
misleading. Expressing the same point in a different manner, Mann
(1984) argues that modern ’infrastructural’ states are ’intensive-
diffused* power networks. Just how much power is diffused is a matter
of contention (Poulantzas, 1979). However, this pervasiveness of the
State has led to the situation whereby
"all social activities directly involving the ’authoritative 
allocation of value* at the societal level are carried out by 
a single decision maker —  the state itself —  no matter how 
internally differentiated and extensively ramified those 
activities might be" (Foggi, 1978, p.92).
Thus the concept of State and the political process have become for all 
intent and purposes, one and the same. As Dunleavy and O’Leary put it:
"analyzing politics in terms of ’the state’ directs our 
attention to a single central problem, the interrelation 
between governing institutions of a country and other aspects 
of that society" (1987, p.320).
If the political process is to function properly, both the organs of 
the State as well as society must be flexible; otherwise it is not a 
process, or at best it is a process with no cutting edge. Thus, the 
’State* in political science is basically the regulator of social life.
3.3. The State, the political process and Sovereignty
In the study of politics, then, the State hats been replaced by the 
political process: modem theories of the State tell us relatively 
little about the nature of the State as such, they describe interac­
tions, a process, they provide a framework for thinking about the
26political process. It would appear, however, that in International 
Relations, where sovereignty is directly the issue, we cannot simply 
equate the State with the political process. On the contrary, the 
political process may be taken as the State by political scientists 
because they assume the sovereignty of the State (Skocpol, 1979; Mann, 
1987b); in International Relations this assumption 1ms to be made 
explicit and it conflicts with the State as a mere political process.
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It appears, therefore, that the two disciplines cannot utilize the same 
’unit of analysis1.
It should be noted, however, that in International Relations the 
prevalent interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty is a narrow and
abstract juridical one, paying no attention, as it were, to political
27philosophers’ views on the subject. According to the juridical 
interpretation, the doctrine of sovereignty is absolute, and sovereign­
ty is understood as the supreme power at home and equality abroad 
(Wight, 1977). Political philosophers, however, take a different view, 
’sovereignty’, says Mauritian
"in its historical origins is  a p o litica l conceptt which later 
became transformed in order to secure a juristic asset to the 
political power of the State" (1950, p.343, my emphasis). 
"Sovereignty in the hands of the lawyers is absolute in form 
only. They have succeeded in concocting a doctrine which 
appears to concede everything to the politically mighty of the 
earth without clearly conceding much of anything to anyone. In 
accomplishing this minor miracle, some confusion has been 
inevitable" (Cole, 1948, p.16).
Indeed, Cole goes on and explains the particular function of the 
doctrine in European history. I will quote him at length:
"The initial idolisation of the state was to some extent 
forced upon the lawyers by the pressure of historical events 
which made it seem discreet to concede the full lawmaking 
potential of some political will. The first and clearest 
necessity which the critical events of the sixteenth century 
pointed to was that of shifting to a particular system of 
maintaining order. During the Middle Ages, there had been an 
attempt to establish a universal order under the aegis of the 
Christian faith and upon the foundation of a common European 
tradition reaching back to the twin classical models of Greece 
and Rome. This order had never worked to insure the sort of 
peace required for development of the economic arts of trade 
and commerce. Sporadic violence was chronic in the entire 
system. When finally, the schism within the religious com­
munity occurred, it became evident that the old order was 
doomed. The only alternative was to accept the dismembered 
parts as self-sufficient units with which to rehabilitate 
strong government. The principle of sovereignty was the great 
ideological weapon used by the nation-states in accomplishing 
it. Of course there were other weapons as well. Nationalism... 
personal loyalty to certain royal houses....
There is a sense, therefore, in which sovereignty may be said 
to have provided a shelter necessary for the preservation of 
Western civilisation after the religious wars. On the other
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hand, however, we must emphasise that the kind of ’soverei­
gnty’ called for on this account does not by any means measure 
up to the pretensions of the sovereignty which actually came 
to be claimed by the nation-states. What each sovereign could 
reasonably claim as a prerequisite for effective local 
government was a finality of decision on all issues arising 
within his realm. This was because the responsibility for 
maintaining order could not be discharged without insulating 
the system of law enforcement within the state from all 
outside control. But insulation of the nation-state in the 
matter of law enforcem ent is a very different thing from 
insulating as respects law itself. The maintenance of order on 
a particularist basis requires that local interpretation of 
general law be final; it does not require a denial of the 
existence of a general law. If we want an explanation for this 
last increment of national isolation, we must look to a 
somewhat different aspect of nation-state building. This 
process involved the use of force against other states even 
more prominently than it involved the use of force internally. 
There have been no hermit states in the modem world.
The lack of a common superior 1ms accordingly meant that war 
had to be contemplated as the principal business of states, 
and a prime factor in determining their internal organisation. 
War, in turn, demands mobility on the part of the successful 
contestant. It must be able to command the instant services of 
all within its borders, and it must —  especially as effects 
in international relations —  be in a position to adopt and 
change its policies without being hampered by the necessity of 
justifying these changes in terms of any general or universal 
law. Hence the definition of law which credits some deter­
minate political agency with absolute and exclusive law-making 
authority is the ideal solution of the problem for the 
nation-state viewed as a war-making association" (pp.17,19).
The doctrine of sovereignty evolved in specific conditions. It evolved
in response to a demand for ’order* at almost any price, and to
7Alegitimise those who could accomplish this. It corresponded therefore 
to the general drift towards insulating political communities and 
locating the ultimate ability to decide in their own system and law. No 
one in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thought of these 
communities as ’organic* entities. (Although some prominent ministers 
and kings were bait on achieving these). Contemporaries knew exactly 
what sovereignty was all about.
"The Venetians, like Bodin, regarded full legislative authori­
ty, the key to the maintenance of political order, as the  
h e a rt o f  s o v e re ig n ty; the right to do ’anything needful’ meant 
above all the right to make and to enforce laws" (Bouwsma, 
1968, p.438).
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This opinion is shared by Carl Schmidt who maintains that Bodin's
’’scholarly accomplishment and the basis of his success thus 
reside in his having incorporated the decision into the 
concept of sovereignty" (1933, p.8). Therein, he argues, 
"resides the essence of state’s sovereignty, which must be 
juridically defined correctly, not as the monopoly to coerce 
or to rule, but els the monopoly to decide" (ibid, p.13).
Sovereignty, therefore, does not entail a de facto division of the
world into organic communities, it only meant the separation of the
political processes. It is ridiculous, therefore, in particular in the
case of a Europe emerging from the throes of feudalism, to talk of the
29’fragmetation’ principle as a great invention. In the long term, the 
significance of the doctrine of sovereignty lies principally in the 
’legitimation’ principle. The humanist postulates that no universal 
ordering of nature and society is possible in the abstract, that 
communities should decide the best order and constitution suited to 
them. This, and not the fragmentation principle, has been one of the 
main element in the gradual evolution towards a self-regulatory society 
els the principle factor of cleavage of modem International Relations.
Precisely what was the impact of this principle upon the course of 
International Relations? This is not easy to articulate. Did the 
emergence and acceptance of the concept of sovereignty in itself change 
that much? I doubt it. In the long progress towards the International 
Relations we know today many elements were missing. First of all, and 
perhaps most significant, the doctrine itself, while linked with ab­
solutism, left the relations between rulers and ruled open. Nowhere is 
it more pronounced than among the European dynasties who felt no 
particular attachment to places and people. There were some ’enlighten­
ed’ tyrants and there were many who were less so. Dynasties were 
trading places and moving ELround the European scene, but they could not 
persist with this activity for long. Under combined military and 
financial pressures, kings and princes were desperately in need of 
financial resources, only stumble upon what today is considered to be 
’international economic relations’ (Heckscher, 1934; Braudel, 1979, II 
pp. 542-9).
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Side by side, then, there grew other kinds of ’International Rela­
tions ’. There were the International Relations of the struggle between 
the Habsburgs and the Valois, and of Europe splitting into East and 
West, and the other international relations, those centring upon the 
commercial competition between the Netherlands, England, Northern 
Italy, and Colbert’s France. Which ’international relations’ was the 
real one ? The question is not totally beside the point. After all, 
traditional International Relations has already made up its mind that 
the first is the one worth bothering with. Moreover, it is possible 
with the benefit of hindsight to see that some countries were contest­
ing anachronistic struggles. Some, countries such as ’Spain’ and France 
were contesting super-feudal welts , working their way laboriously out of 
contention, others were glimpsing capitalist types of competition.
All in all, in this formative period of absolutism, 'politics’ did riot 
matter that much —  or at least not so much as it does nowadays. In the 
prolonged progress towards the unitary State, these formations simply 
did not possess the means to intervene and organise their societies 
into anything resembling those of the present. It was, of course, the 
emergence of the ’infrastructural state’, which, if not a break with 
the past, at least marked a new level of coherence and homogeneity in 
the formal relations between states. In one way or another the formal 
apparatuses became much more responsive to their own population and the 
paradigmatic model of state formation has shifted from perfect war 
machine (Anderson, 1974) to an ideal of an economic corporation.
3.4. A new ’unit* in the making?
There are by now quite a few schools of thought which choose the 
political process as their preferred unit of analysis.I will mention a 
few of them. That does not mean that they are correct or even partly 
correct. The point is that the new ’unit of analysis’ has already been 
used quite extensively.
A. The first, and perhaps most successful of all, has been the French 
school of regulation (Aglietta, 1979; Boyer, 1986; Lipietz, 1983, 1987). 
(Regulation is understood here in its cybernetics connotations —  as a 
sort of auto-regulation mechanism.^ Society is seen as a gigantic
<;
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self-regulatory device of which three distinct moments may be distin­
guished: the technological paradigm, the regime of accumulation, and
the mode of regulation. With Aglietta (1979), and Gramsci (1971) before
31him, Lipietz (1989) regards Taylorism and Fordism as the bearers of 
modem industrial society. These new production techniques led to an 
explosive rate of growth in productivity for which there was simply not 
enough demand. In other words, the technological paradigm did not 
synchronise with the regime of accumulation. The result was the Great 
Depression to which the response in Europe (i.e. the mode of regula­
tion) took three forms, Keynesianism, fascism and Stalinism, all 
offering different solutions for the problem of demand. WWII, according 
to this interpretation was a * civil war* between the different forms of 
socialisation. Prior to WWII capitalists were competing among 
themselves and squeezing labour, thus leading to the problem of demand, 
the favoured solution after the war was a compromise, enshrined in the 
welfare state (collective bargaining, welfare-state, minimum wages and 
so on). The social democratic mode of regulation gained the upper hand, 
and the accompanying regime of accumulation was able to synchronise 
demand with the rate of productivity growth by allowing wages to rise 
at the same time.
This interpretation, of course, is open to debate (Mandel, 1975;
Armstrong, Glyn & Harrison, 1984). However, of particular interest to us 
here is the limit of this perspective. What is the role of the State in
this view? Does the State interact with other states in order to
increase its power and prestige? Hardly.
"The state is the archetypal form of all regulation.lt is at 
the level of the State that the class struggle is resolved; 
the State is the institutional form which condenses the 
compromises which prevent the different groups making up the 
national (or at least territorial) community from destroying 
one another in an endless struggle (the point is not that 
struggles come to an end, but that they rarely destroy
classes)" (Lipietz, 1987, p. 19).
In this perspective, the state is not a compact unit; its insularity is 
defined in terms of its regulatory activity i.e.,the political process.
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B. What about the re-emerging field of International Political Economy?
On the face of it, the rise of this field «as accompanied by the
discovery of the State, and seems to contradict what I am saying. For 
instance, Parboni declares:
"The common element of most innovative positions on interna­
tional monetary analysis (although it is rarely made explicit) 
is probably awareness that the protagonists of the interna­
tional economy consists of national states, and not families 
and firms. These state seek to inflect the features of the 
international monetary system in accordance with their efforts 
to safeguard what in the absence of any more precise term, we 
may call the 'national interest*. By shaping the monetary 
system, states seek to postpone, or even avoid all together, 
the necessity to settle their balance of payments, to promote 
the international use of their own currency and to gamer 
additional advantages" (1981, p.26).
However, what precisely is the State they have in mind? Is it a 
corporeity whose territory remains outside of the international 
political economy? In other words, is it a billiard ball State? Not at 
all.
After all the ’system* of one state is the environment of the other 
State. Subtract them all and nothing remains. International Political 
Economy is the aggregative area of all these States.
Is the State here an identifiable social group?
Again, no.
These 'states' are in fact self-regulating areas within the larger area 
of International Political Economy whose
i) separateness is defined precisely by their self-regulatory activity 
and ii) whose official response (the 'national interest' which Parboni 
talks about) is the product of the domestic political process.
C. What about the calls for 'fair trading', anti-dumping, standardiza­
tion of law in the EEC, etc. Are they not within the context of 
relations between states albeit encumbered by interdependence. No they 
are not. The concept of interdependence, borrowed from a different (and 
I would argue more correct) context of interdependence of people all 
over the globe** was superimposed upon the existing theoretical edifice 
in International Relations. It evokes, therefore, a picture of clearly 
defined' units,i.e. States interacting with each other. Thus, inter­
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dependence is understood as an extraneous constraint steering govern­
ments away from the real business of power. But these various calls, 
which are basically calls for synchronisation in the regulatory 
activity of the formal apparatus are nothing but the reco g n itio n  th a t 
the separateness between these form ations consist in  th e ir  re g u la to ry  
a c t iv ity
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NOTES
1. "In statement the underlying essent may be represented in 
different ways: as having such and such properties, such and such 
magnitude, such and such relations. Properties, magnitude, 
relations are determinations of being. Because, as modes of 
being-said, they are derived from logos —  and because to state 
is kategorein —  the determinations of the being of he essent are 
called kategoriai, categories. Thus the doctrine of being and of 
the determinations of the essent as such becomes a discipline 
which searches for the categories and their order. The goal of 
all ontology is a doctrine of categories. It has long been taken 
for granted that the essential characteristics of being are 
categories." (Heidegger, 1959, p. 187)
2. "The starting-point of this book was a search for fields of 
historical study which would be intelligible in themselves within 
their own limits of space and time, without reference to 
extraneous historical events. The search for these self-contained 
units led us to find them in Societies of the specie we called 
Civilizations"(Toynbee, 1957, p.l). See also Braudel’s definition 
in p.90 and the discussion in Guizot (1985).
3. He adds "frontier is o u te r-o r ie n te d . Its main attention is
directed toward the outlying areas which are both a source of 
danger and a coveted prize... .The boundary, on the contrary, is 
in n e r -o r ie n te d. It is created and maintained by the will of the 
central government. It has no life of its own, not even material 
existence" (Kristof, 1969, pp. 126-128). See also Kratochwil 
(1986).
4. In the light of Schmitt’s definition of politics as a purposeful
activity which is aimed at the creation of a dichotomy of Us and 
Than, we can define this level as the political representations 
of the discreteness of societies. On Schmitt’s definition see 
Strauss, 1988.
5. In the ensuing discussion I have relied upon, Bohm, 1980; Capek,
1976; Carchedi, 1983; Dodgshon, 1987; Foucault, 1973; 1979;
Heidegger, 1959; 1962; Jones, 1982; Poulantzas, 1979; Sack, 1981; 
1986.
6. Poulantzas goes on "...while this serial, discontinuous and
segmented space-territory implies the existence of frontiers, it 
is also poses the new problem of its own hom ogenisation and 
u n ifica tio n . Here too the S tate  p la y s  a ro le  in  fo rg in g  n a tio n a l 
u n ity . Frontiers and national territory do not exist prior to the 
unification of that which they structure: there is no original 
something-inside that has later to be unified. The capitalist 
State does not confine itself to perfecting national unity, but 
sets itself up in constructing this unity —  that is, in forging 
the modem nation. Hie State marks out the frontiers of this 
serial space in the very process of unifying and homogenising 
what these frontiers enclose. It is in this way that the ter­
ritory becomes national, tending to merge with the nation-State" 
(1979, p.105).
117
7. Heidegger quotes kant approvingly: "This schematism of our under­
standing as regards appearances and their mere form is an art 
hidden at the depths of the human soul" (1962, p.45). Roger Jones 
puts it in less poetic terms: "The heart of our modem idolatry 
is quantification —  the world is reduced to quantities and the 
relationships between them" (1983, p. 14). And Bohm asks "whether 
there are any features of the commonly used language which tend 
to sustain and propagate this fragmentation, as well as perhaps, 
to reflect it. A cursory examination shows that a very important 
feature of this kind is the subject-verb-object structure of 
sentences, which is common to the grammar and syntax of modem 
languages" (1980, p.29)
8. The three previous levels are created, sustained and projected
with the aid of concepts. What are concepts ? How reliable are 
they? P.D. Ouspensky discusses them in a simple, but devastating 
manner: "Let us imagine some object, say a book, outside of time 
and space. What will this last mean? Were we to take the book out 
of time and space it would mean that a ll books which have existed, 
exist now, and will exist, exist tog e th er, i.e., occupy one and 
the same place and exist simultaneously, forming as it were one 
book which includes within itself the properties, characteristics 
and peculiarities of all books possible in the world. When we say 
simply, a book, we have in mind som ething possessing the common 
characteristics of all books —  this is a concept". (P.D.
Ouspensky, Tertium  Organum , quoted in Jones, 1982, p.72).
When we discuss a phenomenon such as the relations between 
States, we articulate the concept State —  that is, something 
possessing the common characteristics of all States, with the 
concept interaction - something possessing the common charac­
teristics of all interactions. The newly arranged set of concepts 
is considered nearer to the truth if it conforms to a combinative 
discursive pattern which is considered to be ’logical1.
9. ’Analytical usefulness’ will be regarded as the ability to deal 
successfully with the greatest amount of information with the aid 
of one theory or a scheme.
10. See note 19 chapter 1.
11. "It is this relationship between the slow moving alternation of 
society and the faster moving and more immediate response of 
government, specified in a set of legal relationships and 
powers, <that> constitutes what is meant by the state. It is as 
if the generalised relationships which obtain in society with 
all its myriad strands and links to resources, human and 
material, were tied together at one point, knotted and gripped 
firmly" (Apter, 1973, p. 104). See also discussion in chapter one 
on the juridical.
12. See the interesting discussion in political anthropology: 
Claessen & Skalnik, 1978, 1981; Cohen & Service, 1978; Krader, 
1968.
13. See Poulantzas, 1973 and in particular Foucault, 1979.
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14. "Personee n’a jamais vu l’Etat .... Et cependent 1 * observation 
des ph£nom£nes concretes ne nous r^v61e rien qui perroette 
d ’ apprhender sa r^alite. Nous voyons des gouvemanats, des 
services, des territoires; nous voyons des regies et il nous 
suffit de les enfeindre pour connaitre de la facon la plus 
tangible .... Mais aucun d’eux isol&nent, ni leur addition ou 
leur synthase, ne constitute l’Etat." (Burdeau,1970.pp.13,14)
15. "When Poulantzas claimed to have discovered at last the Marxist 
theory of the state, he had in mind the view that the state is a 
social relation. This involved a fundamental philosophical shift 
for Poulantzas and a return to the revolutionary materialism of 
Marx, since it was Marx who elaborated the paradigm thesis (and 
arguably the more general claim) that capital is a social 
relations'^ Jessop, 1985, p. 326). Jessop goes on "Poulantzas 
argued that the state is a social relation in exactly the same 
way as capital is a social relation. This approach excludes any 
treatment of the state either a simple instrument or as a subject 
(Jessop, 1985, p. 337). I do not agree that Poulantzas simply 
paraphrases Marx. For Poulantzas the state is the ’mode of 
cohesion’ of modem societies i.e. a form of social relationship 
and its strength or weakness are functions of the quality of the 
relationships that have been forged. This has nothing to do with 
Marx’s conception of capital as social relations.
16. "The State has the particular function of constituting the factor 
of cohesion between the levels of a social formation (Poulantzas, 
1973, p.42). We may conclude this discussion with a formal 
definition of the State:
The State is "the centralised socio-political organisation 
for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified 
society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent 
social classes —  viz. the rulers and ruled — , whose relations 
are characterised by political dominance of the former and 
tributary obligation of the latter, legitimised by a common 
ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle (Claessen & 
Skalnik, 1978, p.640).
"The State is a non-primitive form of government. Unlike 
primitive forms of governments, the agencies of government obey 
the state are usually explicit, complex, and formal. Although the 
complex institutions of the state help to integrate the society 
out of which it arises, human society has other means of
composing its integration than the state" (Krader, 1968, p. 13).
17. Dahl (1976, p.8) argues that there are three traditions of
political thought:
A. Relationships involving power, rule, or authority (Lasswell);
B. Relationships involving territoriality (Weber);
C. Relationships in associations capable of self-sufficiency 
(Aristotle).
18. "Notre culture, depuis ses origines, pense le pouvoir
politique en terme de relations hierarchises et autoritai- 
res de commandement-ob£issance. Toute forme, reelle ou
possible, de pouvoir est par suite r6ductible a cetter 
relation privil£giee qui en exprime a p r io r i 1’essence
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(p,15)....En un texte de 1948, R. Lowie, analysant les 
traits distinctifs du type de chef ci-dessus dvoqud....
1) Le chef est un <<faiseur de paix>>; il est 1* instance mod^rat- 
rice du groupe....
2) II doit etre g6n6reux de ses biens....
3) Seul un bon orateur peut acc^der a la chefferie "(Clasters, 
1974, p.23).
19. About the concept of order in sociology see Dowse and Hughes, 
1972. Order and the emergence of the modem State see Bouswma 
(1968); Cole (1948); Pockock (1975).
20. Cohen, 1978b, 1981. For additional discussion in chapter four and 
in Dodgshon, 1987.
21. "The modem state appears as an artificial, engineered institu­
tional complex rather than as one that has developed spontaneous­
ly by accretion...it is a ’made’ reality" (Poggi, 1978, p.95). 
See also Giddens, 1985.
22. The monopolisation of the means of violence is one of the
landmarks separating 'feudal* from capitalists social formations. 
It was the culmination of long and protracted struggles in which 
economic advances, developments in the art of war and the 
logistic of bureaucracies all ensured that only the most powerful 
and rich 'warlords* could maintain powerful armies. A fuller 
discussion in chapter nine.
23. "The national market. This is the term used to denote the
economic coherence achieved within a given political unit - a
unit that is of a certain size, essentially corresponding to what
I have called 'the territorial state* or , as it might also be 
called 'the nation-state*. Since within such units political 
maturity preceded economic maturity, our problem is to discover 
when, how, and for what reasons these states achieved in economic 
terms a degree of internal coherence and the faculty of acting as 
a unit vis-a-vis the rest of the world" (Braudel, 1979, III 
p.177).
24. "From the growth of towns through communications, transport and 
military apparatuses and strategy, to the emergence of borders,
limits and territory» we are dealing with so many mechanisms of
organizing social space" (Poulantzas, 1979, pp. 99,100). "Nous
voulons attirer 1*attention sur ce qui donne coherence a une 
formation sociale, la fluidity de la decision et de 1* inform­
ation, mais aussi le system de regulation des conflits. Leur 
canalisation doit etre comprise cornrne tactique spatiale" (Bernard 
& Ronai, 1977). On homogenization of the nation state see 
Maraval, 1969 and Poulantzas, 1979.
25. On legitimation see Wolfe (1977).
26. See Easton (1954) chapter on the historical origins of the notion
of the political process. On the subject also Sabine & Shepherds.
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27. It is interesting to note that International Relations scholars 
are, generally speaking, well aware of political philosophy but 
tend to overlook modem political science and political sociol­
ogy. See for instance, Waltz, 1954 and Wolfers, 1962. However, 
only when it comes to the doctrine of sovereignty then the 
political philosophers’ theories give way to the dry legal 
interpretations.
28. "The fundamental attribute of sovereignty, for Sarpi, was its 
adequacy. The power which the state exercised by divine right had 
necessarily to be sufficient to accomplish the primary purpose 
for which God had instituted government, namely the maintenance 
of that practical order which was the necessary condition of 
’civil felicity’" (Bouswma, 1968, p.437)
29. For Northedge (1976) "It is clear that the modem international 
system can be regarded as having emerged into the light of day 
when two of its basic characteristics took shape: the secular 
principle, or the spirit of raison d’dtat, which first became 
established in the minds of thinking men about the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and, secondly, what we have called the 
fragmentation principle, or in other words, the waning of the 
idea of a united Europe as a dominant object of policy" (p.55).
Not wishing to play down the significance of these two develop­
ments, one may still ask whether these were the two (or whether 
there were only two) decisive moments in European history. One 
may insist, for instance as Marx does, that the establishment of 
the capitalist mode of production is the most significant 
development. Otherwise, the discovery of America and the colonial 
conquests may be cited. Moreover, one may query Northedge’s 
interpretation of what he imagines to be the two decisive
moments.
Let us discuss the first point first: while the modem doctrine 
of raison d’etat emerged in the 16th and 17th centuries (Ste- 
gmann, 1977), it was around, as an idea much longer. Ullmann 
traces it at least as far back as Thomas Aquinas (Ullmann, 1975). 
In any case, i f  the idea was m issing, the p rac tice  existed fo r  a long  
time.
Huizinga, in his The Waning o f the M iddle Ages propones that 
"This illusion of society based on chivalry curiously clashed 
with the reality of things. The chroniclers themselves, in 
describing the history of their time, tell us far more of
covetousness, of cruelty, of cool calculation, of well-understood 
self-interest, and of diplomatic subtlety, than of chivalry 
.... <however>... the conception of chivalry constituted for these 
authors a sort of magic key, by the aid of which they explained
to themselves the motives of politics and of history. The
confused image of contemporaneous history being much too compli­
cated for their comprehension, they simplified it, as it were, by 
the fiction of chivalry as a moving force (not consciously, of 
course). A very fantastic and rather shallow point of view, no 
doubt" (1924, pp.65,66).
As to the ’secular principle’, which Northedge equates somewhat
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impetuously with raison d’etat, it certainly can be dated much 
before the Peace of Westphalia. The fragmentation principle, on 
the other hand, anyw ay one wishes to look a t i t , was a constant 
feature in European history. Indeed, the ’idea’ of a united 
Europe itself emerged probably not before the 8th or the 9th 
century (Ullmann, 1975). And arguably the idea itself has not 
waned at all. Clearly, the church no longer holds such political 
ambitions. However, the ’idea’ was resurrected at least three 
times later on, first by Napoleon, secondly by Hitler and 
presently by the glorified Steel and Coal cartel that has become 
the EEC.
It is rather curious that the two decisive moments in the 
establishment of the ’ system of states ’, Northedge chooses to put 
an emphasis on what might be called ideological considerations. 
We are entitled, therefore, to ask why is it that a ’Realist’ 
such as Northedge dates the articulation of the idea of ’raison 
d’&tat’ among ’thinking men’ over the practice of ’raison d’&tat’ 
as the decisive moment in the emergence of the system of States? 
It appears to me, that the crucial component in the emergence of 
this particular system was not political but philosophical. It 
entailed a new perspective upon life and order. In short, 
Northedge’s ’system’ has to do with Renaissance Humanism. 
Certainly an important period, but not of such decisive break 
with the past to merit this special treatment.
30. The discussion follows Lipietz, 1989.
31. On Taylorism and Fordism, see Aglietta, 1979; Lipietz, 1987.
32. A similar interpretation can be found in Giddens, 1985 and 
Mandel, 1986.
33. See Macinder, 1969.
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Chapter Four —  Society as a discrete/non-discrete entity
Since sociology emerged as a separate branch of the social sciences in 
the late nineteenth century, sociologists have been unable to agree on 
the nature of its central concept, namely, society. One does not need 
to probe deeply into the etymological origins of the word to see that 
the term ’society’ corresponds to two separate phenomena. On the one 
hand it refers to a bounded social entity, the notion of boundary, 
however, is ambiguous. In some modem artificial constructions such as 
many African nation-states, the boundary is nothing more than a line 
decided upon by politicians. In other societies the boundaries may 
refer to a certain cleavage of social interactions (Mann, 1986). Others 
again regard society as a distinct cultural entity —  its closure is 
not merely spatial closure, but also cultural, political and perhaps 
economic too (Durkheim, 1937; Parsons, 1971). Thus the very notion of 
boundary is extremely fluid. Furthermore, the concept of boundary is 
accompanied, and perhaps strengthened by the intuition that society is 
a community which acts and behaves as a unit. The notion of boundary 
then goes hand in hand with an idea of a collective will, conscious­
ness, and action.
The concept of ’society', however, connotes also a place of social 
activity; society is the milieu of social life in the same way as 
’space’ is the milieu of the spatio-temporal world. In this sense the 
term may be replaced by social activities or any other corresponding 
expression.^ It is clear why the two meanings always go hand in hand, 
for as far as we know humans have always lived in groups. The social 
milieu therefore was always a bounded milieu. However, from a theoreti­
cal point of view, this duality has lead to separate agendas of 
research,
At the cost of some simplification, we may agree with Frsiby and Sayer 
(1986) that the various researches on society may be grouped into two 
schools of thought. The Durkheimians, on the one hand, perceive it as 
an objective social reality. Typically they define it as "a collection 
of people with a common identification, who are sufficiently organized 
to carry out the conditions necessary to living harmoniously together"
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{Bertrand, ,p.22). The Weberians, on the other hand, reject any such 
conception and recommend concentrating instead upon "real interactions 
between individuals". In the light of this dichotomy one may express 
a wish to surpass it and come up with a unified concept.
This chapter speculates on the possibility of creating a unified 
research agenda. I suggest that a reformulation of the concept of 
society as a discrete/indiscrete system may enable us to transcend the 
current split in sociological thinking. It must be understood from the 
outset, however, that these are only suggestions for further research 
and not final, definitive statements.
4.1 .Durkheimians and Weberians
In an attempt to combine and transcend the existing split in the 
research on society, the first question that comes to mind is whether 
there is a point in doing so. Why should we keep both lines of research 
open? Do they provide unique perspective on social life? If they do, 
why was it not possible to transcend the split before? These question 
go to the heart of sociological enquiry and it is possible to deal with 
them here only in passing.
It will be useful to note, first of all, that it is, in fact, the kinds 
of questions being asked which determine the concept of society and not 
the other way around. The Durkheimians, generally speaking, are 
interested in two sets of issues:
i. How coordination and division of labour among so many people is
achieved within the territorial boundary of a formation. They discuss
therefore "the things that must get done in any society if it is to
continue as a going concern, i.e., the generalised conditions necessary 
♦
for the maintenance of the system concerned" (Aberele et. al. 1967, 
p.317).
ii. they aim to discover the dynamics of what appears to be something 
reminiscent of a * collective consciousness’. Thus, they treat society 
as an entity because in certain of its manifestations it appears to be 
cohesive.
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Consequently the Durkheimian project is an enquiring into the homeos­
tatic properties of what is thought to be a system. As Davis explains:
"Every science describes and explains phenomena from the 
standpoint of a system of reasoning which presumably bears a 
relation to a corresponding system in nature. In the case of 
sociology, what is distinctive is the subject, not the method; 
for it deals with human societies whereas other disciplines 
deal with other kinds of systems. Given its subject, the least 
it could do is to relate the parts to the whole of society and 
to one another" (Davis, 1959,p.759).
In other words, the subject-matter defines the nature of society as a 
system.
In contrast, the Weberians begin from the opposite direction. Drawing 
on the works of Dilthy, Simmel and Rickert, they are painfully aware 
that what was called in the last century ’cultural scientist’ makes 
choices which necessarily had as their base the investigator’s own 
value system (Hughes, 1977). They could not accept, therefore, the 
appearance of society sis a bounded entity at face value. They argue 
that, on the contrary, the vast majority of social activities occur in 
an amorphous, shapeless ’entity’. Society therefore is not a system 
but if anything an accumulation of systems and congeries (Sorokin, 
1941), a ’set of sets’ (Braudel, 1979) or a set of ’interacting 
networks’ (Mann, 1986). The Weberians advice, therefore, is to regard 
the closure of societies as the result of specific social activities 
which are called ’politics* (Weber, 1978).
Both approaches, however, are deficient in some respects. In emphasis­
ing the unitary aspect of society, the Durkheimians fail to concep>- 
tualise its open-ended characteristics. They slide easily into the 
belief that the boundary between societies implies a real structural 
separation in social activity. Societies appear as truly discrete 
social entities by virtue of their unique ’culture*. Easton is typical 
in this respect in holding that "a society is a special kind of human 
grouping the members of which continually interact with one another and 
in the process develop a sense of belonging together. This common 
consciousness, as it is often called, reflects the fact that the
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members of the social system have a basic similarity in their culture 
and social structure (1953,p. 135). Such ideas may reflet the conditions 
of tribes or clans, but are inaccurate descriptions of modem societies 
(Collins, 1968).
A more sophisticated approach, perhaps an attempt to compromise between 
these two intransigent positions, argues that society is an 'open 
system’ (Parsons, 1961, pp.33 - 41). A term which is derived from 
physics (Von Bertaffany, 1981) where ’open systems’ maintain their 
homeostatic status by drawing a large amount of energy from their 
environments (Lazio, 1972, p.36; Serra et. al. 1986; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1984). However, we cannot postulate similar conditions for 
societies, and therefore the ’open system* is vacuous and implies no 
more than that there are elements which do not fit well into the neat 
categories of a system approach. The end result is that society is seen 
as "a system of interdependent parts. Events taking place in one part 
of the system have repercussions throughout the system; hence, 
relations of cause and effect involve circular processes, and state­
ments concerning these processes are extremely complex” (Collins, 1968, 
p. 48). The fundamental problem is the postulation of homogeneity and 
uni-dimensionality of social activity. And this has been rightly the 
main target of the Weberians’ attack.
The Weberian approach, if more sophisticated, is no better. The 
aggregative theories tend to picture society as an amorphous, shapeless 
entity, a social ’heap’. The apparent discreteness of societies, the 
maintenance of self-identity over long periods, communal emotions and 
’national characters’ are typically brushed aside and assigned to two 
different social processes. ’Politics’ maintains the discreteness of 
societies (Schmidt, 1988; Mann, 1986, Weber, 1978), and cultural 
uniqueness is reduced to a sort of false consciousness. Nationalism, 
warm communal sentiments are merely manifestations of a legitimation 
principle and consequently, and in spite of loud protestations to the 
contrary, societies are in fact equated with states. As will be argued 
later in the chapter, while investigations into the nature of the 
discreteness of societies are poorly developed, they have conclusively 
demonstrated that it goes much deeper than an artificial closure.
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Why then, and how 1ms this dichotomy occurred ? Various reasons may be 
contemplated, of these I will mention a few:
I) Our conception of society is time-related. Some societies, such as 
tribes or clans, exhibit a high degree of cultural homogeneity 
(Malinowski, 1941), whereas others, such as the Chinese, Indians and 
Moslem empires have little to do with our modem notion of organic 
unities. Because of the great variety of social system only the most 
rudimentary definition based on the lowest common denominator will do. 
But even an elementary definition must divide among organic and non- 
organic types of unities. This seems to be the main force behind 
Randall Collins * (1968) criticism of Structural Functionalism.
However, Collins fails to acknowledge that in spite of wide dis­
parities, it is still possible to recognise some core meaning which 
permits us to group communities together under the term * society*. This 
core meaning transcends and indeed gathers together historical 
phenomena under one roof. Thus, historical arguments cannot explain the 
ambiguity in our conception of the object.
II) The definition of society is subjective, a variety of political, 
ideological and methodological elements confound the issue. Thus for 
instance Hayek’s conception of society as a spontaneous order (1982, 
p.36) is only a thin disguise for his objection to state intervention. 
Whereas Bertrand's definition^ simply fits into the preoccupation of 
American sociologists of that period with the exigencies of what they 
have termed the 'cultural system’.
However, whereas different definitions of society suited for different 
purposes are legitimate, they mask the fact that beneath than there 
exist only one, perhaps, two or three core meanings, the argument again 
fails to deal with the problem in hand.
III) This leads me to the argument of this chapter. The problem has
nothing to do with the social 'object' as such, but with our tools for
investigating such objects. It has to do, in other words, with our
unique epistem ological posture vis-a-vis the social realm. On the one 
hand, as already noted by Hegel, the social realm is the only one we
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have direct access to. On the other, it is precisely the realm which 
lays farthest from the basic tenets of our thought, which are material­
ly based (Quine, 1981; Jones, 1982). That implies that full knowledge 
of the working of the society is in principle accessible to human 
cognition. And yet the social realm presents peculiar difficulties of 
conceptualisation. It is necessary to think of society with the aid of 
an objects-related language, or as I shall call them here —  metaphors.
The cleavage in the conception of society results when metaphors are 
utilised not just to visualise an intangible object, but are sub­
stituted for the object itself. Thus in many cases knowledge of the 
attributes of the metaphorical entity (say the working of the market or 
of an organic entity) ’ serve* an added function of filling up gaps in 
knowledge of the working of society. As I shall argue, we cannot but 
think in metaphors, that is, we need to construct some representation 
in our mind of the ’object’ society. However, instead of allowing these 
metaphors to determine the nature of the entity ’ out there ’, we should 
be able to construct a representation that transcends these bodily 
metaphors.
4.2. How ’system’ has become the vehicle for the introduction of 
machinist and organic metaphor.
An investigation into the nature of society begins with an attempt to 
visualise it. In order to visualise it we use metaphors and analogies. 
For the purpose of this chapter metaphors will be defined as the process  
b y  which know ledge (o r presum ed know ledge) re la tin g  to one set o f 
phenomena is  in te rp re te d  as in form ation  about an o th er, separate , 
phenom ena. The danger is that the metaphor takes the place of analysis, 
as indeed, is the case with the organic and machinist metaphors.^ We may 
distinguish among three realm: Engineering, Biology and Social
Sciences. It is when concepts developed in the first realm find their 
way into the second and the third, that ’system’ appears to shed its
C
heuristic value and takes on the attributes of a metaphor.
Engineering Sciences differ from Biology and the Social Sciences in 
among other things, the nature of their epistemology. Quite simply, in
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the case of designed machines we know the nature-purpose and working 
of these machines because they were designed by humans to serve a 
specific purpose. Whereas any such ’knowledge’ concerning living 
organisms or social systems can only be deduced. Therefore the gap 
between theory and practice is reduced considerably in Engineering 
Science as compared with other realms. In this realm, and in this realm 
only, to all intents and purposes no separation exists between the 
concept ’system’ and the machine itself.
In Engineering Science the term system connotes, therefore, the very 
essence of what a machine is. It implies, for instance, that its 
components are interdependent; that the ’whole’ is a mechanical 
combination of parts; that the machine is a teleological device; that 
all elements or components of the system have a function; and that the 
purpose of the machine materialises as its ’output'. Likewise, it 
indicates that the system forges a particular relationship with its 
environment which may be subsumed under the concepts of ’input’ and 
’output’; that more sophisticated machines combine a process of 
’learning’ or feedback into their system, etc.
These attributes implicit in the systems of designed machines cannot 
mindlessly be transferred to other realms, wherein precisely the nature 
of the system i.e. which components are interdependent, when, and how, 
is called into question. Unfortunately, this has been a widespread 
practice. For instance, Functional Structuralist consider society to be 
an articulated structure. They arrive inductively, on the basis of 
their familiarity with designed machines, at prerequisite sub-systems 
of the social system (pattem-maintenance, goal-attainment, adaptation 
and integration Parsons, 1961). In other words, they allow themselves 
to utilize the attribute of a designed or biological system (Parsons 
was a biologist by training (Black, 1961)) as information about the 
social system.
In other studies the presence of a machine-like social system is 
postulated when something resembling ’input’ and ’output’ is identified 
(Apter, 1973). Almond (1956) and Easton (1979) take this metaphor a 
step further: a teleology is an integral part of mechanical systems,
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they simply presume that what they have named the ’political system’ is 
imbued with purposefulness. Political systems are considered "in 
dynamical terms as active agents which have capabilities, perform 
functions, influence their environment and are in turn influenced by 
it" (Ake, 1982, p.l). The metaphor, in short, is taken well beyond the 
boundaries of a mental construct and becomes corporeal.
There are, of course, many other examples. It is important, however, to 
note that the metaphor of a designed machine could not have been 
transferred to the social sciences unless society were seen as an 
entity: something we do not know for certain. We compensate for this 
’deficiency* in our knowledge by projecting onto societies the 
characteristics of entities which we are able actually to see, namely, 
organisms. The organic metaphor which permeates much of Western thought 
serves one basic function, it enables us to discuss ’society* as an 
entity and thus as an articulated system.
4.3.The problem of visualisation
The first step, therefore, is to reverse this process. Instead of 
filling up gaps in our knowledge of society with our knowledge of the 
metaphor, we need perhaps to construct our own concept or metaphor from 
the knowledge that we do pxDssess of it. The graphic visualisation of 
society is not a marginal representational problem. It is worth 
pondering this problem for a moment. Why is there a need for a metaphor 
for the visualisation of the ’entity’ —  a need so great as to pervert 
systems approach from a method into an hypothesis?
Without venturing too deep into a fascinating but complex subject, I
shall merely point out a theory which holds that all the basic tenets
of our thought (space, time, matter, numbers) are structured by spatial
0
metaphors (Jones, 1982; Quine, 1981). It is commonplace to speak in the 
name of ’society*, to rebel against ’it*, etc. However, such an 
’entity’ is not visible. The problem is that ’society’ is not a 
physical object. We do not know whether it ’really’ exists or whether 
it is a figment of our imaginations. And even if it is as such, what 
sort of effect does it have on the reality of everyday life? In other
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words, all discussions concerned with the nature of society must solve, 
in one way or another the problem of visualising something which is not 
an object with object-related language! This is a thorny problem 
indeed.
In the sciences the problem was solved to a degree. There, to take an 
example, partly due to the immense success of Newtonian physics, atoms 
used to be represented as solar systems in miniature. And when this 
proved to be misleading (as most probably all spatial metaphors 
depicting atoms are (Jones, 1982; Bohm, 1983)), probability itself —  
the probability of the location of an electron at any particular point 
in time - was Visualised* as a cloud surrounding the nuclei (Jones, 
1982). However, Science has an advantage over the Social Sciences in
Q
that it possesses an alternative language, the language of mathematics. 
Thus to a certain extent it is possible to 1outmaneouvre’ so to speak, 
its own graphical traps.
Unfortunately, this cannot be done in the Social Sciences. We are left 
with no other recourse but to make do with an approximate 'bodily* 
representation of the ’object’ (object, entity, phenomena, are all 
bodily analogies) and investigate by logical means what is in reality 
a representation we have ourselves manufactured. That should not imply 
that we have no way of determining which metaphor is superior - or I 
should say relatively superior. As each metaphor is a bodily represen­
tation of a non-bodily ’object*, it may be thought of as an approxima­
tion. The metaphor is broken into its constituent parts, which are then 
compared with the ’parts’ of the non-bodily ’object*. When we compare 
representations we intuitively compare the ratio of supported state­
ments to unsupported ones. As it is logical to assune (and indeed is 
a necessary correlation of what has been said so far) that some of 
these statements will receive empirical support from the entity ’out 
there’ and others will not, there is a method of detecting which 
metaphor better represents the nature of society.
Once the intuitive method of representation is understood, it is 
px>ssible to improve on the spontaneous metaphors we have been using 
thus far. The key is the notion of approximation. Approximations may be
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linear, that is, we may envisage a progressive resemblance to the 
non-bodily object. Thus, it may be argued that approximation ’x’ 
provides a fairer representation of the object than approximation ’y’ 
and so on. (i.e that society behaves more like a 'heap' than a 
’person’).^  However, a better way of using approximations is to 
consider them as emphasising different aspects of the same object. In 
that case, approximation ’x’ is not a fairer representations than ’y’ , 
but reveals a different aspect of the same object. The 'heap' then does 
not represent society better than ’person’, both provide a way of 
describing different elements of society.
If all metaphors are approximations, the basic mistake so far was to 
assume that any one of them is better than any other. It follows that 
we need not choose between metaphors, we need rather to combine them! 
The metaphors (’heap’, ’network’, ’market’, *p>erson’, ’orgnaism’) 
should be dissected into their constituent parts and the parts then 
compared with the knowledge of the non-bodily object. Instead of 
filling up gapxs in our knowledge of society with the 'parts’ of the 
metaphor, we should be assembling a new concept of society out of those 
elements of the various existing metaphors which seem to give the 
fairest representations. For instance, a ’heap’ can be dissected into 
notions such as aggregations, disorder, visual discreteness, etc., 
however, it also implies non-dependence of the particles —  the last 
term clearly does not apply to society. An ’organism’ implies function­
al dependencies between parts, but it also implies the total homogenei­
ty of its space and absolute unity of its parts, the last two elements 
are not corroborated by our knowledge of society.
The issue, therefore, comes down to identifying and combining together 
the ’good’ elements of the various metaphors of society. The organic 
and machinist metaphors, once shed of their irritating ’excess 
baggage’, discuss the synchronic processes by which society become 
’objective’ realities. They investigate the processes by which 
societies remain discrete. The social ’heap’ theories emphasise 
society’s polygenetical and multifaceted nature. However, this 
characterisation is inherently contradictory, for it caters to their 
primary interest in the concept of society as the ’milieu’ of social
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life and leads to a conception of a shapeless and amorphous ’entity’. 
It would be better therefore to retain the initial conception of 
society as a continuous spatio-temporal matrix i.e. as a non-discrete 
’entity'.
When the two metaphors are combined, we arrive at a new concept of 
society as a discrete/indiscrete system, a notion which appears at 
first sight to be something and its opposite. I will attempt to define 
it more precisely. A d is c re te /in d is c re te  system is  a system in which some 
o f its  a c tiv itie s  a re  s tru c tu re d  around  its  c losure, w hile o th e r a c tiv itie s  
develop a long o th e r various sp atio /tem p o ra l m atrices. I t  is  a system in  
which the m a te ria lity  o f  its  position is  o n ly  one aspect o f its  r e a l i ty . In 
contrast to physical entities which are discrete and present to the 
eye, as well as to the imagination, a consistent spatial plane, the 
discrete/non-discrete system is characterised precisely by the lack of 
such a consistent plane —  it is a different phenomenon altogether.
4.4. Techniques of Separation
The question we face now is in what way the conception of society as a 
discrete/indiscrete entity is superior to existing ones? In other 
words, I will have to demonstrate the superiority of the notion of 
discreteness as opjposed to say, closure, as well as that of indiscrete­
ness to that of the social heap.
What exactly is implied by the notion of discreteness ? Discreteness 
connotes a spatial visualisation: it derives from ’to discern’ (Klein, 
1966). It entails, therefore, a unity defined in space; causing space 
to be seen as discontinuous. Thus, it refers to a state and the process 
of becoming —  both united in the act of observation. The term implies 
separation : separation in space and in time i.e. in the case of 
societies, the constitution of individuals into collectivities.
The important p»int is that discreteness, unlike closure, is not 
necessarily the opposite of indiscretion. On the contrary, the first 
concept implies the second, for a discrete entity ’emerges’ from the 
throes of the non-entity. It is in fact impossible to think of a
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discrete entity without its ’background!. Spatio-temporal objects 
* emerge* into the light of day from a space where they are already 
exist as potentials.^ At the same time, it is impossible to think of 
indiscretion without some previous knowledge of shapes and forms i.e. 
without discreteness. Discretion, therefore, does not necessarily mean 
a state of affairs, it implies a process, a process by 'which the 
observer see objects as discrete phenomena. In the case of society, it 
implies a process by which a community becomes ’aware* of its distinct­
ness and separateness —  which, it should be added, does not necessari­
ly corresponds to the true nature of social interactions. In ’reality* 
society may be shapeless and amorphous, it may be indiscrete to a large 
degree; however, it structures itself in the eyes of its members as
well as members of other societies with the aid of a complex set of 
12processes.
Hence, with the concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete entity, 
there is no need to imagine it as a concrete entity. Quite to the 
contrary, we may ask by what means it ’discretises* itself? What 
techniques are used?
Discreteness is first and foremost a closure of society, that is, it is 
a conscious effort by a group of people or organisation to separate 
themselves from others. The practice is so widespread that many chose 
to define politics as the practice of creating a division between Us 
and Them (Andreade, 1983; Schmidt, 1988). This aspect is well documented 
and it is unnecessary to labour the point here. Other works discuss 
less conspicuous elements of closure.
Regis Debray (1983) developed a theory of discretion. Debray’s thesis 
based on a rather free interpretation of Godel’s sixth theorem is that 
"there  can be no organised system w ithout c losure and no system  can be 
closed b y  elem ents in te rn a l to th a t system a lo n e. Contradictory as it may 
seem, a field can therefore only be closed by being opened up to an 
element external to it” (p. 170). Thus, the closure of society implies 
its ideological opening:
"No element within a social set has its necessity within
itself, and this infinite succession of successive decentrings
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is an effect of the group's eccentricity with regard to 
itself. No element can justify its presence unless it takes 
the place of another. 'Kings take the place of God', presi­
dents that of the Republic, general secretaries that of the 
working class, and so on. The necessary condition of represen­
tative follows from the fact that no one has actually seen 
God, the Republic or the Working Class: in a word, the
founding absence" (Ibid, p. 179).
In Debray's opinion a fundamental technique of discretion is the 
creation of an internal duality: "the primary splitting of the 
collective body, whose cohesion is the product of dehiscence, prevents 
it from entering into a direct relation with itself" (Ibid,p. 178). 
Relations of authority therefore, are not the nodal point of social
life as Weber thinks, but the effect of function of splitting the
13collective body.
In a recent book Balandier (1988) demonstrates that the idea of 
'disorder' is instrumental in the maintenance of order. Among other 
techniques he identifies the perpetuation of legends of a primordial 
organised society (p.92), social disorder is then identified with 
decadence and deterioration. The creation of a typology of 'good' 
metaphors of order and 'bad' metaphors of disorder; the dark forest 
versus bright civilisation, heaven and earth, etc. (p.97) also perform 
the same functions. Role reversals and licensed disorder are also 
effective techniques. In many societies, a certain period of the year 
is consecrated to doing the opposite of what is normally allowed. The 
Carnival in Europe used to serve this function. Mensnil states that
"during the carnival, all the social barriers were dropped; 
all distinction of age, class, parentage and sex would be 
abolished and a real communication between citizens would be 
established" (Mensnil, Marianne —  Tro is  essais s u r  la fe te as 
quoted in Attali (1982, p. 144)).
At times they went much further: "The last feast <of this 
kind> was celebrated in 1748 by the 'Cordeliers'. In various 
locations in the provincial towns as well as at the Notre Dame 
de Paris, priests and worshippers would cover themselves in 
charcoal, singing obscene songs and dancing dances of love. 
They ate sausages on the church' s altar, played dice and other 
sacrilegious games and participated in sexual orgies. Some­
times the priest would be naked and holy water was poured on 
him. It was, according to one observer, the 'abomination of 
the ofactive desolation' (Shaitane, C arnaval as quoted in
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Attali, 1982, p.147)
Such practices served two functions: they alleviated the frustration of 
daily life in a rigid society, but in doing so they emphasised the 
orderliness of society" (Ibid, p.144).
Another remarkable thesis was advanced by Rene Girard (1972;1978). 
Girard maintains that imitation, or mimesis is at the origin of the 
most basic social institutions. It is a basic biological mechanism of 
learning and development. However, precisely because of its pervasive­
ness, the propensity to imitate holds the danger of perpetual violence 
as everyone desires what their neighbour desires. For society to exist 
social institutions must allay or re-direct this constant danger of
* mimesis breakdown* into pacific channels . Girard argues that
* sacrifice* and * scapegoat* are the basic institutions holding 
societies together.
These are only few of a growing numbers of ideas on the subject. They 
prove that techniques of discretion are not only political. Is it 
possible to arrive at more general statements concerning the processes 
of discretion? I think so. One way of approaching the issue is to 
derive inductively the recurrent techniques of discretion which may be 
defined later as the ’structure* of a society. This is what the method 
of comparative politics is all about. The problem, however, is that 
such a method assumes that all societies are essentially the same, 
which, of course, they are not. Consequently it gives us only statisti­
cal information about the techniques of discretion of societies.
A systems approach suggests a different method as well as different 
conclusions. This approach investigates and puts forward propositions 
as to when, and in what form, a composite entity takes on holistic 
dimensions.^ Varela argues that
"behind the simple idea of a system, stands the basic act of 
splitting the world into what we consider separable and 
significant entities ... The next question then: what is the 
common basis for a criterion of distinction to isolate 
system-wholes ? my answer: the specification of forms of 
interaction which identify a system-whole by its stability..
136
<thus>.. If a certain degree of repetitiveness exists, a 
system can be identified by its permanence or stability" 
(Varela 1976 pp.3,4).
He adds that anything had been learned from the systems approach it is 
that
"to account for the coherence of the observed systems, their 
constitutive interactions must be mutual and reciprocal, so as 
to become an interconnected network" (Varela, 1976,p.2).
Varela suggests that not all interactions within a system have to do 
with its closure, only what he calls the constitutive interactions 
matter in this respect. If we apply these notions to society, then 
arguably we may derive only a certain number of social processes as a 
functional requisite of the homeostatic properties of the system. This 
is rather different from the Functional-Structuralists who derive their 
whole sociology from the study of systems. Furthermore, the only 
universal, known properties of these constitutive interactions is that 
they must be mutual and reciprocal so as to constitute an intercon­
nected network. Thus, purely on the basis of systems approach, we 
cannot deduce systems and sub-systems of the social system, we can only 
suggest that the various techniques of discretion must be intercon­
nected so that in their combination they constitute an interconnected 
network. In other words, it is possible to account for the discreteness 
of societies without recourse to any general or recurrent technique of 
discretion. Different societies may use completely different techni­
ques.
In fact, the notion of discreteness perfectly allows for varieties in 
principles of closure as well as forms of closure because the principle 
refers to the condition of the whole and not to the quality of the 
pants.
4.5.Propositions
In view of what has been said so far, it is clear that the concept of 
discrete/indiscrete system cannot provide new knowledge; it may only
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provide a framework within which to draw together what are at present 
no more than disparate and sometimes contradictory observations. We 
may take it as our starting point that there is nothing natural or 
primordial about either the discreteness or the indiscreteness of 
societies.
A. The definition of society as a discrete/indiscrete system confers 
equal significance on both aspects in the constitution of society. Any 
postulation of either the logical or chronological primacy of any one 
aspect is contrived. This proposition is generally accepted by modem 
sociologists and social anthropologists, but is notoriously difficult 
to apply. In Anthropology, for instance, there is a tendency to regard 
primeval groups as naturally discrete. The immediate problem then is 
to account for their interactions with other groups. According to 
Levi-Strauss
"<w> know what function is fulfilled by the incest prohibition 
in primitive societies. By casting, so to speak, the sisters 
and daughters out of the consanguine group, and by assigning 
to them husbands coming from other groups, the prohibition 
creates bonds of alliance between these natural groups, the 
first ones which can be called social. The incest prohibition 
is thus the basis of human society; in a sense it is the 
society" (Levi-Strauss, 1973,p.19).
In Levi-Strauss*s explication there is an implicit chronology: first 
there was the group and then an ’opening* occurred. However, there is 
no particular reason not to assume that the reverse might actually have 
happened: first there was the prohibition of incest (which some might 
take to be more ’natural’ than opening to other groups) and then 
sentiment of attachment and bellicosity developed to combat the 
emotional vacuum that resulted. Implicit ’chronology’ suggested by 
Levi-Strauss may be misleading. There are no humans prior to society 
and a fortiori, there are no societies prior to humans. However, 
without the conception of a ’discrete/indiscrete system*, one has no 
recourse but to reify one of the two aspects of society and accept this 
chronology. The concept, therefore, may provide an exit from the 
so-called ’myth of origin’.
B. The level of discreteness (or indiscreteness) of any given society
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may vary considerably. It is generally accepted that until recently 
European societies were becoming progressively more discrete (Hall, 
1975). However, political sociologists have difficulties in incorporat­
ing fluidity into their research agendas because 'definitions* in 
general tend to fix their subject-matter in unchanging relationships. 
According to John Hall, we have fixed our definition of society at a 
relatively high degree of discreteness :
"Our sense of society derived from Durkheim and Weber depends 
on the sharing of a set of norms by all citizens of a geograp­
hically bounded space capped over by a single source of 
authority, the state, which monopolises the use of violence. 
This sense of society reflects the conditions of Europeans na­
tion-state between say 1870-1945" (Hall, 1986,p.29).
Hall concludes on this basis that agrarian societies are not 'real* 
societies (Ibid, p.29) —  which is absurd. However, the notion of a 
discrete/indiscrete system allows for the different levels of discre­
tion (a totally indiscrete system is undiscemible). Thus society may 
be defined without reifying it at any given level of discreteness.
C. The concept of society as a discrete/indiscrete system has a hidden 
principle built into it. The principle is that there is a direct 
relationship between the discreteness and indiscreteness of society. 
(Otherwise, we should not describe it as a discrete/indiscrete system). 
The principle will be made clearer with concrete examples. Ronald Cohen 
proposed that the State format is essentially an anti-fission device - 
- or to use our terms, a discretion power machine. In his words:
"All political systems up to the time of the early state, have 
as part of their normal political and demographic process, 
inherent tendencies to break up and form similar units across 
the landscape. Barnes has aptly called this the ’snowball’ 
effect in which the polity builds up to a critical size, then 
splits up, over succession disputes, land shortages, or other 
reasons, into smaller units that in turn grow again towards 
their own break-up thresholds. The state is a system that 
overcomes such fissiparous tendencies. This capacity creates 
an entirely new kind of society. One that can expand and take 
in other ethnic groups, one that can become more populous and 
more powerful without necessarily having any upper limits to 
its size or strength" (Cohen,1978,p.35).
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The principle above suggests a correlation between the logistical 
problems of discretion and the nature of the social milieu, or 
indiscretion. As the format of the State provides differentiated, but 
formal structures of discretion (army, bureaucracy, etc) it permits 
greater scope for cultural diversity. In contrast to this, tribes who 
lack such formal machineries are claustrophobic entities. Their scope 
for indiscrete activity is much reduced. Members of the tribe
"use similar implements and consume similar goods. They fight 
and hunt with the same weapons and marry according to the same 
tribal law and custom.. .They also speak the same language.. .As 
a rule, the tribe is endogamous, that is, marriage is per­
mitted within its limits "(Malinowski, 1941, p.534).
Paradoxically, it appears that the lack of formal, alienated techniques 
of discretion, bites deeply into potentially indiscrete tribal ac­
tivities .
D. Finally, the discretion of societies is conditioned on the closure 
of their * constitutive interactions * * Is it a necessary condition that 
all the components of the 'constitutive interactions' reside within the 
boundary of their territory ? Traditional approaches based on the 
organic metaphor automatically assume that society is an autonomous 
entity, hence the search for the principle of closure within its 
spatial boundaries. However, there is nothing about the discrete/non—  
discrete system to warrant such an assumption. Far from it, the 
principle of closure has to be individually established and should be 
investigated afresh in each and every case.
Indeed, it appears that some societies 'discretise' themselves with the 
aid of other societies. According to Jackson and Rosberg,
"<w>hen we speak of 'the state* in Tropical Africa today, we 
cure apt to create an illusion ... in Tropical Africa, many 
so-called states are seriously lacking in the essentials of 
statehood .... The independence and survival of African states 
is not in jeopardy, because their sovereignty is not contin­
gent on their credibility as authoritative and capable 
political structures. Instead, i t  is  g u a r  an teed b y  the w orld  
com m unity o f  s ta te s " (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986, pp. 1,2, my 
emphasise).
Jackson and Rosberg argue, in other words, that a significant ’constit­
utive element’ in the structural closure of some Tropical African 
'societies' is external to them.
******************
These are only a few of the issues which could be discussed more 
fruitfully with the new concept of society, the definition of society 
as a discrete/indiscrete system opens the doors for thinking of it as 
a process. The metaphors indicate that the relations between the two 
aspects are problematic, and that is precisely the line taken in this 
chapter. But even a brief discussion such as the one undertaken here, 
suggests there remains much work to be done.
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NOTES
1. The term society is a conventional caption in which the various 
elements of a community are gathered together. In the most 
frequent usage it denotes "a collection of people with a common 
identification, who are sufficiently organized to carry out the 
conditions necessary to living harmoniously together” (Bertrand, 
1967, p.22). However, it denotes also the added dimension of a 
unitary social system, thus, society may be defined as "a network
of social interaction at the boundaries of which is a certain
level of interaction cleavage between it and its environment. A 
society is a unit with boundaries" (Mann,1986, p.13).
2. Among the ’Weberians* we may count Simmel, 1950; Weber, 1952,
1978; Sorokin, 1941; Foucault, 1979; Mann, 1986. There is of 
course also the Marxist tradition. However, Marx is ambiguous 
paradoxically because of his epistemological sophistication. He 
makes it clear in the Grundrisse that he does not know whether
society is a whole or not, it is, as far as he is concerned "a
whole in thought": "The totality as it appears in the head, as a 
totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking head, which 
appropriates the world in the only way it can" (Grundrisse, 1973, 
p. 101). This positions permits everyone to keep to their own 
idiosyncratic representation of society. Thus, in effect the 
Durkheimian/Weberian debate is reproduced within Marxism in the 
form of a the historical versus the structuralist schools.
3. On the subject see Frisby & Sayer, 1986. Among the Durkheimians 
we may count Durkheim, 1937; Mauss, 1968; Parsons, 1931; 1961, 
1971; Althusser, 1969).
4. See note (2) above.
5. A good example would be Aristotle’s claim: "the state has a
natural priority over the household and over any individuals 
among us" (Aristotle, 1981, p.60). He ’proves’ the point by 
adding : "separate hand or foot from the whole body, and they 
will no longer be hand or foot except in name" (Ibid. pp.60,61). 
Clearly, Aristotle employs the metaphor of the human body as a 
substitute for the more painful, and potentially unattainable, 
demonstration of the precise reasons why the State should be so.
6. ’Systems approach' and ’systemic thinking’ will be employed in
this chapter interchangeably. Systems approach is the latest 
high-tech branch of systemic thinking. Of the various systemic 
approaches the best known are Functionalism (Benedict, 1935; 
Demerath & Peterson, 1967; Malinowski, 1944; Radcliffe-Brown, 
1952) Structural-Functionalism (Parsons, 1937, 1961,1971;
Levy,1966), Structuralism (Althusser,1972) and Cybernetics 
(Easton, 1979; Wiener, 1948). For a general survey of systemic
thinking in the social science see Benseler (1980).
7. For a useful discussion of the organic metaphor see (Strasser &
Randall, 1981, pp. 133-138). Also Spencer, 1981 pp.383-435). On 
the attempt to replace the metaphor of a person with that of an 
organic metaphor, see (Sabine and Shepard, 1922).
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8. "Bodies are our paradigmatic objects, but analogy proceeds 
apace.... Bodies are assumed, yes; they are the things, first and 
foremost. Beyond than there is a succession of dwindling 
analogies" (Quine, 1981,p.9).
9. This is not to suggest that mathematics is without its own epis- 
temological difficulties. On that subject: Beth & Piaget (1960); 
Reichenbach (1958).
10. See Spencer op. cit. for an application of such method.
11. See the fascinating discussions on the concept of Space in Capek, 
(1976).
12. Thus, society becomes a ’system*: "It is my contention that a
thing is called a system to identify the unique mode by means of
which it is seen. We call a thing a system when we wish to
express the fact that the thing is perceived/conceived as 
consisting of a set of elements, of parts, that are connected to 
each other by at least one discernible , distinguishing prin­
ciple... A system is therefore an interaction between what is 
*out there* and how we organize it *in here*" (Jordan, 1981, 
p.24).
13. On the subject see Clasters (1974).
14. But systems approach cannot determine the nature of the entity
itself —  this is a matter for observation. Once it is decided 
whether the object is orderly or chaotic, system approach may 
advance some general formulae as to how it exhibits these 
characteristics. System approach is associated in physics with 
the most basic philosophical questions concerning order, chaos, 
and complexity (Serra et. al., 1986,; Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; 
Bohm, 1983). Hence, it should, in principle, be of interest to 
all traditions in Sociology.
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CHAPTER FIVE —  FORMAL AND INFORMAL INTERACTIONS
The theories of the State and the study of International Relations may 
be linked by adopting a common unit of analysis, namely, the political 
process. Society then is viewed as a discrete/nondiscrete entity. This 
chapter proposes a corresponding concept of interactions.
Some theory of interaction is necessary for the study of International 
Relations. It is doubtful, however, whether the concept of *relations* 
is best suited for the task to the extent that it brings to mind 
precisely this picture of clearly demarcated * units' relating to each 
other. * Clearly, the ’ environment * of social formations is not merely 
the * actions ’ of foreign ’decision-makers*, but is the cultural, social 
and economic milieu combined with the policies of other states as well 
as political demands from within. In other words, the environment of 
the State is the whole range of ’history’, it is not merely ’diplomatic 
history’.
A conspicuous form of interactions are direct: foreign policies of 
social formations, or to be more exact, foreign policies which are 
conducted by governing institutions. But these are not the only forms 
of interaction. Among others, we may list trade, investment and 
production, migration, the dissemination of ideas, fashions, tech­
nologies, etc. In addition to that there are ’transnational’ interac­
tions which the expression ’interaction’ does not capture very well. 
For instance, we talk of a ’domino effect’ as if there were some 
mysterious contagious disease travelling between social formations; we 
seem to agree that South Africa’s government will be replaced sooner or 
later unless it adjusts to external conditions, which it is generally 
agreed manifest themselves ’internally’. It appears therefore that 
apart of relations between States there are all sorts of methods and 
forms by which societies affect, modify, and influence each other. Some 
of them are easily recognisable, others can be perceived only by 
theoretical reconstruction. However, all of these methods and form are 
equally important to an understanding of the dynamics of international 
relationships. Thus, the relation between these interactions and the 
domestic political process is the subject matter of the study of
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International Relations.
5.1. Action theory and International Relations
The current methodology and philosophy of State-based schemes in 
International Relations can be traced back to two highly valued 
traditions in the Social Sciences: Political Science and the empiricist 
tradition in Sociology. Since Nicolo Machiavelli, Political Science had 
been preoccupied with the actions and motives of the prince (Meinecke, 
1962 ; Badie, 1987; Goulemot, 1987). It revolves around power. But not 
just any power, certainly not the ' social' power discussed by Foucault 
(1972; 1979). Rather, the discussion centres upon what Stephen Lukes 
called the first dimension of power —  the power to coerce. The 
preoccupation with this dimension of power reflects the kind of 'power' 
princes are interested in —  the power to coerce, both internally and 
externally. Thus, Political Science developed primarily as a manual for 
those who hold power.
This is explicit in the work of Hans Morgenthau. The raw material of 
International Relations, he argues, is the activities of statesmen:
"We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest 
defined els power and evidence of history bears that assumption 
out. That assumption allows us to retrace and anticipate, as 
it were, the steps a statesman —  past, present, or future —  
heis taken or will take on the political scene. We look over 
his shoulder when he writes his dispatches; we listen in on 
his conversation with other statesmen; we read and anticipate 
his very thoughts" (1964,p.5).
But morgenthau is certainly not alone:
"To rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "state"." 
inform Snyder, Bruck & Sapin "it is one of our basic methodol- 
ogicaJ. choices to define the state as its official Decision 
makers. State action is the action taken by those acting in 
the name of the state" (1962, p.65).
From the empiricist tradition, International Relations inherited the 
belief that social action, whether meaningful or not, is the only truly
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scientific tool of analysis.^  Thus it acquired the ambition which is the 
hallmark of the empiricist tradition, "to make the obvious unescapable" 
(Lasswell, 1977, p.82). ’Social action’, in the Weberian sociology, may 
be classified in terms of roles and orientations (Weber, 1978, chapter 
1). Accordingly, different 'activities* are distinguished by recalling 
types of orientation. This procedure produces what Weber calls ’type 
concepts’. Thus, for instance, "action will be said to ’economically 
oriented’ so far as, according to its subjective meaning, it is 
concerned with the satisfaction of a desire for ’utilities’" (Ibid, 
p.63). Whereas, "<s>ocial action, especially organised action, will be 
spoken of as ’politically oriented’ if it aims at exerting influence on 
the government of a political organisation" (Ibid. p.54).
The two traditions are synthesised in the concept of relations. It 
provides the theoretical link between social action and the activities 
of decision makers. Only ’actors’ i.e. corporeal, motivated entities 
are able to relate to each other. However, by emphasising relations 
between unities, the study of International Relations has no other 
recourse but to concentrate exclusively on the interactions between 
supposedly well defined agencies. Thus, contrary to self-avowed claims 
made by Realists, namely, to be learning from the ’facts’ (to ’observe’ 
politics in Machiavellian fashion), their findings are more often than 
not methodologically determined
5.2. International interactions and theories of the State
As mentioned in the second chapter, modem theories of the State are 
concerned with a specific issue. They have the particular task of 
"direct<ing> our attention to a single central problem. The interrela­
tion between the governing institutions of a country and other aspects 
of that society" (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1986, p.320). Since the term 
society here corresponds to what we have called ’social formation*, 
theories of the State may be defined collectively as theories  which 
describ e  the social in te rac tio n s  th a t occur w ith in  a bounded a rea  and  
th e ir  connection to the *g o v ern in g  in s titu t io n * o f  th a t a rea —  In short, 
they provide analytical frameworks for the investigation of the 
political process.
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Since the modem 'political process' is the process by which governing 
institutions and the society at large are related to each other, we 
shall distinguish between two types of interactions: those conducted by 
the state apparatus or the governing institutions I shall call 
henceforth form al in te rac tio n s, and those carried by and among any 
non-governing agencies I shall call in form al in te rac tio n s . Formal 
interactions are so defined because 'governments' are a formal type of 
association. Under this heading all p u rp o s e fu l activities and policies 
of governmental and semi-governmental organs, whether domestic or 
foreign, will be grouped together. The definition of 'informal' 
interactions is simpler; they consist of all other possible forms of
interactions and include the un in tended  consequences o f governm enta l
... 7a c tiv itie s .
According to society-oriented theories of the State, formal interac­
tions, even if they are directly a response to an external initiative, 
are always the 'end result', the 'outputs' of the domestic processes. 
'Informal' interactions, on the other hand, constitute an element of 
the 'input' of the political process. Thus, in contrast to a world 
fragmented into unitary 'States’ who interact with each other to 
achieve certain goals, we present here a picture of a world fragmented 
into political processes. Each 'State' appears from this point of view 
as a sort of a processing machine whose 'outputs' spurts off in many 
directions and become 'inputs’ of other social formations where they 
reappears again in the form of formal and informal 'output' . Since 
societies confront each other as discrete entities only on the formal 
level, the major lines of contacts between them work their way 
informally. It is at this level that social formations are truly 
connected to each other.
This apparent expediency —  a mere reformulation of the nature of 
interactions among social formations, permits us to create a bridge 
between the theories of the State and the study of International 
Relations. However, this simple solution reveals inadequacies both of 
current theories of the State as well as International Relations. As 
mentioned in the second chapter, one of the major problems in analyzing 
today's world stems from the situation whereby political practices and
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the wider social context do not overlap. The political process is 
localised, but the cultural, economic and ideological processes are 
not. However, modem theories of the State deal only with the political 
discreteness of societies and are incapable of dealing with the reality 
of social formations as discrete/nondiscrete entities. They have 
developed therefore (just as the ’political systems’ they purport to 
represent) this perplexing capacity to subvert and domesticate social
processes of varying spatial dimensions into a familiar mould —  and
q
what they cannot possess they simply ignore.
In these theories, factors of foreign origin are either discussed as if 
they were internal factors or they are not discussed at all. Hence, for 
the Pluralists, a foreign lobby is not differentiated from any other 
local lobby; elite theorists treat a foreign dominated ’elite’ in the 
same way as a ’national’ elite; and for Marxists, a dependent ’block of 
power’ is no different from a 'national’ one. At the same time, the 
direct effects of foreign states i.e. formal policies of foreign 
states, are simply ignored, shut out as if they did not exist. In this 
manner, the myth of a neatly defined social unit is perpetuated —  both 
in the real world as well as in the theoretical realm. However, this is 
not wrong as such, it simply implies that theories of the State are at 
best analytical tools of limited utility. They do not provide a full 
picture of societal dynamism.
5.3. Informal Interactions in International Relations literature
Informal interactions have been discussed in International Relations.^ 
Generally speaking, however, since the traditional definition of the 
discipline is of the study of the relations between states, informal 
interactions are treated inadequately. They are mentioned either in 
order to illustrate that the world is more complex than Realists have 
assumed (Keohane and Nye, 1972); to demonstrate that sovereignty is 
eroding (Goodwin, 1974); or to show that foreign policy is not only 
about the ’national interest’. Only Regime Analysis (Krasner,1983; 
Jackson,1987) discusses informal interactions for what they are. 
Nonetheless, here too policies of governing institutions are not 
separated from the actions of other agencies and consequently the
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conceptual tools fail to take full measure of the informal interac­
tions. I shall presently discuss two familiar works and ask why their 
concept of informal interactions is inadequate for our purposes.
The first is the work of Keohane and Nye (1972). Keohane and Nye 
categorised international interactions into three types: governmental, 
intergovernmental and non-governmental or transnational relations 
(Ibid. p.xiv). This typology was replaced in later work (1977) by 
interstate, transgovemmental and transnational relations. Transnation­
al relations are defined as
"the activities of transnational organisations, except within 
their home states, even when some of their activities may not 
directly involve movements across state boundaries and may 
not, therefore, be transnational interactions as defined 
above" (1972,p.xv).
Transnational interactions, therefore, roughly correspond to our notion 
of informal interactions with one vital difference, they refer 
exclusively to the activities of multinational corporations so this 
definition is of limited utility from the start.
The various categories are meaningful only if they can be related to 
each other —  otherwise, it is not a theory but merely a convenient (or 
inconvenient) sets of captions. The key to the whole project lies in 
the relations between the three agencies. Unfortunately, that is 
precisely where Keohane and Nye become vague. At one point they 
characterise the relations between these agencies as follows:
"Interstate relations are the normal channels assumed by 
realists. Transgovemmental applies when we relax the realist 
assumption that states act coherently as units; transnational 
applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only 
units" (1977, p.24).
As it stands this version is totally unacceptable. For strictly 
speaking, it suggests that the category * State* is somehow more limited 
in scope than the category ’government*. Furthermore, on the one hand, 
international interactions are categorised on the basis of the nature
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of the emitting agency —  when the State is posed els a coherent agency 
then they are named * interstate* relations, when it is not then they 
are referred to as ’transgovernmental*. On the other hand, an addition­
al criterion is introduced, this time on the bEisis of the channels of 
interactions —  sometimes the State acts through the channels ’assumed 
by realists’, sometimes it does not. Consequently, by amalgamating 
these two criteria they arrive at what appears on the surffiice to be 
three distinct types of interactions, which of course they are not.
But let us attempt to overcome this hurdle by renaming their state 
government. Now we can ask whether it is useful to discuss internation­
al politics on the bEisis of three different agencies; governments, 
international organisation and multinational corporations. Let us begin 
with the first two, namely, governments and International Organisa­
tions. International Organisations present a difficulty for theories of 
the State. Ordinarily, they are regarded els the arm of the State, a 
venue for conducting diplomEtcy. But Keohane and Nye argue with some 
justification that such treatment does not do justice to the true role 
of these organisations. Unfortunately their approach backfires. For, on 
the theoretical level, they present it els if the issue revolves around 
the degree of cohesiveness of the government. It is clear, however, 
that whether governments are cohesive or not has nothing to do with the 
relations between governments and international organisations. In 
actual fact, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that governments 
are not, and never have been, cohesive units (Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1986, 
chpt.6). But instead of criticising this central tenet of realist 
thought, Keohane and Nye attempt to supplement it with another 
manufactured realm where governments are a collection of ELgencies.
What about the relation between governments and multinational corpora­
tions? Theories of the State do not regard Multinational Corporations 
as unique phenomena. This creates difficulties for the empiricist 
tradition because decision-makers are not particularly good ’units of 
analysis’: they are agents of an abstract ’State’, and at the same time 
they belong to a corporate body (bureaucracy). Their position is 
inherently contradictory: they re-enact, to use a Durkheimian notion, 
the concept 'State’ in daily life. At the same time they represent the
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parochial interest of their corporate body. Indeed, the public 
decision-makers, as the representative of the abstract entity * State *, 
are considered (and no less important, consider themselves) as the 
legitimate representative (admittedly among other interests) of the 
interests of these multinationals. At the same time as members of the 
corporate body of the 'state', they stand in a bargaining position to 
the MNC’s decision makers.
Theoreticians need to choose for the sake of elegancy, one interest 
over the other. Otherwise total confusion reigns. Neo-Realists such as 
Gilpin (1981) have tried to solve the problem (unsuccessfully in ray 
view) by maintaining that there are seme intrinsic interests shared by 
these decision-makers in their double capacity. Keohane and Nye's 
concept of transnational relations, however, has done no more than 
introduce into the discipline of International Relations an on-going 
discussion in political science. They have introduced a problem, but 
have not solved it. It is fair to conclude therefore that Keohane and 
Nye’s conceptual tools prevent the linking of theory of International 
Relations with theories of the State, as is indeed demonstrated by 
their utter failure to take full advantage of the vast literature of 
the theories of the State.
The same sort of criticism may be directed at the work of James Rosenau 
(1980). Rosenau proposes different categories. For him,
"some outputs, conventionally called foreign policy, are 
designed to bring about responses in other systems.. .Yet there 
are a host of other patterns of behaviour within a polity or 
its environment that are not designed to evoke boundary—  
crossing responses but that nevertheless do so through 
perceptual or emulative process" (p.382).
The second type of ’outputs' are Rosenau's way of characterising 
informal interactions. However, for him, the distinction revolves 
around the motivation of the 'actors'; their activities are categorised 
according to whether they were meant to evoke boundary-crossing 
responses. But why is this distinction so important? And for whom? Is 
it important for the receiving social formation? I do not think so. 
After all motivations should always be distinguished from consequences.
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Does it forge a link with the theories of the State? Hardly. It is only 
significant to the observer who may now multiply the types of ’linka­
ges* as much as s/he cares to. Combined with a dazzling array of 
’domestic categories’ (Ibid. p.388) the "linkage phenomena ..are 
combined into a matrix that yields 144 areas in which national—  
international linkages can be formed" (Ibid. p.387). But this number is 
only mentioned to keep things in proportion because in actual fact "the 
number of possible linkages is actually much greater than 144" 
(Ibid.p.387).
Rosenau and Keohane and Nye typify the neglect by International 
Relations’s theorists of theories of the State.^ Theirs are the only 
consequences to be expected of faulty procedures which pile ever 
greater number of actors issues on a study which was designed to limit 
itself to the relations between decision-makers.
5.4. Formal/informal and the distinction between domestic and foreign 
policies
The implicit justification for a separate study of International
Relations lies in the belief that both domestic and international
12politics may be treated as autonomous systems. However, in this work 
both domestic and foreign policies are considered as grouped together 
under one category, namely, formal interactions. The question then, is
whether the distinction between formal and informal interactions is
13analytically superior to that of domestic and foreign policy.
The distinction between foreign and domestic policies has good 
historical, empirical and theoretical reasons to recommend. Historical­
ly, modern European States developed through a long and protracted 
bargaining process between princes and estates over the distribution of 
resources. Partly as a result of this, monarchs were restricted by an 
endless array of local customs and privileges, and felt more comfort­
able with foreign affairs. From this, the feudal social structure from 
which the modem state arose, was founded on a sort of military
152
division of labour (McNeill, 1983). The contributions were, as the 
saying goes, the workers with their work, the gentry with their blood 
and the clergy with their prayers. Accordingly, the nobility and in 
particular the monarchy were accustomed to the art of war. These 
factors together created a situation whereby not only did the conduct 
of war (which is ordinarily identified with foreign policy) remain for 
a long time the exclusive prerogative of princes, but it was the only 
activity considered to be worthy of their attention (Huizinga, 1971); 
Mann, 1987a). In the context of a European reality of a intensely 
competitive state system, such traits could be only reinforced, as 
indeed they were.
Observation abets this view, too. Legally and politically, the globe is 
fragmented into sets of territories, within each resides a supreme 
sovereign. Indeed, the doctrine of sovereignty was devised specifically 
to insulate the nation-state in matters of law enforcement (see 3.3.). 
Since traditional International Relations is attentive to the needs and 
actions of those who are in control. Decision-makers, in their capacity 
as formal agents of the State are generally speaking uninterested in 
philosophical questions and overall structural trends in International 
Relations. Nor do they mind that the doctrine of sovereignty was 
devised to accommodate a particular historical situation. As legitimate 
agent and representative of the State, they deal with the agents and 
representatives of other states as if they were the other State. They 
accept the distinction between the domestic and the international at 
face value.^
These are, then, the reasons for the distinction between internal and
external policies. It should be noted, however, that doubts have
15already been creeping into traditional International Relations.
However, the problem cannot be brushed aside when one attempts to
discuss the structural analyses of the world system and the world 
16economy, for the simple reason that structural analysis is premised on 
continuity in domestic and foreign policies. James Caporaso (1978) has 
attempted to grapple with the problem; it is interesting to review his 
approach. Caporaso proposes a distinction between ' manifest * and 
(presumably) ’concealedl* decision makers. Manifest decision-makers, 
ordinarily situated in dependent formations, only appear to wield
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power. Their options are so much restricted in advance that their power 
is illusionary. In reality Caporaso dichotomizes the 'international 
field’ into two realms of 'decision-making': The 'manifest' realm 
whereby all states are sovereign and equal and a hidden realm which 
dominates the first one. The advantages of this formulation is clear —  
it is a more realistic evaluation of the role decision-makers. The 
disadvantages, however, are less obvious: but this analytical exercise 
is attempted precisely to combat the detrimental effects of the 
separation between internal and external policies, an attempt which 
ends in failure.
The 'manifest' decision-makers of the Third World are no less 'manife­
st' than the decision-makers of the centre. Their options are not 
restricted more than those of the centre; they represent peripheral 
ruling classes just as their colleagues in the centre do. The only
difference is that in many cases, third world ruling class are
manifestly hindering social and economic development, whereas in the 
centre they do it less conspicuously. Ultimately, the issues raised by 
the structuralists transcend the decision-makers. The truth of the
matter is that the two realms, foreign and domestic politics, are not
17'linked' to each other, they are one and the same.
It is absurd, for instance, to think that when the United States of 
America decided in 1970 on a perfectly good 'domestic' policy, for
perfectly good domestic reasons, to end subsidising small oil wells
(Odell, 1983), this decision infiltrated into the 'international' arena 
only in 1973 (the oil embargo). Similarly, it is a mistake to think 
that faced with the embargo, Americans attempted to unite the 'free 
world* against the OPEC states. Indeed, the 'foreign' and 'domestic' 
policies produced an interesting play: in its official, 'foreign'
policy capacity, the United States undertook to unite the western 
powers, but its 'domestic' policy amounted to a hurried attempt to take 
advantages of the situation and advance over its allies/competitors 
(Parboni, 1981). In fact, the 'foreign' policy was advanced with such 
singularity because 'internal' policy did the 'dirty' job.
Similarly, the conceptual separation between domestic and foreign
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policies led many observers to interpret the relations between the USA 
and Saudi Arabia as hostile. Certainly, on the formal level, the two 
were protagonists in the early seventies. Yet it needed an analyst such 
as Fred Halliday (1974), unencumbered with and unhindered by the 
theoretical tools of Foreign Policy Analysis, to notice that conven­
tional interpretation "exaggerates the differences between the rulers 
of the oil states and the major capitalist states. The ruling classes 
of the Middle East owe their present strength, and in some cases their 
very existence, to decades of support from the capitalist West" (p.5). 
One may conclude, therefore, with Susan Strange’s (1986) that all 
policies (as well as ’non-policies’) are potentially belong to 
international politics. It is fair to infer therefore that the division 
between domestic and foreign politics is of secondary importance.
5.5. The limitations of the distinction between formal and informal 
interactions
So far I was arguing in favour of the distinction into formal and 
informal interactions. It is now time to examine its drawbacks. The 
distinction is utilized in order to create a bridge between the 
theories of the State and the study of International Relations, 
however, it was argued already that the theories of the State themsel­
ves are of limited utility. The limit can be gauged by examining the 
manner by which a society as a discrete/indiscrete entity experiences 
its environment.
5.5.1. Formal/Informal
The formal/informal matrix corresponds to the distinction between the 
government and the country at large. And indeed, it is possible to 
demonstrate that the two ’agencies’ respond differently to external 
stimuli. ’Governments’ are formal systems of rule. They may be seen els
"a point in a flow of activity which is initiated by the 
political community ... Behaviourial tensions represent 
’inputs’, or stimuli affecting political leaders, who by 
responding to than generate decision, or ’outputs’" (Apter, 
1973, pp.75).
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Modem government may be conceived therefore as an Input/Output (I/Os) 
machine (Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979, Almond, 1956). Although this is an 
idealisation, as governments are regarded as empty 'black boxes' with 
no contribution of their own, there is an element of truth in this 
formulation. If the relation of government/population is not of the 
simple linearity of the I/Os machines, at -least it is a relation of
correspondence: there is a direct connection between 'demands’ and
18'pressures' on the one hand, and 'policies’ on the other.
A stark illustrations of this sequence is provided by the plan-rational 
states (Johnson, 1982, chpt.l, Japan, South Korea, Singapore as opposed 
to the regulatory states such as the United States, Britain etc.). The 
economic 'success' of these societies, depends on their ability to 
concentrate upon single goal and in effect transform themselves into 
I/Os machines. (The mere absurdity and cruelty of such practice implies 
that there a m  other levels too).
Ordinarily there is one ministry or agency which takes the lead in 
formulating clear-cut objectives. In Japan, the Ministry of Interna­
tional Trade and Industry (MITI) assumed this role (Johnson, 1982). 
Considered by many as the precursor of the phenomenal success of the 
Japanese economy (Johnson, 1982; Morishima, 1982), the Ministry makes a 
general assessment of the world (economic) situation and formulate five 
years plan. It targets few industries as the bearers of the next stage 
of development and channels capital and know-how as well as appoints a 
few chosen corporations to undertake this move.
The same is said of Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore. Singapore has found a
niche in the rapidly growing Far East trade as an entrepot port and the
19provider of semi-skilled, orderly work force. But success, if not 
followed by further development might turn sour. Singapore, therefore, 
attempted to move up the ladder of the International Division of 
Labour. By combining government incentives with private industries 
(especially foreign companies), upgrading its education system and 
forcing workers wages up (to force capitalists to shift into more 
profitable and modem industries), it has attempted to transform itself 
into an industrial nation. So far this was met with varying degrees of
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success.
In both instances, governments and its ministries assess ’inputs’ and 
produce ’outputs’ by abstracting the ’environment’ of the social 
formation into clearly defined parameters. In this process the 
formation itself is ’flattened’ into clearly defined sets of goals. The 
process resembles the strategic planning of corporations to such an 
extent, that Japan has been nicknamed ’Japan Inc.. * and West Germany, 
Germany Ltd, etc. It would be wrong, however, to assume, as many do, 
that social formations are simply the equivalents of corporations 
operating in a world of more or less well defined parameters. On one 
level, and one level only, social formations operate as linear I/Os 
systems. But this level is compounded by the following two levels.
5.5.2. Discrete/Non-discrete
In the previous chapter it was argued that society is a discrete/indi­
screte entity. Its discreteness manifest itself as an ’organic’ system. 
Organic systems differ from an I/Os system in two respects:
i. The living system cannot deal with its environment as a set of 
parameters but adapts to it in its entirety (Capra, 1983, chpt. 9).
ii. The ’environment’ is not felt directly by the living system, it 
perturbs the system (Varela, 1976; Glarserfeld, 1980). The organism 
reacts to the perturbation by compensating or modifying its internal 
structure (Maturana & Varela, 1975, 1987).
Such system may be called therefore Perturbation/Compensation machines 
or P/Cs in short. Unlike I/Os systems, in the case P/Cs systems one
must take into account both the environment that perturbs the system
20and the constitution of the system itself. In contrast to the I/Os 
machine where outputs relate directly to Inputs, P/Cs systems compen­
sate in a manner which on the face of it might appear unrelated and 
unproportionate to the external stimulus. Consequently, P/Cs system 
responds to its environment in somewhat erratically. I will presently 
examine three examples.
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5.5.3. Cultural Contacts in the Northern territories of the Gold Coast
The first example derives from a discussion of M. Fortes (1936) of the 
dynamic of cultural contact in the Northern Territories of the Gold 
Coast. Fortes concerned himself with diffusion of cultural traits in 
the Northern Territories and more specifically the socio-economic 
effects of the missionary service. He quotes approvingly Livingstone’s 
aphorism that "wherever a missionary lives, traders are sure to come, 
they are mutually dependent and each aids the other" (p.31), and 
examines the mechanism of such interdependence. I will quote extensive­
ly to demonstrate the precise moment when a seemingly benign ’cultural 
contact* becomes decisive element in the transformation of society.
The missionary, an agent of an alien culture, inserts himself into the 
existing pattern of behaviour.
"A missionary in Africa is seldom merely *a man going about 
with a Bible under his arm’...He generally offers essential 
and much desired services to the community, a school, or a 
hospital, or even so apparently trivial a thing as a football 
at the disposal of the idle youth. Such service creates links 
of dependence and a context of prestige which ensure a 
tolerant hearing for his specifically Christian teaching. The 
polyvancy of functions is a well-established attribute of 
primitive institutions" (pp. 31,32).
Once accepted, the missionary acts like any general endowed with
Clauswitzian logic. He sees a gap and seizes upon it:
"In the patrilineal and patripotestal communities of the 
Northern Territories, young men generally seen to respond most 
rapidly to mission teaching. It is not merely a question of 
youth. The ancestor cult is the dominant religious institution 
there. Now young men, though always participating freely in 
rites and ceremonies and often as fully conversant with 
details of ritual as their fathers, seldom have direct ritual 
responsibility.... In such communities where religion is more 
a matter of doing than of thinking, a young man often has no 
religious obligations to renounce by conversion" (Ibid,pp.32,- 
33).
The conversion is smooth. For a while the two ’religions* co-exist side 
by side, but this state of affairs cannot remain forever. The mission­
ary essentially is attacking a strategic point of that society:
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"The cult of common ancestor is one of the main sanctions of 
patriliean family and clan cohesion, and, on the other hand, 
the foundation of a solidarity between matrilineal kindred 
which breaks down the exclusiveness of the patrilineal group" 
(Ibid, p.35).
Once the fundamental beliefs of that society are undermined, the 
effects are devastating : the existing social order virtually melts 
away.
5.5.4. The Iroquois and the population of the Great Lakes
My second example is borrowed from Eric Wolfe’s (1982) discussion of 
the fur trade in the North American continent. This trade consisted of 
nothing but the exchange of beaver's skin for rifles, utensils and 
shiny jewellery. But due to the huge disparities in power and wealth 
between the European powers and the native communities, the trade 
sparked off structural transformations of colossal magnitude.lt is 
customary in anthropological studies to characterise social structure 
according to three levels, economics, linguistics and kinship (Levi-St- 
rauss, 1953, p.536). The political structure, or the structure of order 
and authority is a fourth level. When any one of those four factors is 
modified, one is entitled to talk of a fundamental change. But when all 
four are transformed concomitantly, this is a tremendous structural 
change, a metamorphosis.
That is precisely what happened to the indigenous Indian communities of
North America. We pick up the story with the Iroquois. Prior to the
arrival of the Europeans, the political structure of the Iroquois
consisted of five distinct nations, each controlled its own settlement.
Ihey were linked in one political organisation, but were culturally and
linguistically different.
"The languages of the various clusters were mutually unintel­
ligible, and the business of the confederacy was carried on 
by multilingual chiefs" (Wolf, 1982, p.165).
The Iroquois had developed an interesting social and economic struc­
ture:
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"The economic basis of Iroquois life before the growth of the 
fur trade was horticulture and the hunt. Horticulture was 
largely in the hands of women, although the men helped in 
clearing land during the slash-and-bum cycle, .cultivation 
were carried out by the women of the village as a whole, under 
the guidance of the head matron of the dominant lineage and 
with the matrons of other family lines acting as lieutenants. 
Rights to use land, as well as the tools used in cultivation 
and food processing, passed through the female line. Distribu­
tion of produce was similarly in the hands of women. The 
weight of these economic roles granted women considerable 
authority, since they could use their ability to provide food 
and moccasins to exercise a veto over the activities of war 
parties of which they did not approve" (Ibid, p. 166).
In the traditional Iroquois division of Labour, hunting and warfare 
were in the hands of men. The direct result of the trade was a marked 
increase in violence and warfare as each group strove to comer the 
market. Naturally the centre of gravity of the Iroquois ’economy’ 
shifted from horticulture to hunt. The result was
"the separation of male and females roles increased.... It is 
possible that they became increasingly matrilocal after the 
early seventeenth century, in response to this growing 
bifurcation of activities"(Ibid. p,167).
This led to further developments: "The evidence has seme 
striking implications. It points to the possibility that in 
the course of fur trading and enhanced warfare the forms of 
kinship affiliation remained the same, but their meaning and 
function underwent a major change. When the Europeans first 
arrived, the Lodge extended lengthwise was primarily a league 
of local groups adjudicating local interests in cultivated 
land and other resources, as well as impeding the escalation 
of local quarrels into feuds and warfare. Yet increasingly the 
Iroquois confederacy found itself acting as an association of 
fur traders and warriors,sometimes of quite different origins, 
in relation to the translocal imperatives of the fur trade and 
of the political struggles between rival European state 
systems" (Ibid. p. 167)
In the area of the Great lakes another stupendous change was witnessed. 
There the fur trade sparked off processes of fusion and alliances among 
groups that had previously entertained separate local identities:
"The feast of the Dead was replaced as the major ritual of 
exchange and alliance by a new religious forms, the best known 
of which is the Midewiwin ... The feast of the Dead had
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celebrated local group identity ... The Midewiwin, in con­
trast, was directed more toward the individual and his 
integration into a hierarchical association that transcended 
locality and distinctive symbol groups thus yielded to the 
development of a translocal ’church*, providing a mechanism 
for the local and ideological control of large aggregate 
population; that congregated during the winter months" (Ibid. 
p.172).
In all these example, native Indian communities mutated within a 
century or so. Yet, these transformations were sparked off by the mere 
trade of rifles and trinkets for bear skin and later buffalo meat.
5.5.5. The ’Modem Men*
Early development studies in the 1950s and 1960s centred upon the
21vagaries of the ’political system’. Political systems were conceived 
as active agents who perform functions, influence their environment and 
are in turn influenced by it. The literature reserved a special place 
to the psychology of ’modem men* who was after all the bearer of 
modernity (Porter, 1974).
Hie modem man has been examined studiously. S/he proved to possess an 
infinite characteristics and traits. But in essence these studies seem 
to agree on something like the following definition: "Psychological 
modernity can be defined as a dynamically self-seeking orientation —  
aware and desirous of the benefits of life in advance countries and 
willing to participate and acquire the skills necessary for attaining 
a similar life style" (Ibid. p.259). Tempted by the notion of dif­
fusion, developmental studies put their trust in the diffusion of 
modem traits to produce the desired developmental outcome.
Alas, whereas the diffusion of modernity succeeded, it failed to pull 
underdeveloped societies out of their misery. On the contrary, it 
became a factor of underdevelopment. The masses in the Third World 
’internalise’ to varying degrees the traits of modernity. They became 
self-seeking individuals desirous of the benefits of life in advance 
societies. But
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"what occurs when there are little opportunities for social 
participation? ... the spirit of modernity, a dynamically 
self-seeking orientation, will search for other possible 
alternatives for fulfilling these goals .... The resulting 
modernity-in-underdevelopment syndrome is pathetically 
exemplified by many capital cities in Latin America. These 
cities have become flooded with modem goods satisfying a 
premature demonstration effect demand which far from stimulat­
ing a feeble economy, further contributes to its stagnation" 
(Ibid, pp. 259 - 61).
It appears to me that these studies have conflated a correct principle 
with the wrong theory. They attribute correctly an important role to 
the diffusion of cultural traits in the transformation of societies. 
However a theory which concentrates on the 'political system’ to the 
exclusion of all other factors is faulty. In their definition, the 
political system becomes the strategic factor of cohesion of society 
(Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 47-8). It is both its adaptive and goal- 
attaining mechanism (Parsons, 1961). Hence development is the develop­
ment of the political system. Unfortunately no amount of clever 
analytical tricks can ascribe to the 'political system' such powers in 
reality. What Almond (1956) calls the political structure may be 
transferred wholesale, on its bureaucracy, judges, etc. to another 
formation only to produce unintended results (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986), 
while the culture traits of modernity may become the vehicle of 
stagnation.
These development studies centre exclusively on the 'political system', 
they are tied therefore to the metaphors of an I/Os system. In fact, 
they superimpose the linearity of an I/Os system on what is in reality 
a P/Cs system. With an I/Os system, the relation between inputs and 
outputs should in principle be straightforward. An input of modernity 
in 'demands' and 'support' is supposed to produce an output of 
modernity. But a P/Cs system reacts rather differently, an 'input' 
(which is in fact perturbation) of say, rifles to a native society, of 
a new belief in salvation, or of the traits of modernity, sparks off 
ripple effects leading to a totally unexpected 'output'.
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5.5.6. Direct Bombardment
I/Os and P/Cs systems combined warrant the treatment of social 
formations as bounded, discrete entities. But society is also open to 
its environment, many interactions do not make any particular cleavage 
leap when they exit one formation and enter another. For them society 
is not a bounded entity, it is submerged within a larger entity which 
may be called ’civilisation’ or a ’cultural area’ (Goldenwiesser, 
1937). the free flow of cultural traits within the cultural area may be 
characterised, from the point of view of the receiving social formation 
as ’direct bombardment*.
The model of direct bombardment is perhaps best suited to describe the 
spread of the industrial revolution from the British Isle to Europe. 
The industrial revolution did not spread through the conscious policies 
of government, it is a case of ’direct bombardment’ riding on the backs 
of private citizens. "At first sight" Pollard says,
"it is not at all clear what was distinctive about the British 
contribution ... the most obvious item to be transferred was 
the new technology" (1981, pp.85).
Technology transfer sparks off new enclaves of industry in Europe.
We may take a few other ’trivial’ examples. Ordinarily they are not 
noticed, let alone thought to be worthy of the study of International 
Relations, but for some reason or other countries have felt it 
absolutely necessary to hamper their free flow. My first example is a 
pop song performed by Madonna called ’like a virgin’. Unfortunately the 
Kuwaiti regime does not take kindly to such overt sexual innuendoes. 
After all they might corrupt the tender spirits of its own subjects who 
might follow in the decadent ’western ways*. They devised an ingenious 
scheme: the song was translated in Arabic under the title ’like a 
virtuous person* and the possible disastrous effects were averted.
The former sultan of Oman, the Sultan Said bin Taimur, report Fred 
Halliday, did not employ such refined methods.
"Under the guise of respecting Ibadhism a savage regime was 
upheld. Said’s rule prevented Omanis from leaving the country;
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discouraged education and health services, and kept from the 
population a whole series of objects, including medicines, 
radios, spectacles, trousers, cigarettes and books" (Halliday, 
1974, p.275).
Malawi’s customs’ officials are not much better. Reputed to have taken 
an absolute distaste to bell bottom Jeans, guitars, long hair and the 
name of Carl Marx.
These sort of commodities are normally transported along borders not 
because modem states are liberal or tolerant, but because the process 
of submersion within a larger ’cultural area' has already been long 
completed.
To sum up, I have reviewed a variety of studies which suggest that 
society receives an external stimuli in three distinct manners. The 
formal level of government, the level of the discrete system, and the 
level of the social milieu.
164
NOTES
1. On the concept of relations see Mitchell, 1984.
2. Some modern theoreticians of International Relations have
attempted to distance themselves from the 'billiard Ball’ model. 
See: Banks, 1984; Burton, 1965; Keohane & Nye, 1972; 1977;
Mansbach, 1981. However, by keeping with the concept of ’rel­
ations’ , they immediately resurrect the vision of a cohesive 
units —  the very thing they were intent on breaking up.
3. Lukes, 1974. For discussion see Hindess, 1982.
4. On action theory see Weber, 1978 in particular chapter 1: ’Basic 
Sociological terms’ pp. 4-56; Parsons, 1937; 1961. For a critique 
See: Hindess, 1977 in particularly chapters 1 and 7; and Keat, & 
Urry, 1982.
5. On the historical dimension of the political process see chapter 
3.3. Also Dunleavy & O’Leary, 1986; Poggi, 1978, chpt.l).
6. Weber defines a formal association as follows: "An association 
with a continuously and rational operating staff will be called 
a form al organisation (1978, p.52). In Weber’s terminology 
religious and economic organisation are considered to be formal 
organisations. Nonetheless, here the term formal is reserved 
exclusively for the ’governing institutions*. On government as a 
formal system see also: Rose, 1984; Finer, 1950.
7. The reason for this definition will become progressively clearer 
as the dissertation unfolds.
8. Indeed, of necessity, the localisation of the political process 
within the confine of a territory entails that much of what we 
call politics will have to do with the division into Us and Them.
9. What can the ’political system’ do in the light of the difference 
between the spatial extension of political, economic and cultural 
systems? It can only pretend there is no mismatch at all. Hie 
political system appropriates all within its boundary as its own, 
professing no concern whatsoever as to whether these processes 
are linked in some way or another to other social formations. Max 
Weber’s definition of the ’political community’ might be read in 
this light. For him, it will be remembered, "<t>he term ’polit­
ical community* shall apply to a community whose social action is 
aimed at subordinating to orderly domination by the participants 
a ’territory’ and the conduct of the persons within it, through 
the readiness to resort to physical force, including normally the 
force of arms" (Weber, 1978, p.901).
Weber is obviously aware that the ’State* (’political 
community’ is his term for the State) is not a closed social unit 
—  it only pretends to be one.
10. The reference is to the Interdependence school. On Interd­
ependence see note (2) of the Introduction.
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11. The same analysis can be made of Hanrieder, 1978; Burton, 1965,
etc. I do not think there is any point in going into greater 
detail.
12. See note (18) of the Introduction.
13. The first chapter outlined a partial answer.
14. For the theoretical justifications of the distinction between 
domestic and international politics see the Introduction.
15. Prominent is the Interdependence school. These writers base their
argument on supposedly empirical grounds. They argue that with 
the advent of interdependence, the distinction between domestic 
and foreign policy is no more tenable. However, the argument is 
false for it implies
a) that the European state system used to be true to the myths of 
sovereignty at some point in the past, while in actual fact the 
European state system always has been ’ transnational’; and
b) that the separation between domestic and foreign politics was 
conceptually relevant at some point in the past.
Wolfram Hanrieder (1967) has grasped the theoretical 
difficulties presented by the distinction into foreign and 
domestic politics. The problem, he says, is not the separation 
itself, but the resulting teleological theory of the interna­
tional relations. Whereby "nations are immediately delegated to 
play out the roles that internal system as * assigned* to its 
members* to maintain system stability or equilibrium. Domestic 
political variables are largely neglected in this analytical 
perspective. Foreign policy aspirations are assessed primarily in 
terms of whether a nation has adequately * internalized* system 
'rules’ - that is to say, whether a polity has adjusted to the 
contingencies of the international system" (p.971).
In other words, the theory assigns, in an a priori fashion 
a privileged position to the 'international system*. This 
theoretical a priori, encumbered with the empiricism of tradi­
tional International Relations, produces a meta-physical theory 
of the relations between States. A theory in which the pos­
sibility of investigating foreign policy is eliminated (see 
chapter one).
Whereas the difficulties presented by a strict division 
into domestic and foreign policy have become evident to Interna­
tional Relations theorists. The medicine applied is conditioned 
by the diagnosis. First, as usual, a symptomatic treatment was 
attempted. The logic develops as follows: Since there is an 
autonomous 'international political system’ then it follows that 
there is an autonomous ’domestic political system*. Now the two 
systems need to be linked somehow. In an empirical context the 
issue appears therefore to be as if the international system is 
becoming progressively better linked to the domestic system. 
Considering that from this perspective the 'international politi­
cal system’ has not changed in any fundamental way, nor did the 
’domestic political system’, what has changed was the link 
between them. Interdependence thinkers consequently take im­
mediate steps to make ’ the obvious inescapable *. They conjure up 
some concepts of the link.
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See the discussion of Keohane and Nye and Rosenau in the 
previous pages.
16. As the two approaches are so diametrically opposed, it is not 
immediately evident that 'structuralism' poses a serious chal­
lenge to the traditional International Relations. To mention some 
of the ridiculous attempts at synthesising the two : Marghoori 
and Ramberg, 1982; Pettman, 1979; Hollist & Rosenau, 1981.
17; Gourevich’s (1978) paper is most frustrating in this respect. In 
this paper, Gourevich gathers various sociological, political and 
economic studies which discuss the effects of the international 
system upon an individual formation. But his conclusion, instead 
of moving forward, is a return to Realism !
18. In effect, governments are regarded in the discipline of Interna­
tional Relations as linear I/Os machines. These machines are 
programmed to achieve the ’common good’ or the ’national inter­
est’ (Krasner, 1978). They proceed by processing ’inputs’ which 
include ’demands’ from within and ’pressures’ from outside, and 
produce an ’output’ in the form of decisions that represent the 
’national interest’. The well-known pessimism of realists stems 
not so much from their opinion of human nature as from their 
estimation of the possibility of achieving the goals for which 
states have ’entered* the international arena for. The reason is 
that once in the context of international politics, initial goals 
are inevitably translated into an attempt to make other states do 
something they would not do otherwise (Morgenthau, 1967,p.25).
In the process, the ’initial’ goals are deflected and 
international politics takes a life of its own. Thus, the mutual 
interaction of these practices in effect distort State’s polic­
ies of its normative goals and reduces International Relations to 
a crude game of power and prestige.
19. The Economist: ’Singapore. Lee’s legacy : A Survey’. Nov. 22,
1986.
20. "Ontogeny is the history of structural change in a unity without 
loss of organisation in that unity. This ongoing structural 
change occurs in the unity from moment to moment, either as a 
change triggered by interactions coming from the environment in 
which it exists or as a result of its internal dynamics. As 
regards its continuous interactions with the environment, the 
cell unity classifies them and sees them in accordance with its 
structure at every instant" (Maturana & Varela, 1987, p.74).
21. (Easton, 1979; Dahl, 1976; Almond, 1956; Eisenstadt, 1971; 
Parsons, 1971, Rostow, 1971; Pye, 1966)
22. The anecdote reported on a radio 4 programme.
23. From ’Africa on the Cheap’, a travellers guide book.
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Chapter Six —  Description and Typology of Informal Interactions
In the previous chapter I made a distinction between formal and 
informal interactions. Formal interactions were defined as all those 
interactions which are conducted by governing institutions. Informal 
interactions were defined as all those interactions which do not work 
their way through the state apparatus. It was argued that informal 
interactions constitute the link between theories of the state and the 
study of International Relations. This chapter is intended to provide 
a brief, non-critical survey of the current literature which is 
concerned with what is dubbed here informal interactions.
We shall ask the following questions :
1. What are informal interactions ?
2. What are their mechanisms of transmission ?
3. Are they handled appropriately in the literature?
4. If not, why not ?
6.1. What are informal interactions ?
The distinction between formal and informal interactions recalls the 
contrast between diplomatic and social history.* While the study of 
diplomatic history revolves around issues such as war, treaties and in 
particular, personalities, the study of social history possesses its 
own unique types of ’events. They consist of:
1. Advancement in the art of war and in the deployment of means of 
violence, from the instruments of war to organisation and logistic.
2. Progress in methods and techniques of transport.
3. The art of communication and transmission of information in all its 
variations (mathematical, lyrical and technical language).
4. Sexual and kinship relations.
5. The procurement of energy.
6. The production of food.
7. The production of tools.
8. The production of goods.
9. Finance and banking - means of exchange.
10.Development of organisational skills.
6.2. The mechanisms of transmission of informal interactions
The following is a brief compilation of the concrete methods of 
transmission of the various techniques and technologies. Among these, 
it is possible to differentiate direct modes of transmission frcwm 
indirect (or induced) ones. In the previous chapter it was stated that 
it is not always possible to distinguish between formal and informal 
interactions. We may now add that these difficulties are associated 
only with the first category —  that of direct transmission. All types 
of ’induced transmission’ may be safely characterised as informal 
interactions.
3
6.2.1. War and Conquest : Direct Transmission
War and conquest is a major^ , if somewhat sporadic, means of transmis­
sion of techniques and technologies. More often then not, conquerors 
pass on their superior techniques and methods of organizations to the 
conquered. They may effect changes in the belief system of a subject 
population; they always force (by definition) new types of social 
organisation upon them; and they often create new economic structures, 
if only in order to extract tribute from the defeated. There are, of 
course, exceptions to the rule. Both the Mongols (McNeill, 1983) and 
the Vikings (Scammel, 1981) appeared to absorb more from their enemies 
than they were able to teach them.
The adeptness of welt as a means of transmission of techniques and 
technologies springs from extreme mobilisation in times of danger. The 
sense of urgency and desperation which accompanies war leads to a 
search for new and viable solutions to various problems. It is as if 
society were condensed and crystallised at one point allowing enormous 
powers to accrue to the political leadership. These are pressing times 
in which the very fabric of society is laid bear for all to see. Hie 
significance of empires as transmitters of techniques and technologies 
also stems from the ability to use direct political force. Paradoxical­
ly, however, it is precisely the use of political force in the two 
cases which may account for the relative superficiality of this mode of 
transmission. For, to begin with, political force may easily trigger
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off counter-measures (Hechter, 1975, chpt.l) or anti-systemic forces 
(Wallerstein, 1983). And secondly, in the case of empires, as Hall 
argues, many were little more than huge tribute-paying machines whose 
ruling classes were not interested in, perhaps incapable of, penetrat­
ing the local communities (Hall,1985, p.30).
It is worth noting that the model of wars and conquests as modes of 
transmission is used heavily in ancient and non-Westem historiography, 
but progressively becomes less favoured tool of analysis as we come 
closer to home. Nonetheless, there are still many important works which 
stress the impact of modem welts as modes of transmission (Maier, 
1975). Of these, the so-called revisionist interpretation of the cold 
welt merits special attention, for it sparked off a renewed interest in 
the concrete activities of the victorious powers, the United States in 
particular, at the end of the war.
The revisionists argument is relevant to our context not only because 
it lays stress on what has here been dubbed 'informal interaction’, but 
also because it amounts to a sharp rebuff to the findings of the 
Realist theory of International Relations. As already discussed in the 
first chapter, the Realist theory presents international society as the 
unintended consequence of the activities of egotist states. In contrast 
to this revisionists have drawn attention to the fact that the post- 
war international system bore an uncanny resemblance to the system by 
which the allies fought the welt (Giddens, 1986, pp.236-244 & chapter.
10). That in fact, this ’international system’ was premeditated up to
g
the level of its details.
Let us pause for a moment and reflect upon the activities of the United
7
States els an occupational force. In Japan, writes Morishima,
"In November 1945, General MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of 
the Allied Forces, issued a directive to Prime Minister 
Shidehara, Laying down five major reforms; these were female 
suffrage, the right of labour to organise, liberal education, 
abolition of autocratic government and democratisation of the 
economy" (Morishima,1982, p. 158).
The avowed aim of the directive was to establish a
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"democratic country based on the free enterprise system, whose 
actions would be restrained and peaceloving"(Ibid,p. 161).
One of the most significant of these reforms was the break up of the 
highly concentrated industrial structure (the zabaitsu). Jon Halliday 
explains the point:
"Japan's industry has been under the control of a few great 
combines, supported and strengthened by the Japanese gover­
nment . The concentration of control has encouraged the 
persistence of semi-feudal relations between employer and 
employee, held down wages, and blocked the development of 
labour unions. It has discouraged the launching of independent 
business ventures and thereby retarded the rise of Japanese 
middle class" (J.Halliday, A P o litica l H i s t o r y  o f  Japanese  
Capitalism, p. 178 as quoted in Armstrong, et. al. 1984).
The breakup of these combines was deemed necessary because of the 
widespread belief that they were responsible for the aggressive 
policies pursued by Japan before the welt. However, one cannot fail to 
notice that it was modelled on the American anti-trust laws and indeed, 
fitted the overall design of the Americans for shaping the world in 
their own image. The same design is reflected in the Trade Union laws 
enacted by the Occupation. The Occupation insisted on legalising, and 
indeed, organising trade unions (Armstrong et. al. 1984,p.56). A line 
of attack was spearheaded by the American Unions themselves (Van Der 
Piji, 1986). It is worth noting that precisely the same policy was 
implemented in occupied Germany (Berghahn, 1986; Spohn & Bodemann, 
1989).
In this tale, the quest for 'power' and prestige as such plays a 
minimal role. Power and prestige were used in order to implement a 
system amenable to American capitalism, and not the other way around. 
One could well imagine that, haul Nazi Germany won the war, the 
structure of current international society, which to the Realists is as 
natural a phenomenon as rain and thunder, would have been rather 
different. Most probably we would have seen less emphasis placed on the 
formal independence of social formations and laissez-faire economics, 
and more on hierarchy and autarky.
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6.2.2. War and Conquest - Induced transmission
Wars and conquests also transform societies indirectly. The preparation 
for war, and in particular the perpetual demand for better organisa­
tional skills and more sophisticated weaponry generate their own 
dynamism. In turn, development in the art of war provoke further 
changes in the social system. In the literature one finds the following 
linkages between military technology and the larger social context:
1. There is, generally speaking, a correlation between types of
g
military organisation and the size and nature of the social formation.
2. There is an affinity between military discipline and other modern 
institutions such as schools, hospitals, prisons, etc. (Foucault, 
1973,1979).
3. There is always a direct link between military procurement and 
industrial production (McNeill, 1983).
4. There are other, more subtle forms of linkage. Alexander Gersche- 
nkron’s analysis of Russian economic situation provides a case in 
point:
’’The main reason for the abysmal economic backwardness of 
Russia" writes Gerschenkron "was the preservation of serfdom 
until the emancipation of 1861. In a certain sense, this very 
fact may be attributed to the play of a curious mechanism of 
economic backwardness, and a few words of explanation may be 
in order. In the course of its process of territorial expan­
sion, which over a few centuries transferred the small duchy 
of Moscow into the huge land mass of modem Russia, the 
country became increasingly involved in military conflicts 
with the west.. .the economic development in Russia at several 
important junctures assumed the form of a peculiar series of 
sequences : (1) Basic was the fact that the state, moved by its 
military interest, assumed the role of the primary agent 
propelling the economic progress in the country. (2) The fact 
that economic development thus became a function of military 
exigencies....(5) Precisely because of the magnitude of 
government exactions, a period of rapid development was very 
likely to give way to prolonged stagnation" (Gerschenkron, 
1962, p.17).
In Gerschenkron1 s judgement, Russia did not simply ape its neighbours, 
it restructured itself completely in order to compete with them on the 
military front. But in doing so, its economic structure was completely 
destroyed.
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Because of these localised affinities and correlations, the adoption of 
say, a particular weapon or new military organisation, tends to 
generate a series of secondary modifications within the social system 
which may be labelled as induced transmission. The consequences they 
generate within a given society cannot be explained adequately within 
exclusively society-bound models. However, as sociology does not 
possess an alternative models: sociological explanations are of 
necessity inadequate.
Similarly, these types of induced transmissions create patterns of 
informal linkages between societies which cannot be discerned from the 
traditional perspective of International Relations. They indicate the 
existence of another type of ’international relations* which is not 
discussed in the traditional literature. But the problem is only one of 
inadequate explanations of a particular phenomena, the very dynamism of 
modem politics can only be discussed in partial terms when a sig­
nificant amount of it lies outside the scope of the two fields of 
political investigation.
6.2.3. Learning and Cultural transmission
One of the fundamental problems of sociology concerns the concepts of 
stability and change. The fixation and maintenance of patterns of 
behaviour and norms are the basis of any social system. However, social 
systems are constantly changing and evolving and there seem to be no 
general theory in sociology which is able to deal with the two 
phenomena concomitantly. In fact, it is precisely the methodological 
techniques and assumptions underling theories of stability which 
prevents an explanation of change (Bienkowski, 1981). By and large, 
theories of stability, dominated by functionalism have been the more 
successful this century. However, functionalism, on all its variants, 
have enormous difficulties dealing with social change.
It is for this reason that the functionalist school in sociology and 
anthropology has been attracted to exogenous explanation of change, or 
to use our terminology, informal interactions. In the words of G.M. 
Foster,
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"<d>espite the significance which local innovation and 
discoveries may have...the main forces for cultural change 
are borrowings. The members of one social group assimilate 
forms of behaviour which they encounter in other societies ... 
Contacts between societies are the main and most important of 
social change" (G.M. Foster, T rad itio n a l C u ltu res  and  the  
Im pact o f Technological Change, 1962, p. 25 as cited in
Bienkowski, 1981, p.54, my emphasis).
Nonetheless, in spite of the enormous proliferation in literature 
concerned with the transmission of cultural traits, in particular
Q
diffusionism and acculturation, there is a dearth of theoretical 
elaboration.^ It is possible to distinguish between two modes of 
diffusion, direct and indirect diffusion. Diffusion of a cultural trait 
will be termed d ire c t d iffusion when a formation (or rather elements 
within a formation) borrows some cultural traits or artifacts from 
another formation. In d u ced  d iffu s io n occurs when subjects of one 
formation (individuals, companies or even the State apparatus), ape the 
techniques and technologies which are used in another.
The first form of diffusion is a widespread phenomenon. The Japanese 
seem to have developed it into a fine art. Morishima recounts that
"In a search of a model for their modem state the government 
sent many missions to Europe and America ... In each country 
they investigated the conditions of such things as the police, 
industry and finance. On the basis of the information relating 
to these subjects obtained from the missions the government 
made its decision as to which sphere should be patterned on 
which country. For example, the education system promulgated 
in 1872 was patterned on the French system of school dis­
tricts. The Imperial Navy was a copy of the Royal navy. The 
telegraph and the railways followed the British example, 
universities the American. The Meiji Constitution and the 
Civil Code were of German origin, but the criminal Code was of 
French origin" (Morishima, 1982, p.88).
At the end, the Japanese State was an eclectic amalgamation of foreign 
ingredients superimposed one upon the other. According to Turner and 
Killian More important than borrowing,
"is the discovery that there is a vantage point from which 
one’s own values no longer appear unquestionable axioms but 
merely one among alternative systems of values. Thus it is not
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so much the particular culture with which culture contact 
takes place as it is the a ttitu d e toward one’s culture that is 
induced by any serious culture contract ... Culture contact 
gives rise not only to borrowing but to new ideas concerning 
the necessity for change in the established order and the 
directions in which such change should go" (Turner and Killian 
—  Collective B ehaviour, 1957, as quoted in Strasser & Randall, 
1981, p.75).
In this context, there is a fascinating discussion in Kroebner (1940), 
a major exponent of diffusionism. In this article, Kroebner examines 
cases of the transmission of cultural traits "in situations where a 
system or pattern as such encounters no resistance to its spread, but 
there are difficulties in regard to the transmission of the concrete 
content of the system" (p.l).
I will quote two of his examples. Hie first concerns the Phoenician 
alphabet:
"It is well known", he writes "that alphabetic symbols for the 
complete consonantal scheme occur in Egyptian as a minor 
factor within a system of several hundred characters ... This 
mixed system had been in use for two thousand years before 
someone hit upon the idea that ninety-five per cent of the 
apparatus of the Egyptian system could be discarded and any or 
all words could be written...In this case the essence of the 
invention was the discarding of what was unnecessary" (Ibid,
p.6).
Hie Phoenicians adopted a foreign technique by developing it. In the 
second example Kroebner speculates on the origin of Japanese drama. 
Following a discussion on the probability of a Chinese influence on 
religious drama (the No), he concludes:
"There is, however, another possibility for the secular 
Japanese drama: European influence. Hie first origins of this 
drama are dated about sixty years after the arrival of the 
Portuguese in Japan.. .Hie policy of isolation was in force. 
However, there remained one permanent Dutch trading colony .,. 
There was at any rate enough intercourse for the possibility 
of knowledge of lay dramatic performances being introduced ... 
Certain resemblances between the plays of Chikamatsu and of 
Shakespeare have been noted" (Ibid, p.8).
These stories relate the importance of the world-wide phenomena of
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diffusion of cultural traits for any individual society. Exponent of 
diffusionism fail, however, to provide systematic elaborations of the 
relation between these societies and the external world.
6.2.4. Models
Underlying the concept of an induced transmission lies the notion of a 
model. The expression ’model* is mentioned frequently in the litera­
ture. We hear of the British model of industrialisation, of Maurice of 
Nassau’s model army, etc. Yet, there is little discussion of the role 
of models. We know relatively little of their mechanisms of transmis­
sion; what impact they have; when they tend to be more salient, etc. 
This section will do no more than outline some basic propositions in 
relation to models as types of informal interactions.
Informal interaction models can be defined as a n y  techniques o r  
technologies which have been developed in one society  and have  been 
tra n s fe rre d , o r a ttem pted  to be tra n s fe rre d  wholesale to a n o th er society. 
Learning is the adaptation of ’models*. ’Models* may include the 
actual transfer of goods and technologies, or the induced transmission 
of goods and technologies which comes about as a result of the 
’knowledge’ of its existence in other formations.
An author who uses the concept frequently, if implicitly, is Michel 
Foucault (1979). Foucault argues that the modem prison is not simply 
a penal institution but functions as the paradigmatic model of modem 
techniques of power. His ’model theory’, if I may name it as such, is 
outlined in his D iscip line and  Punish (1979). In Foucault’s view, the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw the emergence of
"A ’political anatomy’, which was also a ’mechanics of power*
... it defined how one may have a hold over others’ bodies ... 
Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 
’docile* bodies... The *in v e n tio n * o f  th is  new  p o litic a l anatom y  
m ust not be seen as a sudden d isco very. I t  is  r a th e r  a m u lti­
p lic ity  o f  o ften  m inor processes, o f  d if fe re n t o rig in  and  
s ca tte re d  location, which o verlap , re p ea t, o r  im itate  one a n o th er  
... They were at work in secondary education at a very early 
date, later in primary schools; they restructured the military 
organisation. They sometimes circulated very rapidly from one 
point to another (between the army and the technical schools
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or secondary schools), sometimes slowly and discreetly (the 
insidious militarisation of the large workshops). On almost 
every occasion they were adopted in response to particular 
needs: an industrial innovation, a renewed outbreak of certain 
epidemic diseases, the invention of the rifle or the victories 
of Prussia" (p. 138, my emphasis).
This theory defies generalisations. Nevertheless, Foucault’s work 
demonstrates vividly the importance of ’models’ to social investiga­
tions. Foucault was also the inspiration to Jacques Attali whose 
H isto ire  du Temps (the history of Time, 1982) discusses implicitly the 
role of models within an overall social context. In this work, Attali 
aims to tie technological developments in the measurement of time to 
epistemological and socio-economical changes.
The invention of the pendulum clock is a case in point. The first of 
these clocks was produced in England 1671. Unlike its predecessor this 
clock was capable of indicating minutes as well as hours. This newly 
found precision, argues Attali, pre-supposed (as well as begot) a 
serial conception of time (pp.171-220). In turn, the serial conception 
of time may have been one factor in the rise of a new awareness of the 
value of products. The social value of products was not measured in 
terms of quality or rarity any longer, but by the amount of necessary 
social labour invested in them. Furthermore, a serial conception of 
time (and of space) precipitated an interest in scientific management 
and thus may have been a factor contributing directly to the emergence 
of a mass consumer society.
As these authors have demonstrated, as with war and conquest, models 
reverberate and affect societies in more ways than one. We may assume 
that once a model is transported from one society to another, it will 
generate the same sort of dynamic effects there.
6.2.5. Tourism, emigration and immigration
The movement of population, as individuals or en masse, is one of the 
major carriers of cultural transmission. But their effects go much 
deeper than that. The decline of the Spanish Empire and the parallel 
rise of Amsterdam in the sixteenth century is believed to be related to
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the expulsion of the Jews in 1 4 9 2 While Frederick the Great went out 
of his way to attract fleeing Huguenots to Prussia and was rewarded 
with a highly skilled labour force who brought with them new industries 
(Pollard, 1981, p.152). According to Pollards, the industrial revolu­
tion spread on the backs of immigrant (1981). Closer to home, an 
important role the formation of the American Federal reserve system 
was played by Paul Warburg who attempted to reproduce in the USA what 
his father had done in Germany (Attali, 1985, pp.96-99). No less 
important, given the mobility of population, informal ’networks* and 
trading circuits were formed, without which, says Braudel, the 
precarious European long-distance and middle-distance trade would have 
been inconceivable (Braudel, 1979, II,pp.138-168). Thus, for example, 
the proliferation of American short-term loans to Germany in the 
twenties may be due to excellent personal relations between German and 
American Jewish bankers (Van der Piji, 1986; Quigley, 1966). Indeed, 
Van Der Piji has demonstrated that something akin to an Atlantic ruling 
class had emerged through this kind of personal contact.
6.3. Summary
So far we have been able to demonstrate that informal interactions
feature in practically every discussion in anthropology, political
sociology, political geography and history as major causes of change.
However, in all these disciplines they are utilised as auxiliary tools
of analysis and there is no attempt to unite them under one analytical
framework. To my knowledge, the only groups of scholars who have
attempted to deal with informal interactions in their totality are the
15so-called historical sociologists. From their perspective, individual 
action, diplomatic history and even major wars pale in significance in 
comparison to the basic structural features that compose our notion of 
civilisations. They therefore concentrate upon the constituent elements 
of these civilisations, which are by and large not the political acts 
of states but the steady flow of informal interactions. However, here 
too the poverty of theoretical elaboration is manifest in the widely 
used notions of the diffusion of cultural traits and correspondingly
1C
their eventual fusion, or grouping, in one society.
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In the light of all that has been said so far, what is still needed in 
the discussion of informal interactions is a conceptual framework which 
will
i) encompass informal interactions in their totality, and
ii) 'fit' into the parameters of theories of the state.
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NOTES
1. On diplomatic history see note (2) chpater 1. On social history
Dose, 1987.
2. Needless to say that this list is not complete and is somewhat 
arbitrary. Moreover, the traits are not outlines according to 
order of significance.
3. The following is a typology. Like all typologies, it is used for
a specific purpose, to make our way through the maze of informal 
interactions. And like all typologies, it is somewhat contrived
4. W.E. Moore lists the following modes of contacts and ranks them
according to the frequency and the number of people involved. 
They include:
"1. Imperialism as colonization and indirect domination;
2. Other wars, conquests, and military occupation;
3. Cultural imperialism in the guise of missionary religions;
4. Mass migration;
5. Individual migration;
6. Economic trade;
7. Tourism;
8. Transferred labour;
9. Diplomacy, indirect contacts, formal communications" (Social 
Change, as cited in Strasser & Randall, 1981, p.76).
5. Chabod has that to say on the dismemberment of the Reman empire: 
"present-day thought .... seeks to prove that the barbarian 
invaders, far from making tabula rasa of all the achievements of 
ancient civilization, accepted, meekly and fully, the legacy of 
Rome" (1958, p.149). See also Guizot, 1985.
6. Indeed, it appears that the ’pax Americana’, more than its 
predecessor, the ’pax Britanica’, was conditioned by the fact 
that many of the major European powers as well els Japan were 
direct occupation by the end of the war. On the subject see: 
Armstrong et. al., 1985; Berghahn, 1986; Wall, 1989.
7. On Japan see: Johnson, 1982; Morishima, 1982; Armstrong et al. 
op. cit. chpts. 4-6.
8. "External conflict between states form the shape of the state. I 
am assuming this ’shape’ to mean —  by contrast with internal 
social development —  the external configuration, size of a 
state, its contiguity (whether strict or loose), and even its 
ethnic composition" (Hintze, 1975, p.160).
The bELsic veiriables were already outlined by Aristotle: "Just els 
there are four chief divisions of the mass of the population —  
fanners, mechfiinics, shopkeepers, suid day-labourers —  so there 
are four kinds of military forces —  cavalry, heavy infantry, 
light armed troops, and the navy. Where the territory is suitable 
for the use of cavalry force for security, and it is only men of
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large means who can afford to breed and keep horses. Where 
territory is suitable for the use of heavy infantry, the next and 
less exclusive form of oligarchy is natural: service in the heavy 
infantry is a matter for the well-to-do rather than for the poor. 
Light armed troops, and the navy are wholly on the side of 
democracy” (as quoted in Finer, 1975, p.84). See also Elias, 
1939; Howard, 1976; Mann, 1986; McMeill, 1983.
9. Leading the field are the studies in anthropology: Beals, 1953; 
Bidney, 1946; Boaz, 1924; Coss, 1985; Hechter, 1975; Herskovits, 
1937; Leslie, 1945; Gilmore, 1955; Goldenweisser, 1925, 1937; 
Hodgen, 1950; Jeffereys, 1948; Levi-Strauss, 1937; Mauss, 1968; 
Radfield et. al. 1937.
10. There are essentially two basic notions of diffusion. The notion 
attributed to Durkheim that the diffusion of cultural traits 
works their way like osmosis (Hechter, 1975, p.24), and the ideas 
of modernization theorists who regard diffusion as automatic and 
irreversible process (Ibid. p.24).
Otherwise the argument has been that diffusion is never a 
straightforward affair. In the words of Kingsley Davis: "Di­
ffusion turns out to be a complex abstraction, not a separate 
entity. No idea, no practice, no technique ever passed from one 
society to another without seme modification being added to it. 
The borrowed culture trait must be somehow modified and adapted 
so as to fit into the existing cultural context. It follows that 
diffusion and invention are always inseparably mixed" (as quoted 
in Strasser & Randall, 1981, p.74). On the subject see also 
Bertrand, 1967; Lowie, 1940.
11. The point is echoed by Alexander Gerschenkron: "The typical
situation in a backward country prior to the initiation of
considerable industrialization processes may be described as 
characterized by tension between the actual state of economic 
activities in the country and the existing obstacles to in­
dustrial development on the one hand, and the great promise 
inherent in such a development, on the other" (1962, p.8).
12. "Many disciplinary methods had long been in existence in
monasteries, armies, workshops. But in the course of the 
seventeenth and eighteen centuries the disciplines became general 
formulas of domination ... I simply intend to map on a series of 
examples some of the essential techniques that most easily spread 
from one to another. These were always meticulous, often minute, 
techniques, but they had their importance: because they defined 
a certain mode of detailed political investment of the body, a 
*new micro-physics*" (Foucault, 1979, pp.137 - 144).
13. It should be understood that I am merely quoting Attali*s opinion 
and it is not necessarily similar to mine.
14. "They <the Jews> undoubtedly contributed to Holland*s increase 
trade with the iberian peninsula ... as well as to its trade with 
Italy ... Undoubtedly too, they were among the architects of the 
first colonial fortunes in America" (Braudel, 1979, II, p.159).
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See also Battista, 1970; Maraval, 1960; On emigration see Thomas, 
1972, 1973.
15. On historical sociology see Hall, 1985, pp. 261 - 264.
16. See Guizot, 1985; Toynbee, 1957.
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CHAPTER SEVEN —  POULANTZAS* SCHEME
The series of concepts which have been presented thus far hold good, I 
would argue, for any attempt at creating a bridge between modem 
theories of the State and the study of International Relations. 
However, from now on it is necessary to develop the argument on the 
basis of more detailed propositions. In other words, it is necessary to 
continue on the basis of a specific theory of the state.
According to Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) there are currently five 
competing schools of theories of the state: pluralism, elite, marxism, 
neo-right and neo-pluralism, each of them boasting a series of 
significant thinkers. In reality, however, the choice is more restrict­
ed. Even a basic sociological anatomy of societies entails a discussion 
of a series of complex issues* and there Eire very few comprehensive 
discussions which have attempted to synthesise them all under a unified 
framework. Of these, beyond a shade of a doubt the work of Nicos 
Poulantzas (1973, 1979) is the most important.
Poulantzas work is a milestone in political analysis . As he himself 
recognised, Its strength lies not so much in its originality, although 
there is certainly no lack of that, but in his ability to synthesise 
modem Marxist thinking with recent developments in political science. 
In contrast with other major Marxist contributions of recent vintage 
such as the German Derivation school/ and even the French school of 
regulation , Poulantzas dealt successfully, in my view, with the many 
faceted problems presented by the phenomena of state and power 
including what is of particular interest to students of International 
Relations, the geographical dimension. Although it is customary 
nowadays to play down Poulantzas’ contribution, there is practically no 
major work, which has not been influenced by his it. It is for all 
these reasons that his work is eminently relevant to the study of
g
International Relations.
In Poulantzas scheme, the State is not conceived as a real, organic
1
entity , but rather as a complex process of articulation of various 
social practices. This permits us to conceptualise the external world
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not as tangibly outside; we do not have to postulate a clear-cut 
division of the world into real entities. On the contrary, the very 
notions of internal and external become relative. The State is 
understood to denote simply the spatial dimension of the political 
process. The external world is an area which is external to the 
political process but which implicates it on many levels. This chapter 
presents the main features of this scheme.
7.1. Political Process and Global Analysis
Every scheme of inquiry into the nature of the political process 
reflects and derives its philosophical foundations from the more 
elementary normative and methodological conception of society. 
Therefore, a satisfactory understanding of such schemes can only be 
achieved once the method of construction of general social theories is 
understood properly.
In any global discussion of social phenomena two moments can be 
distinguished. The first consists of an analytical dissection of the 
totality of social life into more manageable practices or levels. The 
second involves the summation of these levels or practices into a new 
synthetic whole. The two practices are clearly interdependent. 
Nonetheless, this elementary strategy is not very well understood and 
is often confused with the secondary, if not less important, methodolo­
gical issues which are concerned with the logical flow of conceptual 
arrangements.
In the work of Poulantzas the two strategies have been kept separate.
However, perhaps because of the influence of Althusser, he makes
explicit reference only to methodological issues. This has caused some
confusion. Poulantzas distinguishes between two types of concepts which
he terms 1 real-concrete ’ and * general-abstract* concepts Poulantzas,
0
1973, p. 12). The allusion is to Marx's brief methodological discussion 
in the Grundrisse (1973a,p. 101) which was interpreted by Althusser 
(1969; 1970) and Poulantzas (1973) to mean that Marx prescribes a 
certain movement from the most abstract to the most concrete concept. 
Such interpretation is clearly an over-simplification and has been
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subjected to scathing attacks by Mandel (1975) and Albirtton (1986).
In actual fact, contrary to Poulantzas* own presentation, it appears 
that in his own work the real function of the progression from the 
abstract to the concrete is precisely the summation of various concepts 
into a global view. The real-concrete concepts pertain, according to 
Poulantzas, to objects that exist in the * strong sense'. Of these he 
mentions only one, the social formation. In his words, "The only thing 
which really exists is a historically determined social formation, i.e. 
a social whole" .(1973, p.15). However, the social formation is, of 
course, no more real than the mode of production or social classes. 
Thus its characterisation as existing in the 'strong sense* is not 
tenable. Rather, the social formation is the term chosen to depict the 
point of departure which is also the final aim of his analysis. This 
characterisation is significant and it is perhaps one of the major 
contributions of Poulantzas.
At the heart of the problem lies the question of what the correct unit
of analysis for political science is. In the liberal tradition, the
q
only one which developed systemic efforts on the subject, the tendency 
has been to pose some independent sphere of activity, the realm of 
political action or of the 'political system* as the proper subject 
matter of political analysis. The underlying aim was to locate and 
define, by methods of abstraction, homogenous sphere of activity which 
is called politics. Otherwise politics was seen simply as the study of 
the state (Easton, 1954).
In contrast to this, by placing the concept of the social formation at 
the centre, Poulantzas is not simply employing an expression used by 
Marx, but locates his subject-matter in a normatively neutral geograph­
ical area. The social formation, he argues, is an historically 
determined social whole "at a given moment in its historical existence:
e.g. France under Louis Bonaparte, England during the Industrial 
Revolution" (1973, p. 15). As a geographical area the terms suggest a 
conglomeration of various social practices which from a sociological 
px>int of view are not necessarily commensurable. In his words: "a 
social formation which is a real-concrete object and so always original
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because singular, presents a particular combination, a specific 
over-lapping of several ’pure* modes of production” {1973, p.15).
The immediate suggestion is that this geographical unity is not of 
necessity homogenous. On the contrary, it is diversified and perhaps 
even incommensurable. It is interesting to note that of the leading 
thinkers only Braudel arrived at a practically similar conception of 
society. Braudel makes clear the significance of this conception:
"Shaped by centuries of sedimentation, destruction and 
germination, ’feudal’ society was in fact a combination of at 
least five ’societies’, five different hierarchies, existing 
side by side. Hie most ancient and fundamental of these, now 
dislocated, was seigniorial society....Less ancient, but with 
historical origin in the Roman Empire and spiritual roots 
plunging even further back, was the theocratic society 
constructed by the Reman church....Thirdly, a younger 
society.. .was taking shape around the territorial state... .The 
fourth sub-sector was feudalism in the strict 
sense... .Finally, the fifth and last system ... consisted of 
the towns" (1979, II, p.465).
There is no denying the important theoretical differences between 
Braudel and Poulantzas. Both agree, however, on the essential point 
that society is a ’set of sets’, or an accumulation of practices.^ It 
is an aggregation of different people with different culture, etc. The 
difficulty lies in generalising upon the relationships between these 
various ’societies’ within any given one. That is precisely the aim of 
Poulantzas scheme.
7.2. Social Structures
As said in the above, in any global discussion of social phenomena two 
moments can be distinguished. Accordingly, Poulantzas analysis sets off 
in two directions. The first investigates purified forms of social 
interactions; the second groups them together into a coherent picture. 
The final aim is to understand the dynamics of the social formation.
The first direction develops in a conventional manner. Poulantzas 
follows the methods of action theory wherein the social realm is
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perceived as an infinite procession of diachronic as well as synchronic 
individual actions.^ By employing generalisation and reductionism, the 
aim of this methodology is to transpose these ’actions* to the realm of 
concepts, in the hope that they will not lose any of their essential 
characteristics in the process. To date, the most successful procedure 
consisted of the lateral mutilation of individual activities on the 
basis of its orientation and roles (Weber,1978, chapter.1; Parsons, 
1937). Accordingly, certain types of activities are categorized as 
’political*, whereaus others are dubbed ’economics’, ’cultural*, and so 
on. These ’shreds* of individual action are then gathered together in 
what is called ’political’, ’economic* or ’cultural’ systems (Sorokin, 
1941; Almond, 1956; Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979). The aim of the exercise 
is to discover the dynamics of these abstracted * systems *.
Similarly, Poulantzas makes an original distinction between three
12’practices*, politics, economics, and ideology. The implication is 
that each of these levels is harmonised at least to a certain extent on 
the national plane (See Figure I, p. 187). In other words, he accepts 
that there is seme thing which may be described as a national economy, 
national ideology (or culture) and national politics or a political 
system. However, in contrast to traditional action theory, Poulantzas 
supplements these structures with a vertical framework which is called 
the mode of production, (See Figures II and III pp. 187,8).
The gist of Marxist thought is that society is essentially a maushine 
for the exploitation of one class by another (Casanova, 1971). That does 
not mean that other processes do not occur concomitantly. However, the 
conviction is that other processes are determined to a large extent by 
the exigencies of class struggle. Accordingly, the concept of the mode 
of production was proposed by Marx but has undergone a few changes 
since it is central to Marxist analysis.
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In his famous Preface of 1859 Marx presents the classical definition 
of the mode of production:
"In the social production which men carry on they enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will; these relations of production correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material powers of 
production. The totality of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society... political 
consciousness arise and to which definite forms of social 
consciousness correspond. The mode of production of material 
life determines the general character of the social, politi­
cal, and spiritual processes of life" (1963, p.67).
Althusser found these propositions ambiguous. The reference to "the 
anatomy of civil society" reflects a far too ordered and static notion 
of the social whole. Furthermore, the economic and social are not 
demarcated in precise terms. Indeed, the * social' seems to be defining 
the * economic *. In Althusser and Poulantzas * opinion a more rigorous 
reading reveals that Marx did not possess a simple base/superstructure 
metaphor of society but of an articulation of the economic, political
and ideological practices in which the economic is determinant in the
13last resort.
Accordingly Poulantzas defines the mode of production as follows:
"Mode of production ...<is> a specific combination of various 
structures and practices which, in combination appear as so 
many instances or levels, i.e. as so many regional structures 
of this mode. A mode of production, as Engels states schemati­
cally, is composed of different levels or instances, the 
economic, political, ideological and theoretical.. .The type of 
unity which characterizes a mode of production is that of a 
complex whole dominated, in the last instance, by the 
economic" (1973, p.14).
The location of the mode of production at the heart of the Marxist 
analysis has sparked off the famous mode of production controversy 
(Foster-Carter,1978; Hindess &. Hirst, 1977; Wolpe, 1980). However, this 
debate is not central to our concern here as the principle objection 
to this concept lies in its applicability to the study of non—  
capitalist societies (Albirtton, 1986; Bailey & Llobera, 1981;
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Giddens, 1973; Hindess and Hirst, 1975; Pastoral, 1979). Nonetheless, the 
term ’ economics ’ has undergone major changes since the days of Marx 
and it is not possible to equate it any more with the process of 
exploitation. I will define therefore the heart of the mode of 
production not simply as * economics’ but as the ’mode of exploitation’, 
the method by which surplus value or surplus product is extracted 
(Figure II).1*
A century or so after Marx, it has become clear that the capitalist 
mode of production underwent at least two if not three major transfor­
mations, or as Poulantzas name them, stages. Hence we distinguish the 
classical or competitive stage, the ’imperialist* stage whose origins 
can be traced back to 1870 (Lenin, 1977), and the stage of late 
capitalism which emerged after the Second World War (Mandel,1975). 
Apart from these one may distinguish many phases of capitalist 
development.
Within a given social formation, these various stages and phases are 
articulated (or unified) by one dominant mode and stage.1® But as these 
various modes are located within one national space, they can never be 
pure. They are distorted and the lines of contact between them are 
precisely these economic, political and ideological structures (See 
figure III). Nonetheless, the higher visibility of the political, 
economic and cultural systems should not imply that they are the proper 
unit of analysis of social investigation as the Structural-Functionali­
st seem to presume. Quite to the contrary, these ’systems’ exert only 
secondary, distorting effects upon the primary units of modes of 
productions. In other words, only the modes and stages of production 
have their own intrinsic dynamics of development, as is amply demonstr­
ated by Marx in Capital (Sekine, 1980).
Hie relationships between the various structures within any mode of 
production are linear (modes of production are in fact defined in term 
of the articulation of these structures), nevertheless, the distorting 
effect within the social formation guarantee a certain independence. 
Accordingly, Poulantzas defines the relations between the various
1C
structures by the term ’relative autonomy*.
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So far the scheme is static, what is missing is the subject. The 
process of exploitation which is at the heart of the definition of the 
mode of production defines also social classes as the * bearers* of 
these structure. Poulantzas supplements therefore the level of the 
structures with another level which he terms the level of class 
struggle (Figure, IV). The relations between the two levels are 
character i zed by the term ’as if *: Everything happens, says Poulantzas, 
as if "social classes were the result of an ensemble of structures 
and of their relations" (1973, p.63). The idea behind such charac­
terisation is rather simple. It amount to the affirmation that there is 
no mode of production without its social classes, and conversely, there 
are no ’classes* as such without modes of production.
In actual fact, masked by an elaborate and somewhat obscure language, 
there lies basically Marx’s exposition of the capitalist mode of 
production in the M anifesto. Marx presents the growth and eventual 
demise of the capitalist mode of production on three distinct planes. 
He discusses first of all what Poulantzas calls, the level of the 
structures:
"Modem industry has established the world market, for which 
the discovery of America paved the way. This market has given 
an immense development to commerce, to navigation, to comm­
unication by land. This development has, in its turn reacted 
on the extension of industry" (p.69).
Evolution at the level of the Structures is accompanied by a con­
comitant development at the level of class structure.
"In proportion as industry, commerce, navigation, railways 
extended, in the same proportion the bourgeoisie developed, 
increased its capital, and pushed into the background every 
class handed down from the Middle Ages. We see, therefore, how 
the modem bourgeoisie is itself the product of a long course 
of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of 
production and of exchange" (p.69).
The experience at the two levels is then mirrored on another plane 
which is dubbed by Poulantzas the ’political scene*. The political 
scene is the level where the interests generated at the level of the
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structures and class struggle are articulated in the form of 'real’
17political actors (political parties, unions, lobbies, etc.)*
"Each step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accom­
panied by a corresponding political advance of that class. An 
oppressed class under the sway of feudal nobility, an armed 
and self-governing association in the medieval commune; here 
an independently urban republic ( as in Italy and Germany), 
there a taxable ’third estate’ of the monarchy (as in France) 
...the bourgeoisie has at last, since the establishment of 
modem industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, 
in the modem representative state, exclusive political sway" 
(Ibid. p.69).
The political scene is epitomised in the state which is a condensation 
of the whole social formation (Jessop, 1985, pp. 337 - 9 and Figure 
IV). As social formations contain more than one mode or stage of 
production, the class scene becomes very complex. As a corollary to 
this, we cannot speak of one cohesive ruling class, nor for that matter 
of cohesive working and middle classes. Each of these groupings 
comprise various fractions and groups. However, just as social 
formations are unified under one dominant mode or stage of production, 
so the dominant classes are unified in a ’bloc of power’ by a hegemonic 
fraction.^
The notion of the bloc of power and of the hegemonic fraction is one of 
the central innovations of Poulantzas scheme. He himself claims to be 
following Gramsci. However, it is quite clear that the major element 
here is in fact the debate in liberal literature between pluralism and
IQ
elite theories. With the concept of the bloc of power Poulantzas is 
able to synthesise the Marxist notion of a ruling class with the 
pluralists and elite theories pre-occupation with the practical 
problems faced by such an ’elite*.
In Poulantzas view, the State does not function simply as the tool of 
the ruling classes, but reflects to a certain extent a wide range of 
interests including those of the working classes The State is not 
simply a tool of class rule, it is a condensation of a class society. 
It must be seen, therefore, as ’relatively autonomous' in relations to
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its class structure (1973, p.256).
7.3. The relativity of the social structure
In the analytical distinction between the levels of the structures, 
class structure and the 'political scene’, there is an implied gap much 
exploited by Marxists and their opponents alike. In his broad exposi­
tion of history, Marx certainly suggested that the three levels evolve 
concomitantly. However, a friction may develop in the gap, a friction 
which he describes at times as a contradiction between the old and the 
new and which serves as a secondary source of dynamics in the Marxist 
scheme of things.
For instance, in the famous 'Preface' of 1859 Marx writes that:
"At a certain stage of their development, the material forces 
of production in society come in conflict with the existing 
relations of production, or —  what is but a legal expression 
for the same thing —  with the property relations within which 
they had been at work before ... .Then occurs a period of 
social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation 
the entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly 
transformed" ('Preface',1963, pp. 67,68).
This gap is utilized by Poulantzas for other purposes too. The co- 
-existence of the various modes and stages of production in one social 
formation provides a plausible account for the plethora of classes and 
fractions. Furthermore, the 'friction' itself, claims Poulantzas, is 
the bearer of fractions and groups who play a political role (Poulant­
zas, 1974b, Introduction). In actual fact, the very mechanism of 
representation of the various interests in the State generates its own 
play of contradictions: just as two- dimensional snapshots are
distortions of their three-dimensional subject-matters, so is the 
social formation 'distorted' in the very act of condensation (or 
'representation'). Consequently, the political scene may actually 
reflect in a distorted manner only development in society at large. 
All in all, in contrast with the rigidity of over-deterministic 
assertions of traditional Marxism, Poulantzas and Althusser assign a 
prominent place to historical contingency. The Marxist whole, argues
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Althusser: "is different from the Hegelian or Leibnitz, it is a whole 
whose unity far from being the expressive or spiritual unity, is 
constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity of a s tru c tu ra l  
whole containing what can be called levels or instances which are 
distinct and ’relatively autonomous’ and co-exist within this complex 
structural unity, articulated with one another according to specific 
determination, fixed in the last instance by the level or instance of 
the economy" (Althusser, 1970, p.95).
The relations between all these levels are conceptualised by the term 
’articulation’ (Althusser, 1970a; Wolpe, 1980), with the implicit 
suggestion that when the ’articulation’ of the level is successful the 
social formation is agile. When articulation is not successful the 
result is the various forms of ’exceptional’ states: Bonapartism, 
military dictatorships, and Fascism (Poulantzas, 1973, 1974a, 1975) .
The concept of articulation is not very well developed. However, the 
fault does not lie in the concept itself, but with political analysis 
which has not developed much since the days of publication of P olitica l 
Power and  Social Classes. The three concepts of the social formation, 
the bloc of power and of articulation, constitute the essential 
ingredients for a political analysis which does not take the State as 
an organic entity.
The uniqueness of the Poulantzasian scheme is that by superimposing 
two approaches, namely, the layered structure perspective of Action 
theory animated by a vertical movement from base to superstructure, all 
lying underneath a ’topographical’ representation of society as a pile 
of modes and stages of production, he achieves a three dimensional 
idiographic ’model’ of society. As a corollary to that, the lines of 
contacts between societies are increased exponentially. Indeed, as the 
subsequent chapters will demonstrate, a whole new range of ’links’ 
become discernible under this model. On top of this, as suggested in 
chapter four, the ’volume’ of the body ’society* (which is represented 
by its level of discreteness) changes constantly. The national boundary 
becomes only one, albeit the more visible perameter of closure.
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NOTES
1. Which includes:
a. An outline of its economic base. The ratio of industry, 
commerce, agriculture and finance and the relations between them;
b. The constitution of its ruling class;
c. Its class structure;
d. Its dominant ideology and relation to other ideologies;
e. Geographical analysis, the relation of city, country, the 
level of urbanisation etc.
f. Its political structure, or the political system. The party 
system, etc.
For an anatomy of a society see: Bottomore & Brym, 1989; Coates, 
Gordon and Bush, 1985;
2. Since the publication of P olitica l Power and Social Classes there
have been many developments in theory of the State. Poulantzas 
theory inspired the German derivation school (see note (2) 
chapter two) and the French school of regulation (see discussion 
in the Introduction) as well as major contributors such as 
O’Connor (1984) and Offe (1984). There are also signs of 
interesting syntheses between system approach and the struc­
turalist theory of the State (Willke, 1986). Quite apart, the 
pluralism has been re-invigorated in a form which has been 
branded neo-pluralism (see Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). Similar­
ly, elite theories found new and powerful exponents (see chapter 
one).
However, none of these works and schools of thought achieved a 
comprehensive synthesis comparable to Poulnatzas’ work. Thus, in 
spite of its problems, it is still the best theory at hand.
For criticism of Poulnatzas’s work see; Albirtton, 1986; 
Anderson, 1976; Bakvis, 1984; Barker, 1977; Brym, 1986; Bulbeck, 
1979; Clarke, 1977, 1978; Comniel, 1986; Easton, 1981; Gulalp, 
1987; Jessop, 1985; Kenrp, 1984; Pal, 1986; Urry, 1981; Wolpe, 
1980.
3. See Jessop, 1985. Jessop, however, plays down the elements
derived from the American political science. On the subject see 
Clarke’s (1977) disparaging but rather accurate assessment.
4. See note (2) chapter two.
5. Both the German derivation and the French school of regulation
have not aimed at a general theory of the State. On the French
school see Introduction.
6. As the debate on the merit of Poulantzas’ work is, and will
remain unresolved, there is no need to pretend that all is well 
or that there are no difficulties. However, ultimately, the work 
here will be judged not on the basis of Poulantzas work but 
because it allows a link with the theories of International
Relations.
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7. "The State is neither a thing —  instrument that may be taken
away, nor a fortress that may be penetrated by a wooden horse, 
not yet a safe that may be cracked by burglary: it is the heart 
of the exercise of political power" (p.81). Discussion in Easton 
op. cit and Jessop op. cit.
8. "When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin
with its population, its distribution among classes, town, 
country, the coast, the different branches of production, export 
and import annual production and consumption, commodity process 
etc. It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the 
concrete, and with the real preconditions .... However, on closer 
examination this proves false .... The concrete is concrete 
because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence 
unity of the diverse ... (Marx, Grundrisse, 1973, pp.100 - 1).
9. See Easton, 1954; Parsons, 1937; Weber, 1978.
10. Braudel never clarified his theory of the State. In spite of
differences of language and terminology, he seemed to have share 
many of Poulantzas ideas. I am not aware of any study on the 
subject.
11. "Society ... is an abstraction. Although indispensable for 
practical purposes and certainly very useful for a rough and
preliminary survey of the phenomena that surrounds us, it is no
real o b je c t. It does not exist outside and in addition to the 
individuals and the processes among them" (Simmel, 1959, p.4).
According to Weber "The empirical material which underlies
the concepts of sociology consists to a very large extent, though
by no means exclusively, of the same concrete processes of action 
which are dealt with by historians" (1978, p.4).
Durkheim agrees, but adds that sociology is concerned only 
with certain activities: "On l’emploie couramment pour designer 
peu pres tous les ph^nomeenes qui se passent a 1 *int^rieur de 
la soci£t£, pour peu qu'ils presentent, avec une certain 
gen^ralite, quelque int&ret social ... Mais, en realite, il y a 
dans toute soci£t6 un group d6termin6 de phenomenes qui se 
distinguent par des caract&res tranches de ceux qui etudient les 
autres sciences de la nature" (1937, p.3).
12. "The object of historical materialism is the study of different 
structures and practices (the economic, politics, ideology) which 
are connected yet distinct" (Poulantzas, 1973, p.12).
13. "The M arx is t whole is different from the Hegelian or Leibniz, it 
is a whole whose unity far from being the expressive or spiritual 
unity, is constituted by a certain type of complexity, the unity 
of a s tru c tu ra l whole containing what can be called levels or 
instances which are distinct and "relatively autonomous" and 
co-exist within this complex structural unity, articulated with 
one another according to specific determination, fixed in the 
last instance by the level or instance of the economy" (A- 
lthusser, 1970, p.96).
14. On Marxism and exploitation see chapter two.
197
15. "The dominance of one mode of production over the others in a 
social formation cause the matrix of this mode of production 
(i.e. the particular reflection of determination by the economic 
elements in the last instance by which it is specified) to mark 
the whole of the formation" (Poulantzas, 1973, p.15).
16. P o litica l Power and Social Classes is quite clearly a schematic 
endeavour —  it is a scheme for relating various practices within 
a social formation and its governing institutions. Of necessity 
such enterprise is static because schemes are static. The 
problem, however, is that the relative autonomy of the State is 
deduced from the scheme and is not proved. Consequently it is 
not clear whether the * relative autonomy* is a concrete phenomena 
or whether it is a theoretical device. I take the relative 
autonomy to be the relative autonomy of the state apparatus vis- 
a-vis any one class or fraction. An historical development 
peculiar to the establishment of the State in the West. See note 
(27) chapter one.
17. It is with the introduction of the concept of the * political 
scene’ (Poulantzas, 1973, pp.240 -5) that Poulantzas brings into 
Marxist thought the ideas of the Structural-Functional ists 
(Almond, 1956, 1960; Apter, 1973; Easton, 1979). For further 
development see Mouzelis, 1986.
18. Many works since the publication of P olitica l Power an d  Social 
Classes were dedicated to the study of the block of power. See 
Poulantzas, 1974a; Coates et. al. 1985; Mouzelis, 1986. On the 
bloc of power see Poulantzas, 1973 pp. 229 -254.
19. On Gramsci’s relation with the Italian elite theorists (Pareto, 
Mosca) see Bellamy, 1987.
20. "The line of demarcation between domination and subordination 
cannot be marked out from a viewpoint of dual is tic struggle .... 
The reasons for the appearance of a bloc of power is in the 
structure of the capitalist state that it has as an effect the 
coexistence of the political domination of several classes and 
fractions of classes" (Poulantzas, 1973, pp. 229 - 30).
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CHAPTER EIGHT: THE VERTICAL LINKS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF THE 'MIDDLEMEN*
As it was argued earlier, the literature concerned with informal 
interactions is vast but uneven. Some aspects of these interactions 
such as dependency, colonialism, military and economic competition, 
etc. have been explored in great detail, whereas others, such as 
cultural links, are still very much underdeveloped.* The problem, 
however, is that each of these areas have been analyzed separately with 
no serious attempt at:
(a) relating than to each other, and
(b) integrating than with the domestic political process.
The argument of the Thesis is that informal interactions forge links 
between groups of people residing in different social formations, and 
a significant number of these links may be subsumed in such a way that 
they correspond to Poulantzas ’ scheme. This shared common ground may be 
grasped when the following steps are taken:
(a) These links are not independent of their interactions with the 
domestic political process. Thus, in contrast to the presentation of 
informal interactions in chapter six, informal links will be discussed 
here in the context of their effects on the domestic political process.
(b) To do this, we need to extract their form from the overall socio­
political context. Theoretically speaking, a socio-economic context 
consist of form s, contents and  pow er re la tio n s h ip s. Historical studies 
in political economy concentrate on the content of international trade 
—  what is being traded, by whom, etc. (Mandel, 1975). Whereas 
historical political studies centre on the context of power relation- 
hips. Only structural investigations aim at establishing relationships 
between abstract forms.
(c) These ’groups’ of people which are gathered together here as the 
bearer of these links should be understood in terms of Jean-Paul 
Sartre’s concept of a ’serie* and not of a ’nexus* (Sartre, 1960). 
Sartre’s original example of a serie was that of the bus queue. The 
members of such a primitive group have only the bus as a common object 
of unification. They relate to each other only in so t a r as they all 
relate to a common external object (Howarth-Williams, 1977, p. 34). 
Nexus, on the other hand is a group wherein "each member of such a
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group interiorises every other members’ syntheses of the group. A 
perfectly formed group, then, for each member is both the synthesis of 
the multiplicity of the members, and the synthesis of the multiplicity 
of the synthesis made and maintained by each member” (Ibid, pp.34,5).
The object of unification of the s erie , i.e. content, will remain 
outside the scope of this work. Where the members, or at least some 
members, of a serie are aware of their object of unification, one may 
expect the translation of this awareness to political practice. This 
makes our job, as academics, who, generally speaking, prefer to deal 
with documents, so much easier to perceive and write about. However, 
wherever the serie is unable for some reason or another to organise 
itself into a political force, the link is nevertheless still there, 
although it is so much more difficult to ascertain and document.
(d) The forms themselves are nothing but schematic abstractions. They 
are accompanied by all sorts of residues that we shall have to neglect 
in order to apprehend them in their purity. Hie only reason to insist 
on these as the building blocks of the study of International Relations 
is their connection to Poulantzas’ scheme (Chapter seven).
(e) Consequently, these links are grasped only in thought: in no case 
one may find the vertical or horizontal links in their purity. They may 
easily be perceived, and indeed, they can be quantified, but they are 
not like objects in nature.
Accordingly, in chapters eight and nine I shall present two, concepts 
of informal interactions. Hie first groups the research which focuses 
on unequal power relationships on a world scale, these are the links 
of dependence, but I shall cadi them henceforth, vertical links. Hie 
second gathers under one heading the diverse forms of equal structural 
relationships. These are links of competition, or horizontal links. 
Chapter ten will relate these two concepts with the Poulantzasian 
scheme for the study of the political process.*
In this chapter I will aim to demonstrate that:
(a) disparate phenomena such as dependency, colonialism and trade may 
be discussed under the term vertical links;
(b) that vertical links modify both dominant and dominated formations
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simultaneously, and;
(c) therefore vertical links, or the principle of the 'middlemen* is 
much more pervasive than previously imagined.
8.1. A brief Survey of The Principle of the fmiddlemen1
The pervasiveness of vertical links may be appreciated when two 
seemingly unrelated phenomena, the centre-periphery pattern which 
accompanies commercial relationships, and the various forms of 
'indirect rule' characteristic of the colonial period and the maritime 
adventures, can be shown to interact with the domestic political 
process in precisely the same manner. Stripped of political, ideologi­
cal or moral connotations, they may be seen to link groups of people 
residing in different formations to another. They form therefore one 
type of universal link among social formations.
In his classic Capitalism and  Underdevelopm ent in  L a tin  Am erica (1967) 
Andr£ Gunder Frank describes the spatial socio-economic effects of the 
world capitalist system. He argues that "metropolitan centre-peripheral 
satellite relationships, like the process of surplus expropriation/app- 
ropriation, run through the entire world capitalist system in chain—  
like fashion from its uppermost metropolitan world centre, through each 
of the various national, regional, local and enterprise centres" (1967, 
p. 10). This description bears more than a passing resemblance to the 
pyramidal ideal-type representation of the medieval polity as a 
succession of lord-vassal personal dependencies ending ultimately with 
the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope.* It is also reminiscent of the 
hierarchical structure of modem bureaucracy.
The resemblance is not accidental. In all three cases a complex 
hierarchical structure emerges on the basis of a simpler format of 
vertical dependencies: the complex structure is maintained by an
aggregation of direct relationships between individuals or groups who 
function as 'middlemen’, or glue, tying a larger nimber of people to 
each other. The global effect of these links is to amass an enormous 
social power through the vertical relationships. Karen Field explains 
very well the power relationships amassed through the vertical link:
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’’Indirect rule was a way of making the colonial state a 
consumer of power generated within the customary order. It did 
not transfer real power from the Crown to African rulers. Just 
the inverse: Real power issued from the ruled. Dame Margery 
Perham once used a metaphor that is neat, although it turns 
the reality upside-down: ’<Chiefs> took the strain of indirect 
rule, breaking down, like human transformers, the powerful 
current form above and distributing it in voltage that their 
people could take’. Turned right-side-up, the image of 
electrical power generated and distributed is apt” (Fields, 
1985, pp.31,2).
Elias18 (1982) description of Charlemagne ’ s empire is as good a
starting point as any for a survey of the principle of the ’middlemen1:
’The emperor and king could not supervise the whole empire 
alone ... <Therefore>, he sent trusted friends and servants 
into the country to uphold the law in his stead, to ensure the 
payment of tributes and the performance of services, and to 
punish resistance. He did not pay for their services in 
money.. .The earls or dukes, or whatever the representatives of 
the central authority were called, also fed themselves and 
their retinue from the land with which the central authority 
had invested than" (p. 16).
These ’trusted friends’, then, functioned as the nucleus of a hierar­
chical structure which was basically an extension of the same prin­
ciple . This pattern enjoyed great success all over Europe. It underpins 
the English political system, with its Justices of the Peace and 
sheriffs operating in the counties as independent and self-financing 
arms of the state down to the late nineteenth century (Smith,G.R., 
1984). In France a different arrangement (although based on a similar 
principle) emerged towards the end of the Hundred Years’ Wars, a 
vertical bureaucratic structure (to be reformed later by Richelieu) 
centring around the in ten d an ts (the int^ndant de Justice, de Police and 
de Finances), functionaries dispatched with omnibus powers into the 
provinces (Anderson, 1974, p.96). The in te n d a n tu r  d e r  Arm ee, again on 
the same principle, developed as the nucleus of a new central govern­
ment in Prussia (Bruford, 1970).
The principle which served kings so well at home, was extended to be 
utilised in the colonial adventures. Cortes’s extraordinary exploits 
cannot be explained without a reference to it. In his political
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astuteness, Cortes managed to enlist indigenous tribes against the 
Aztecs. In fact, by the time he arrived at Teothitachlan (modem Mexico 
City), his own army of four hundred men was augmented by a local army 
40,000 strong, which, incidently, he shrewdly brushed aside for the 
final push into the city (Madariaga, 1942; Toscano, 1977). Pizarro, 
too, with his hundred and sixty men, employed native tribes against the 
Incas in precisely the same manner (Hemming, 1970).
The principle of the middlemen also aided other maritime powers. 
According to Simkin, it underpinned the Portuguese empire:
"Many Indians developed privileged partnership arrangements 
with Portuguese officials or merchants and, for political 
reasons, free licenses had to be granted to a number of Indian 
rulers... .There were never more than 10,000 Portuguese in 
Asia" (1968, p.182).
In turn, the Portuguese became
"a model for the Dutch East India Company which later ousted 
them. Treaties were imposed on local rulers for supplying 
produce at prices below market levels. The pass system brought 
customs dues and business to Portuguese harbours, reserved 
trade in arms, pepper, and a few other products to Portuguese 
ships and excluded Indian or Moslem ships'* (Ibid. pp. 181,2).
The Dutch on the other hand, preferred a more formal system of 
’indirect rule’
"At almost all times it has been a fundamental axiom of Dutch 
policy to utilise wherever possible the existing native chiefs 
or headmen, operating through some modified version of the 
existing institutions, as the intermediaries between the 
supreme Dutch authority and the mass of the population" 
(Emerson, 1964, p.411).
Indeed " throughout its long reign in Java the Company 
maintained the heads of the native aristocracy as the instru­
ment by means of which it exerted its control over the 
populace, and on the Company’s disintegration they continued 
to be the intermediaries between the Dutch and their native 
subjects"(Ibid. p.416).
Utrecht reiterates the same point and places it in its social context: 
"As early in the days of the great trading companies, such as
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the British East India Company (EIC) and the Dutch VOC, 
foreign trade helped create a new social class of middle 
traders, a petty bourgeoisie of Asian origin engaged in the 
collecting trade of commodities and the distributive commerce 
of consumer goods supplied by the foreign merchants. The 
foreign trading houses were very much in need of such a 
comprador class, and it happened in many an Asian and African 
country that they even imported the middle traders from, in 
particular, China and India, when it was obvious that no local 
middle traders were at hand or could be trusted" (1978, p.65).
The British, too, made use of the principle ’middlemen* quite extens- 
7
ively. According to Robinson and Gallagher,
"<i>deally, the British merchant and investor would take into 
partnership the portenos of the Argentine, the planters of 
Alabama, the railway builders of Belgium, as well as the 
bankers of Montreal and the shippers of Sidney; together they 
would develop the local and metropolitan economies. But this 
collaboration meant much more than profits. A common concern 
for peace and liberal reform would knit together the en­
lightened groups of all these communities" (1961, p.3).
A particularly fascinating story, which might shed light on the wider 
context of the vertical link, is reported by Veena Talwar Oldenburg in 
his fascinating book: The M ak ing  o f  Colonial Lucknow, 1856-1877.
Oldenburg describes the new arrangement imposed by the British Raj upon 
Lucknow, an imperial city located about three hundred miles north of 
Delhi, following the 1857 revolt. The person sent to oversee the 
reconstruction of British power was not the sort normally associated 
with political tasks. He was merely a captain in the engineering corps 
named Napier. However, he succeeded where a political commissar would 
probably have failed miserably.
Napier approached his task as an engineer. First, the city had to be
made safe: A "feature of the old city that proved fated to British
forces was the innumerable cul-de-sacs in which in the residential
parts of the mohalla meandering lanes would abruptly end" (p.39).
Napier spent, therefore, vast sums of money creating new wide streets
traversing the whole city through which troops would quickly pass. The
city was then parcelled into administrative cantons, and a residential
0
area for the use of European non-military personnel was created.
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The city had to be orderly too, the police were transformed, and a 
municipal committee, an institution that would look after the civic 
affairs, came to Lucknow. But by far his most controversial move was 
the cleaning of the city: "The high mortality rate of European troops
during the mutiny retold the horror story of the Crimean War: more men 
died of disease than in combat" (p.96). Hence the creation of a 
sanitation system for which a census had to be taken. It was rumoured 
—  and this almost sparked off a new rebellion —  that the British were 
interested in the precise number of local virgins for their own use. 
However, the real issue was that with the sanitation system buildings 
were placed under municipal control.
The city was forced for the first time to pay for itself: "The citizens 
of Lucknow had no experience of direct taxation under the nawabs. On 
the contrary, the city had been supported by funds from the state 
coffers, which in turn had been replenished annually by the revenue 
from the countryside" (p. 145,6). Last but not least, the city must be 
loyal, the spatial and morphological changes were not enough to ensure 
stability. The very nature of colonial rule proved precarious:
"<o>nly a handful of British civilians replaced the Oudh court 
in a hostile city.... These two decades also saw the transfor­
mation of the taluqdars, the larger landowners in Oudh, into 
an urban elite group. Their infiltration into the civic arena 
was sponsored by the British, and they increasingly became 
absentee landlords with their political and social interests 
centred in the capital.... The British skilfully tried to 
refurbish the dwindling elite ranks with men who had a 
permanent stake in the stability of their Raj in Oudh"
(p.182).
There is always more to the vertical link than meets the eye, as the 
story of Lucknow makes clear. However, like many observers before and 
after him, Oldenburg seems to agree that underpinning the process of 
colonisation was the making of a class structure amenable to British 
dominance: He concludes,
"<t>he argument so far has been that under the patronage of 
the British, the taluqdars slowly legitimised their status as 
an elite group by acts of philanthropy, acquisition of 
property, and efforts at cultural assimilation in a city where 
their presence was once anathema" (p.230).
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Although in a very different context and for different purposes, the 
principle of the middlemen is also associated with the operation of 
modem transnational corporations. They too, construct world-wide
Q
’networks* of vertical links :
"For their operations in countries other than those of their 
parent companies," writes Utrecht, "Transnational corporations 
need the close co-operation of certain groups of people among 
the elites in the host countries of their subsidiaries.. .we 
call them compradors, and because of their dealings with 
foreign corporations the term ’corporate comprador’ is most 
appropriate. Compradors are indigenous (local) persons who 
voluntarily serve foreign (capitalist) interests. Where it 
does not exist the foreign simply create it" (1978 p.87).
There is an exhaustive amount of evidence to support Utrecht’s 
thesis.^ In the annex to this chapter I reproduce a translation from 
the French of a compilation made by Guir and Crener (1984) of the 
various methods of and reasons for international investments of 
transnational corporations.
8.2. Restructurations affect both sides
Whereas the impact of the vertical links upon the dependent social 
formations is well documented, their effects upon the ’dominant’ 
formations has received less attention. In actual fact, as much as 
dependent formations are shaped internally into a structure of 
dependency, so are dominant formations moulded into a particular 
pattern of relationship with the world market. When circumstances 
change, it is more often the dominant which find it particularly 
difficult to re-structure and accommodate these changes. I will cite 
here two very well known examples.
Spain’s rapid decline in the seventeenth century from a leading power 
in Europe to a peripheral one has been a paradigmatic case. Ferry 
Anderson (1974) summarises the widely held view that it was precisely 
the success of Spain which led to her eventual downfall. From the 
1560’s onwards, he argues, the multiple effects of the American Empire 
on Spanish absolutism became increasingly determinant for its future 
(p.70), for it provided Hispanic Absolutism with a plentiful and
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permanent extraordinary income that was wholly outside the conventional 
ambit of State revenues in Europe (p.71):
"For the first half of the 16th century", Anderson continues, 
"the moderate level of shipments <of gold and silver> (with a 
higher gold component) provided a stimulus to Castilian 
exports, which quickly responded to the price inflation that 
followed the advent of colonial treasure....However, there 
were two fatal twists in this process for the Castilian 
economy as a whole. Firstly, increased colonial demand led to 
further conversion of land away from cereal production, to 
wine and olives. This reinforced the already disastrous trend 
encouraged by the monarchy towards a contraction of wheat 
output at the expense of wool...The combined result of these 
pressures was to make Spain a major grain-importing country 
for the first time by the 1570 * s. The structure of Castilian 
rural society was now already unlike anything else in Western 
Europe... .Most striking of all, the Spanish censuses of 1571 
and 1586 revealed a society in which a mere one-third of the 
male population was engaged in agriculture at all; while no 
less than two-fifths were outside any direct economic produc­
tion —  a premature and bloated ’tertiary sector* of Ab­
solutism Spain which prefigured the secular stagnation to 
come.... Accelerating inflation drove up the costs of produc­
tion of the textile industry, which operated within very rigid 
technical limits, to a point where Castilian cloths were 
eventually being priced out of both colonial and metropolitan 
markets. Dutch and English interlopers started to cream off 
the American demand" (1974, pp.72,73).
A similar tale is recounted by J.A. Hobson (1988) in relation to Great 
Britain. In his view,
"although the new Imperialism <of the late nineteenth century> 
has been bad business for the nation, it has been good 
business for certain classes and certain trades within the 
nation" (1988, p.46). "Some of these trades," he goes on,"esp­
ecially the shipbuilders, boiler making, and gun and ammuni­
tion making trades, are conducted by large firms with immense 
capital, whose heads are well aware of the uses of political 
influence for trade purposes. These men are Imperialists by 
conviction; a pushful policy is good for them (p.49)... Still 
more dangerous the special interest of the financier, the 
general dealer in investments" (p.56).
Naim’s analysis of contemporary Britain follows in the same vein. Why 
is it, asks Naim, that in Britain the development of modem industry 
and techniques of production were retarded? The reason, he maintains,
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are to be found in
"Britain's prior involvement in an older web of external rela­
tions, in a system, now archaic, to which capitalists had 
adapted themselves only too well .... The role of world banker 
has proved the toughest, most resistant section of 
imperialism... .The elements of this profane structure are the 
body of foreign sterling investments, the general employment 
of sterling as a trading medium.... are controlled or coor­
dinated by the city of London, its material sources of 
strength are the tin and rubber of Malaysia, the oil of the 
Middle-East, and the gold of South africa and,of course, the 
British domestic economy" (p.5).
8.3. Dependency and the Vertical links
A great deal of work on unequal structural relationships has been 
conducted within the frameworks of Dependency theory/imperial ism and 
the study of colonialism. Whereas the latter are almost exclusively 
historical accounts of the colonial period, studies of imperialism and 
dependency have sought to develop general conceptual frameworks. Again, 
much of the literature on imperialism follows the work of Lenin (1977) 
and aims at identifying the particulars of the capitalist mode of 
production. The literature which discusses imperialism as relationships 
between social formations is not sufficiently distinct from that of 
dependency theory, to which I shall now turn.
In accordance with the 'nationalistic' perspective which permeates all 
social sciences, most research into unequal structural relationships 
tends to concentrate upon global relationships between social forma­
tions to the neglect of the much larger number of informal links 
between individuals, companies and social groups. Consequently, the 
legacy of Dependency theory is ambiguous, to say the least. The general 
impression one gets from reading the literature is one of crude 
reductionism. This is due partly to the confusion of the concept of 
capitalism, which is a mode of production, and dependency, which 
alludes to the relation between social formations. Hie result is that 
it seems as if dependent formations are dependent vis-a-vis 'capita­
lism', which is after all an impersonal mode of production.
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However, a careful reading reveals a much subtler approach. As 
mentioned in the introduction, dependency theorists extended the neo­
classical concept of international division of labour into the social 
and political realms, Their contention was that such a division of 
labour patterns a the class relations and indeed, the class structure 
of each individual country. It is the domestic class structure, 
burdened with international alliances among classes and fraction which
causes, so is believed, the underdevelopment of a large majority of the
12countries in the world. Thus, the message of dependency is twofold. 
Firstly, that there are ’informal' vertical ties linking classes 
residing in different social formations. Secondly, that as a result, 
powerful fractions of the ruling classes are excessively dependent to 
the detriment of their own society on their connection to the * world—  
market’.
Dependency theory has attracted a lot of criticism of late. This is 
partly due to the spectacular success of export-led growth of the NICS 
on the one hand, and the utter failure of sub-Sahara African States on 
the other, which, for all intents and purposes, were abandoned by the 
main international conglomerates (Jackson, 1987). The main line of 
attack, nonetheless, is theoretical in nature. Most of the criticism 
was directed at the claim that the world-market, or the international 
division of labour, is more powerful than domestic class structure and 
so permanently blocks any possibility of development (Frank, 1978b). In 
the meantime, however, almost by default, the thesis of the existence 
of informal or structural relationship on a world scale has been 
generally accepted.^
A similar fate befell studies of colonialism. There is an intense if 
unresolved debate concerning its long-term effects upon colonised 
peoples.^ As a result, much of the discussion degenerates into mutual 
recrimination. In this atmosphere, the international links which were 
forged between people residing in different formations have been almost 
forgotten.
I propose to replace here the concept of dependency with the more 
cumbersome notion of a ’vertical link’. An explanation is due.
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‘Dependency* is an ambiguous term, it describes a process, a relation­
ship, a state of affairs, a condition of a formation as well as its 
causes and consequences. Thus, whereas the term is excellent for 
rhetorical uses (Warren, 1980), it is less so as an analytical tool. 
Let us examine the various meanings of the term * dependency*.
Writers on dependency always stress that underdevelopment is not merely 
a moment in the history of a formation, but a dynamic condition, a 
process. This process, it is argued, is the result of a particular form 
of integration of a society into the world-economy. Accordingly, 
dependency is seen as the external condition causing underdevelopment. 
This external force may either take the shape of an identifiable 
’dominant’ formation, or where a clear candidate for such title cannot 
be found, the world market is considered as the external force. 
Although the two cases may appear to be similar, conceptually they are 
rather different. For whereas in the first case the condition of 
dependency may be defined in precise terms because the formation’s 
socio-economic structure may be seen as an appendage to a dominant 
formation, in the second case the condition of dependency may be 
defined only by contrasting it to those countries which were fortunate 
enough to be ’advanced* or ‘centers* at that particular conjuncture. 
However, the definition of the ‘advanced* or ‘centre* itself is not a 
straightforward affair, for many studies have demonstrated that the 
factors which go into making a particular country ’advanced* at any 
historical moment are conjunctural to a great extent (Aglietta, 1974; 
Braudel, 1979, vol. Ill; Lipietz, 1987; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980). 
Consequently, the definition of a ‘dependency* condition is in fact an 
enumeration of various unhappy coincidences: dependency and under­
development are defined in relation to the ‘advanced* which, in turn, 
is defined in contrast to dependency. We enter therefore an analytical 
loop that makes it difficult to examine each case on its own.
Let us move to the particulars of a dependency situation. Although 
dependency refers to the overall condition of a formation, one can 
distinguish at least three if not unrelated, at least separate 
situations of dependency. To begin with, virtually all those countries 
whose overall situation may outwardly correspond to that of ’ depende­
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ncy', that is, countries which are excessively dependent on the world 
market, but which were able to extricate themselves from poverty, 
beginning with nineteenth century Prussia and the United state and 
twentieth century Japan, the NICS, or present-day Canada, were able to 
do so by utilizing the state apparatus, i.e. by a particular organisa­
tion and mobilisation of their societies.^ The ability or inability to 
do so, as far as it refers to the relationships with the external 
world, may be called, for lack of better terms, 'political dependen- 
cy\16
Secondly, dependency is attributed largely to the penetration of a 
dependent formation by the agents of an advance formation, be they a 
colonial administration or a modem transnational corporations. The 
vertical links is dominated in this case by the centre. The effects of 
penetration by these corporations are rather different and could be
resisted differently from cases of 'inverse dependency'.
Inverse dependency arise when a social formation is relatively
underdeveloped because of the sort of products it exports. For
instance, the production of coffee or tea requires relatively little in
terms of production techniques and size of farm. Consequently, when
such sectors dominate an the economy, they may hinder the development
17of modem industry. That is rather different from cases when a sector 
is dominated by a foreign company. Inverse dependency denotes therefore 
a vertical link dominated in the periphery.
Both types of vertical links do not imply, by themselves, that the
social formation is underdeveloped. In the words of Delacroix "The 
idea that specialization in export of raw materials has adverse effects 
on economic growth and development is supported by little empirical 
evidence" (1980, p. 155). Nor does for that matter foreign penetration 
necessarily inhibits local bourgeoise (Brym, 1989). None of the 
matrises of dependency are necessarily correlated with underdevelop­
ment. Indeed, vertical links are rife in the relations of the advanced 
to each other. Their correlation with underdevelopment can be gauged 
only in relations to the domestic political process of a particular 
society. All these factors combined, makes it rather an over—
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simplification to equate excessive involvement in the world economy 
and/or under-development and poverty directly with dependency. In our 
scheme of things, ’political dependency* will not be considered as 
dependency at all. It may be considered as the result of the interac­
tion between the various vertical links (horizontal included) with the 
domestic political process. Whereas the two types of dependency links 
will be considered as vertical links, albeit pointing in opposite 
directions. They too, make sense, i.e. become meaningful, only if 
considered in the context of the domestic political structure.
10
8.4. The links as structurations
We can elaborate at this point upon the notion of an informal link: 
these two patterns of informal interactions are l in k s. That is, the 
fo rtu n e s  o f  a g ro u p  o r g ro u p s  o f people re s id in g  in  one form ation become 
l in k e d  to a certa in  extent to the fo rtu n e s  o f  a g ro u p  re s id in g  in  a n o th e r. 
In many instances, but not invariably, members of such informal 
groupings may be aware of their common interest (or inversely their 
mutual antagonism). For instance, workers in a General Motors sub­
sidiary in Europe or the Third World are generally well aware of their 
dependence on the head office, and therefore indirectly upon the 
American polity. Similarly, African chiefs recently endowed with new
powers under the system of * indirect rule * are very well aware of their
19dependence on their masters. The same applies to the workers and 
managers of BASF who are well aware of their competition with say, I CL. 
However, there seems to be only a vague awareness that the attempt to
reform the health service and the education system in England is due
20largely to external *uninformal* stimuli.
These links are ties : they create what Galtung calls ’bridgeheads* of 
interests and connections. In some cases, the links might prove to be 
ties stronger than loyalty to the nation-state. Thus it might be 
beneficial to supplement the political map of the independent, 
sovereign state with a 'social* map consisting of an infinite number of 
these ties cris-crossing these formations in all directions. Most of 
these are relatively weak; however, in combination they become a factor 
to be reckoned with.
These links may be seen as channels o f  communication: hut on the whole 
the ’messages’ that travel along these lines are not linguistic in 
form. Consequently, their impact is quite different from that of formal 
interactions which operate through cognitive gestures and verbal 
communications and are therefore open to ’misperception’. As they Eire 
not received on a cognitive plane, as demonstrated in the chapter four, 
the receiving social formation ’interprets’ them through its own 
structure. Moreover, we may also speak of a certain ’ technological 
determinism’ as the lines themselves may determine to a certain extent 
the speed and type of message run through them. For instance, in 
chapter nine, we shall see that military hardware and fighting 
techniques travelled faster than techniques of taxation along the 
horizontal link. This has created, in turn, a certain divergence 
between the levels of the social formation. In the long run, variations 
in speed, type and efficacy of these types of communications create a
major dissonance between the three levels of mode of exploitation,
21society and superstructure.
Lastly, a social link is always more than a mere link —  it is also a 
social s tru c tu re . That is, it does not simply link people residing in 
one society to another, but it also disturbs, distorts, enhances the 
internal structure of the two societies in question. Thus, through 
these links and lines of communication societies ’export’ and ’import’ 
their domestic political processes. There is an ongoing and permanent 
process of re-structuring which makes any investigation of a society 
as if it operates in isolation rather futile.
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NOTES
1. Dissatisfaction with this state of affairs yielded some interest­
ing interdisciplinary studies: there is a trend in Sociology to 
study war in the context of State formation (Ashworth & Dandeker, 
1987; Creighton & Shaw, 1987; Mann, 1986; McNeill, 1983), and in 
International Political Economy to develop models of internation­
al relations (Gilpin, 1981; Strange, 1988). On cultural links and 
International Relations see: Kelroan, 1965.
2. Political histories centre on personalities classes or states. 
However they discuss essentially power relationships.
3. On structuralism see note (39) Introduction.
4. Chapters eight and nine will not discuss these links at length. 
I will aim only to concentrate on areas or aspects which have 
been neglected in my view in the literature.
5. "Feudalism as a mode of production was originally defined by an 
organic unity of economic and polity, paradoxically distributed 
in a chain of parcellised sovereignties throughout the social 
formation. The institution of serfdom as a mechanism of surplus 
extraction fused economic exploitation and politico-legal 
coercion at the molecular level of the village. The lord in his 
turn typically owed liege-loyalty and knight-service to a 
seigniorial overlord, who claimed the land as his ultimate 
domain" (Anderson, 1974, p.19).
6. Many writers noted on the affinity between the methods used in 
the expulsion of the Moores and the conquistadores: Pieterse 
writes: "These motives <aristocratic desire for prestige> were 
clearly at work in the Reconquista of southern Spain and also in 
overseas Hispanic expansion. The viceroyalties and audiencias 
established in the America were typically headed by Spanish 
grandees and may well be regarded as overseas forms of neofeudal 
vassalage... the pattern was reproduced in arrangements such as 
the encomienda which, under the overall authority of the crown, 
gave Spanish lords a similar control as in an earlier stage in 
Andalusia" (1989, p. 200).
On the difference between the conquest of North America and 
Ireland see Sack, 1987.
7. The British, could rely also on their own experience with the 
Moscow company (Chadrhui, 1965). See also, Morris & Read, 1972.
8. For a similar story see: Abu-Lughud, 1980.
9. In liberal literature the activites of the MNCs in third world 
countries goes normally under the heading of ’ networks ’ of 
relationships. See for example Schultz, 1979.
10. On the debate concerning the phenomena of globalisation or 
internationalisation of production. See among others: Bergesen, 
1980; Berthelot, 1983; Bettleheim, 1972; Deubner, 1984; Froebel,
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Heinrichs & Kreye, 1980; Gordon, 1987; Harris,1983 ; Jessop, 
1980; Lipietz, 1987, 1989; Mandel, 1975; Michalet, 1976;
Poulantzas, 1975.
11. Reports of the Spanish case confirm this diagnosis (Braudel, 1979; 
Maravall, 1986). Due to its special political and economical 
place in the world, a bloated tertiary sector of hidalgos, and in 
particular the political strength of the MESA, the association of 
the sheepbreeders (Wallerstein, 1974) which together played the 
role of the ’middlemen', weighed upon the Spanish social 
formation. It created a social structure singularly unfitted for 
subsequent development.
12. Frank (1967) writes: ”My thesis holds that the group interests 
which led to the continued underdevelopment of Chile and the 
economic development of some other countries were themselves 
created by the same economic structure which encompassed all 
these groups: the world capitalist system... .The most powerful 
interest groups of the Chilean metropolis were interested in 
policies producing the underdevelopment at home because their 
metropolis was at the same time a satellite. The analogous 
interest groups of the world metropolis were not interested in 
policies producing such underdevelopment at home (though they did 
abroad), because their metropolis was not a satellite” (p.94).
Elsewhere (1978a) he adds: "The indians* own hierarchical 
social organisation served as the principal instrument by which 
the Spaniards would dominate and colonise their Indian subjects 
and by which they would organise the division of labour that 
would put the indigenous population at their service” (p.43).
13. In the words of Alain Lipietz (1987) assessment reflects the 
general mood: "This thesis <dependency>.. .had one great advantage 
over the liberal argument. It concentrated upon studying the 
links that bound economic spaces into international relations, 
and it saw the world economy as a system. Its weakness was that 
it paid little attention to the concrete conditions of capitalist 
accumulation either in the centre or on the periphery.... The 
very notion of an ’international division of labour* (not to 
mention an International Economic Order) suggests that there is 
some Great Engineer or Supreme Entrepreneur who organises labour 
in terms of a pre-conceived world" (PP. 2-4).
14. For a recent summary see Pietrese, 1989.
15. On the Russia and Prussia see Gerschenkron, 1962. On Japan,
Johnson, 1982. On the NICs see Lipietz, 1987. On Canada see 
Clarke, 1984; Laxter, 1986; Omstein & Stevenson, 1983. On the 
failure of Latin American States see Friedman, 1984 & Mouzelis, 
1986.
16. It is true that political dependency results from economic 
dependency but it is not necessarily true the other way around.- 
The positive connection between economic and political dependency 
is summarized by Chase-Dunn: "Merchants, with their stake in the
export of raw materials and the import of manufactured goods,
combine with landed classes (which have similar interests) to
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prevent the emergence of domestic manufacturing or industrial 
bourgeoisie. They do so by politically preventing the introduc­
tion of tariffs that would protect infant industries against the 
competition of already developed producers in the core states. 
(Chase-Dunn, 1980, p. 136).
17. On coffee and tea and the world market see: Machado, 1977; 
Streeten & Elson, 1971; Wickizier, 1951.
18. I use the term structuration to describe a situation by which the 
structure of one society 1ms been affecting, modifying, influenc­
ing the structure of another’s social structure. The medium has 
been defined here as ’informal interactions’. Thus the concept of 
structurations needs to be distinguished from Giddens, 1984, 
which developed in different context for different purposes.
19. About the encomienda system in the new territories Wallerstein 
has that to say "Not only did the landowner have the Spanish 
Crown behind him in creating his capital ... He normally had an 
arrangement with the traditional chief of the Indian community in 
which the latter added his authority to that of the colonial
rulers to the process of coercion .... The interest of the chief
or caicque becomes quite clear when we realize how laborers were
in fact paid .... the Indians working on gold washing received a 
sixth of its value. This payment, called the sesmo, was however 
made not to individual indians but to the collectivity of whicy 
they were members. One can guess at the kinds of unequal division 
that were consequent upon this kind of global payment system" 
(Wallerstein, 1974, p.94).
20. See Vogler, 1985 on class interest in the global context.
21. "Whenever a ’vertical integration’ on sny two links on a
commodity chain occurred, it was possible to shift even more to 
the centre" (Wallerstein, 1983, p.32).
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CHAPTER NINE: THE HORIZONTAL SmtCTURATIONS. THE EUROPEAN BALLET, 1450
- 1700
When two agents, be they individuals, companies or states are competing 
with each other, they tend to modify their behaviour to gain an 
advantage. In this was they become linked in an 'informal’ link. This 
simple principle accounts for the horizontal channels of interaction 
between societies. The horizontal links, or links of competition, may 
be discussed under three separate headings:
a. Commercial competition between companies from different formations.
b. Commercial competition between States.
c. Military competition between states.
In contrast to the vast literature on dependency and colonialism, there 
is relatively little on the social effects of competition in interna­
tional relations. Commercial competitions between companies as well as 
States are normally discussed under the heading of 'restructuring'. 
The questions they tend to ask is what sort of policies will aid local 
companies to face foreign challenges (or to be more specific how 
America should respond to the ' Japanese challnege *). An examination of 
the literature reveals an awareness that competitiors either adopt 
techniques and technologies of their competitiors, or are forced into 
innovative approaches, which may, in its turn, be adopted by their com­
petitors. However, there is virtually no discussion of the global 
effects of these series of competitions on the study of International 
Relations.*
Military compeititon, of course, has been the bread and butter of the 
study of International Relations. However, here again, there is little 
discussion of the social effects of compeititon on social formation. 
In their turn, sociological studies of war emphasise the relation 
between war and the preparation for war and the social structure, not 
the horizontal links which results from these competition.* Bearing that 
in mind, in contrast to the previous chapter, this one cannot summarize 
existing literature but needs to develop the argument. For this reason, 
of the three types of competitions, I will concentrate on only one of 
than, namely, military competition.* I will present a somewhat schematic
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survey of the intersection between state formation and military 
competitiveness from the conclusion of the Hundred years* War to the 
age of Louis XIV. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate how this 
informal link operates concretely.
Military competition is only nominally competition for power and 
prestige. What goes into making a society into a perfect war machine is 
its overall social structure. In different periods different con- 
junctural combination of factors have led to success. If States wished 
to survive as a viable political forces they were forced to copy their 
more successful neighbours, even if that entailed unpleasant structural 
changes.* During the period under consideration the formations which 
were capable of achieving solid ententes between the aristocracy and 
the crown were, generally speaking, triumphant. Hie underlying force in 
this period was the so-called * military revolution* which, coupled with 
continual inflationary pressure, imposed an intolerable financial 
burden upon the European states. Consequently, state formation in 
Europe was bound up with financial reforms (Braun, 1974).
European history provides a vivid example of this complex process. As 
in a ballet, where couples, trios and sometimes the whole company, find 
themselves dancing together, caught up in their own little world, and 
then, as if by a sign from above, the dancers disconnect, take a 
respite and a new dance begins and carries on the narrative. State 
formation in Europe was the summation of these smaller private dances. 
No one planned the State, there was no divine choreographer, the 
competition between leading polities swayed their progress to and fro 
in unpredictable manner. In this tale, the focus must lie not ex­
clusively on the most advanced formation, but rather with those which 
came second at the time. These States were the true motor forces of 
constitutional and administrative developments in Europe.
The subject of this chapter is the technicalities of European state 
formation and not with the general picture. Consequently, the discus­
sion is of necessity a simplification and schematisation, and thus in 
no way should it be seen as a history of state formation in Europe. By 
simplification and schematisation I mean:
218
A. Of the three tools of analysis, namely, the domestic political 
process, the vertical and horizontal links, only the third will be 
examine in any detail. The common attitude is to present state 
formation as if it were an internally propelled development —  which to 
a significant degree it was. In this perspective all the ’actors' are 
imbued with intrinsic interests which they then play out. Thus, it is 
postulated that kings and their ministers were forcing the pace of 
state formation whereas the nobility fought a rear-guard battle against 
it, and so on. This attitude is typical of Bendix (1980), Anderson 
(1974) and it informs the organisation of the New Cambridge Modem 
History. In these type of works the synchronisation of the European 
States is noted with curiosity, but never becomes a question mark, let 
alone a factor in the narrative.
In the seventies some authors began to discuss the role of vertical 
links in European history (Braudel, 1979; Frank, 1978a;1978b ;
Wallerstein, 1974; 1980). Thus, for instance, Wallerstein was able to 
present the weakness of Eastern European’s bourgeoisie within a global 
context of what he called, the European world-economy (1974, pp94-6). 
However, these thinkers concentrated exclusively on the major vertical 
links, to the exclusion of the domestic political process, formal 
policies as well as horizontal links.
The texts that did address the issue of competition in the European 
context (Jones, 1981; Hall, 1985; McNeill,1974) aim to explain why 
European beauracracies abetted rather than inhibited economic advance. 
They tend to emphasise a link between the fragmentation of Europe and
9
the unique concept of liberty which developed there. I have my reserva­
tions: the concept of liberty in the European context denotes the 
liberties of villages and towns versus the centralised power. If 
anything, whenever competition was intense, as between the Habsburg and 
the Valois, local liberties were easily compromised. In countries where 
local liberties prospered, namely, the Netherlands and England, it
occurred because they managed to keep themselves relatively aloof from
0
the main dynastic rivalries.
A comprehensive treatment of competition can be found, as far as I
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know, only in the work of Hintze (1975). Hintze saw a clear need to 
relate international relations to the domestic political process. 
Unfortunately, his theory of the state is a crude form of psychologism 
typical of the Romantic tradition and it held him back from developing 
any theoretical concepts. He writes:
"The life of the internal constitution .. .adjusts itself to the 
conditions of the external political existence, and the external 
shape of the state is a reflection of the situation prevailing at 
the time of this formation and is the consequence not only of 
power struggles but also of the geographical situation and of the 
then existing means of comnunications. The impact of the outside 
world must pass through an intellectual medium; and the only 
question is how strong is its refraction, to what extent it 
possesses independent vigour and can exert a counterweight. With 
this reservation we can - indeed, must - stress that in the life 
of peoples external events and conditions exercise a decisive 
influence upon the internal constitution. History does not permit 
progressive spiritual development, flooding its own laws, as was 
supposed by Hegel; there is rather a constant collaboration and 
interaction of the inner and the outer world. The process in 
which a state is shaped produces aims, habits, needs, and views, 
and they create among leaders and masses a distinct intellectual 
disposition that favours a particular type of constitutional 
structure. Analysis of this process of psychological type of 
constitutional mediation must be regarded as the main task if we 
want to explain these phenomena" (1975, p.62, my emphasis).
B. Statesmen learned to adopt military, financial and administrative 
techniques which enabled others to forge ahead.^ However, restructuring 
may be perhaps the best long term policy, but it requires a tough and 
sometimes unpredictable tussle with strong domestic forces. Consequently, 
as imitations grew faster, there also developed a variety of techniques for 
avoiding or at least mitigating such painful processes. The policy of 
‘balance of power* was a case in point. It entailed in practical terms that 
states could now pool their resources and consequently avoid painful 
restructuring.
The policy of balance of power, nonetheless, did not and could not stop the 
pressure of horizontal structurations. Rather, it shifted it in a different 
direction as advantage could be gained no longer by simply adopting to 
modem military techniques. In any case, by the second half of the 
seventeenth century the armies of all the major European protagonists came
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to resemble each other. In the situation that developed, the so-called 
’balancer’ state was the one able to finance armies of other states, and 
as a result accumulate the greatest number of soldiers and cannons on the 
battlefield. Hence, the series of financial reforms and innovations which 
amounted in England to a ’financial revolution’ was tied up with the wars 
against Louis XIV. With that, the principal line of competition shifted 
from a crude military format to finance and with it, the first signs of a 
structural trend towards economic competition became visible.
In its turn the 'financial revolution’ can be seen as the culmination of 
a secondary (but no less important) line of horizontal structurations which 
originated many centuries before. Nonetheless, I will concentrate only on 
the first line of competition, namely the direct military competition and 
decline to comment on this secondary line which included among other 
things, the development of the banking system, the national debt, the great 
trading companies, industrial policy and the colonial ventures.
C. As the discussion here is meant to illustrate a point and not to be a 
comprehensive account of European development, even the discussion of the 
horizontal structurations will remain restricted. Consequently, the Ottoman 
threat which, induced the so-called ’military revolution* of 1560-1700 
(M.S.Anderson, 1988; McNeill,1974), remains outside of the narrative. So 
will Russia, Sweden, Denmark, etc. , whose dynamics of development are very 
similar to those experienced by the western states.
9.1. The Hundred Years ’ War and the constitutional frenzy at the end of the 
fifteenth century
The conclusion of the Hundred Years War left the two combatants, France and 
England, possessing rudimentary state frameworks (Elias, 1939).** That 
should not come as a surprise. In order to fight each other effectively, 
both monarchs were in desperate need of permanent financial arrangements. 
Whenever one achieved any progress either in military technique or on the 
financial front the, other soon followed. Until the 1420s the English (and 
the Burgundians) held the field. This, according to Perry Anderson (1974) 
was due to two factors: first, the greater political integration of the 
English feudal monarchy, and second, and this goes to the heart of the 
ideas discussed here, in their battles with the Welshmen and the Scots
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(which were non-feudal polities), the English perfected the art of using 
long bowmen on battle thereby proving superior on continental battlefields 
(Howard, 1976).
The war confirmed the limitation of knights on the field, and consequently
12the weaknesses of a parcelled polity more generally. The conversion of 
the French dominions into a centralised State undertaken by Charles VII, 
if not patterned exactly on the English model, was prodded by the example 
of its more successful neighbour. But once taken this route it led to the 
establishment of the most tightknit state in Europe. Like his ancestors, 
Charles attempted to revive all sorts of ancient taxes as well as invent 
new ones. But unlike his predecessors, he was able to put them on a 
permanent basis (Elias, 1939). This was because by the 1430s the centrali­
sation of finance was already a good deal advanced, the enemy had been 
driven out, but the army was not disbanded. The king, therefore, was strong 
enough to declare a permanent tax, the a id es, without waiting for the 
agreements of the estates.
In essence, what had happened was that 'England*, that is, the English 
polity, the English style of fighting, the English pattern of relationship 
between king and aristocracy, proved superior to classical feudalism on the 
battlefield. It forced France off onto a new course of development that 
could never have occurred purely on the basis of its internal dynamism. It 
did not take many years for the new, resurgent France, to force England on 
precisely the same course.
Apart from France and England, the horizontal links direct attention to the 
Duchy of Burgundy, which fought incessantly with the French State. It was 
only in 1477 with the death of Charles the Bold (and 1482 with the Treaty 
of Arras), that the Burgundian menace was practically over for France. 
Huizinga's (1971) thesis is that Burgundy played a significant role in 
European states formation. This is substantiated here. There were quite a 
few interesting adminstrative development in the Burgundian lands which 
found their way through the horizontal link to the French State, and from 
there were transmitted all over Europe.
Already under Philip the Good (1419-67), the diverse Burgundian councils
222
of State were beginning to possess separate functions: control over state 
affairs was established through a privy council and a separate council for 
justice, the G rand Consdilwas established in the 1480s. Although Charles 
the Bold introduced the French fiscal method of division between ordinary 
and extraordinary revenues, with his death Burgundy reverted back to the 
old method of Philip the Good, under which income from the domain and from 
taxation was administered by the same officials named commis b u t  le  fa i t  des  
domaines e t finances. In 1496 these chambres were compulsory united and 
their headquarters was set in Malines.
The last two decades of the fifteenth century were crucial years in the 
formation of the framework of the ancien regimes and France was taking the 
lead. The unprecendent rapidity of administrative changes were unques­
tionably related to the unfortunate decision of Charles VIII to march on 
Italy (1494). Following the Burgundian example, In the 1490s, the 
administrative and judicial arms of the State were separated, the Consdil 
du ro i, rather similar to the Burgundian Grand Conc^il, where the great 
officers of the crown sat,became a permanent organ for political and ad­
ministrative functions. From then on, the c h an ce lle ridand the su rin ten d aces  
de fin a n c es, with their staffs of generaux  des fin an ces as well as the 
treso ires  de France, administrative arms in the collection of taxes, became 
permanent. And a supreme court was gradually differentiated from the king’s 
own courts. An ordinance of 1498 recognised the existence of the Grand  
Consdil, a council for judicial concerns (which of course, was rather 
similar to the Burgundian Grand Cons&il). Alongside the parlement, the 
chambre des comptes with their cours des aides were established to 
supervised the financial system.
Only two or three years later, under the reign of Henry VII, a somewhat
similar structure was erected in England. The S ta r Cham ber, resembling the
13French Grand Cons&il was established, and held the supreme justice over 
the nobility. It was accompanied by a new conciliar court which became the 
main political weapon of the monarchy against riot or sedition. Thus the 
Burgundian methods have arrived to England via France.
The Burgundian example was copied in other matters too. The Burgundian 
princes were able to use the institution of the States General (or the
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parliament) to override provincial particularism and thus give a firm 
foundation to the monarchy. Louis XI of France adopted the principle so 
that between 1468-84 there were important plenary meeting of the French 
estates and government seemed to evolve in the direction of the English 
parliamentary system. However, crucially, the French kings already had at 
their disposal a permanent standing army (the compagnie d ’ordonance  
<1445>. Therefore they did not need to call upon the Estates as often as 
their English counterparts. 1484 was the last time the estates general were 
summoned.
The French were cultivating their own administrative arrangements. One of 
the interesting development was the administrative partition of the kingdom 
in 1494 into four generalites. In due course this system became the basis 
for a homogenous bureaucratic structure constructed around the intndants 
(happened during the Thirty Years* War). Such a method of organisation 
overrides local particularism and its successful implementation proves how 
far down the road of absolutism France already was. (Six years later 
Maxmilian I tried to introduce precisely the same system to the Holy Reman 
Empire and got nowhere). At the same time, in order to facilitate the 
collection of the taille the villages were organised into communautes 
d 'h ab ita ts , a organisation which resembles the English system of J.P. ’s and 
probably inspired by the success of the Spanish h e r m a n d a d Masters of 
requests (a system which had already proved useful in England) were 
appointed in 1493 to exercise a general jurisdiction on the king's behalf. 
The result was that by the end of the century the French kings had at their 
disposal an extremely flexible fiscal system.
In their turn, French administrative methods were imitated all over Europe. 
In the Treaty of Picquigny (1475), Louis XI promised Edward IV a subsidy 
which made the latter relatively independent of parliament. (Parliament was 
not recalled until Edward's death (1483), and between 1497 and 1509 
assembled only once). The English kings were certainly learning from their 
French counterparts. But why did England not adopted the French model to 
the full? It is quite obvious that terms like 'model', 'following an 
example’ etc. are euphemisms. When we say that England did not follow the 
French example, we are really asking why a visible convergence in the 
social structure of the two societies did not extend any further. Various
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responses may be cited, and they are all versions of the horizontal 
structurations thesis. Most commentators seem to agree that in actual fact 
the English kings did try to adopt the French model; in particular they 
coveted the level of centralisation achieved under the French kings. As we 
shall see later, only with the benefit of hindsight is it possible to 
appreciate the significance of the French (and the Spanish) standing armies 
(the compagnie d’ordonance and the tercios). At that period, a standing 
army of 10,000 men (on paper, as was the French) was not much different 
from the local militia or a private army prevalent in England.
As everywhere else, so in England too, local administration was tightened 
up under royal control by the vigilant selection and supervision of 
Justices of Peace, small body of guards to patrol the highways and punish 
criminals were established, and royal estates were greatly enlarged by the 
assumption of lands. In fact, it was the manner by which Henry VIII broke 
with the pope, and the Anglican Church was established, and in particular 
the manner by which parliament was used in these proceedings, that assured 
the survival and indeed the development of the English parliamentary 
system. There were other developments too, to which we shall come later, 
that kept England out of the main line of European struggles.
To return to Burgundy. When Maximilian, son of Emperor Frederick III 
married Mary of Burgundy in 1477 and the Burgundian lands became part of 
the Habsburg domains, the estates were able to force upon their new rulers 
a special agreement, the Grand P riv ile g e . The Grand Privilege distinguished 
between the sovereign’s interests and those of his subjects. In its 
collective sense it was a constitutional procedure whereby a new ruler 
entered into contractual relations with each territory. It became an 
alternative model for state development for it seemed to guarantee the 
priviledges of the old nobility within a new framework.
It was in the Holy Roman Empire that the two ’models’ of state’s formation, 
the French and the Grand Privil£g£, met each other and ended in deadlock 
—  sealing the fate of the Empire as a significant political force in 
European politics. On 19th of August 1493 Frederick III died and Maximilian 
I took over. Maximilian, who clearly perceived the trend in Europe, tried 
to establish a centralised monarchy on the French model. All the major
actors in the German schene agreed that effective organs of central govern­
ments were the essential remedy to anarchy in Germany and Maximilian 
enjoyed the support of some of the major towns. However, aristocratic 
elements led by Berthold, the archbishop of Mainz, opposed his proposals 
and put forward their own alternative plan which amounted to something 
similar to the Grand Privil6g6.
Already back in 1489 Berthold of Mainz suggested a constitutional reform 
reminiscent of developments in other European states. It included a supreme 
court of justice and the permanent prohibition of private wars. In 1495 
fo llow ing  the F rench  v ic to ry  in  Fornovo, Max summoned the reichstag and an 
agreement was reached for a scheme of general taxation, the Common Penny, 
to provide for an army for defence. Max, however, wanted to take a much 
more forceful stance in Italy. This gave the reformers their chance. On top 
of their demands from 1489 they presented a scheme for a permanent supreme 
executive body (the R eich stra t) without whose consent royal acts would be 
invalid. The emperor, however, did not agree to being reduced to the status 
of an executive officer (and few of the estates liked it), the Reichstrat 
therefore was dropped and it was agreed instead that the Reichstag itself 
will take over the functions of the Reichstrat. Thus, an institution of 
long-proven incapacity was chosen.
The only thing that came out of these proceedings was the Reichskam - 
m erg erich t which was the supreme court of the empire, but it was not a 
great success. From 1496 to 1498 Berthold of Mainz kept the Reichstag in 
continuous session, and Maximilian remained aloof, choosing to concentrate 
instead on reforming his own patrimony of Lower and Upper Austria. However, 
in 1500, following successful French expedition against Milan, Maximilian 
proposed what he rejected in Worms, the appointment of a representative 
supreme Executive Council, a R eichsreg im entf which was to take over 
virtually all the functions of the monarchy. To meet defence requirements 
new expedients were adopted. The nobility was to provide the cavalry, 
whilst princes taxed their common subjects for the provision of a militia. 
The expenses of the reg im en t and re ichskam m ergerich t would be met from the 
contributions of the clergy and towns. This scheme was in fact a step back 
from a confederation: Max’s desire for a reich army was to be fulfilled, 
but even the military command was taken from him and entrusted to the
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hands of Albert, the Duke of Bavaria. The reformers, however, were 
unsuccessful in conducting central government and by 1502 Maximilian was 
in control again. With this, the Holy Roman Empire virtually returned to 
its point of departure.
These disagreements over models of constitutional and administrative 
development were by no means abstract. They attest, first of all, to an 
unrelentling external pressure felt by the major combatant exhorting them 
towards painful self-restructurations. Furthermore, they provide a faithful 
representation of the conflicts all these formations were involved in. The 
ruling classes were still a fighting nobility and they were hankering for 
a fight. In that, they had a common interest with the Crown. However, the 
dynamics of this process passed through the emerging bourgeoisie, who as 
a rule preferred a strong monarchy. Accordingly, wherever the monarchy was 
strong, towns seem to have flourished (relatively speaking) and wherever
the aristocracy had their say, as was the case in Spain and Germany, the
15bourgeoisie were defeated.
9.2. The Habsburg-Valois struggle
The sixteenth century was characterised as the struggle between two 
dynasties, the Habsburgs and the Valois. France was potentially the 
undisputed power in Europe. She had a population of about eighteen to 
nineteen millions, her finance and bureaucracy was in better shape than any 
other state, and she had a standing army. Partly as a response to this 
potential French threat, the Habsburgs succeeded in consolidating a land 
mass even more massive than France through a series of opportune marriage 
arrangements. The sudden rise of the Habsburgs, in turn, gave rise to a 
genuine threat to the southern borders of France. The effect of this risk 
perception enhanced, in its turn, State formation in France.
By the end of the fifteenth century Spain was not yet a major power. The 
marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella (1469) founded what has later become 
known as the M onarqu ia: a loose confederation of states, each retaining 
its own parliament, political institutions, laws, courts, armed forces, 
taxation and coinage. None of these polities were constitutionally subject 
to any of the others, and the subjects of any one were aliens in the
V227
others. In the words of Solorzano Pereira: "The Monarch who keeps all these 
countries together is sovereign of each rather than king of all” (cited in 
Batista, 1968. p.322).
Ferdinand and Isabella surrounded themselves with a constellation of 
councils representing the various states. Nevertheless, some features of 
the Spanish State paralleled the general trend in Europe. Most of the 
Corteses, the local parliaments, lost their character as representative 
national assemblies and after 1497 they were summoned only to recognise 
heirs. A system of taxation and a standing army of a sort was established. 
But perhaps the most interesting development was the adaptation of the 
ancient institution of the hermandad to a council of provincial delegates 
under the presidency of the viceroy of the sovereign, with full powers to 
punish robbery, and with a small constabulary force. All towns had to pay 
it a tribute (its success led to its suppression in 1498). The hermandad 
is reminiscent of the English JP system, the and the French the communaut& 
d’habitants.
When Charles V acceded to the Spanish the throne in 1519, he brought with 
the him some of the Burgundian methods which had already been adopted in 
France and England, the mixture the made Spain more powerful, if somewhat 
eclectic state. Thus, for instance, in 1523 Charles appointed Henry of 
Nassau, who had been c h e f e t s u rin ten d an t des fin an ces in the Netherlands, 
to control the Castilian Contadurias heading a committee of six which the 
emperor refers to as the financial council (the name did not exist 
officially until 1568). His Piedmontese Chancellor, Mercurio Gattinara 
inspired by Erasmian ideals, strove to make the Habsburg’s realm more 
compact by creating unitary institutions on the departmental type, notably 
the Council of Finances, a Council of Welt and a Council of State (the 
latter theoretically becoming the summit of the imperial edifice) with a 
trans-regional character. These councils were backed by a permanent 
secretariat of civil servants. Nevertheless, the old structure of 
territorial Councils remained in place. So the empire remained a melange 
of different methods of rule, with different organisations competing, 
implicating and permeating each other.
The text-book contention is that the very size of the Habsburg empire
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overextended its capacity for integration and helped to arrest the process
of administrative centralisation (Anderson, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974; Kennedy,
1986). However, the concept of over-extension is ambiguous. It harks back
to the belief that kings were truly personal rulers and neglects the class
relationships which underlie any political arrangement. If the Habsburg
empire was ’ over-extended'; it would be foolhardy to search for the causes
in its geographical extension (as the case of Brandenburg/Prussia makes
clear), it would be much more fruitful to investigate Charles’ failure to
synchronise the social structures of his domains. The result was that
relations between the various ruling classes of the monarquia were always
tenuous, a situation which can be traced to the Habsburg*s dominant
16position in international politics.
From the point of horizontal links, the question then shifts away from the 
motives and wishes of the protagonists to the political and social 
imperatives of the time. The question then is whether Charles V was fo rc e d
to modernise h is  em pire o r n o t. One thing is quite clear, he failed to do
17so not for want of trying. It appears that Charles’ dominant position 
while embroiling him in incessant wars, nonetheless allowed him to maintain 
the status quo, which, as Roper-Trevor (1970) demonstrated was even fifty 
years later very attractive to large sections of the ruling classes. In 
other words, the organisation of the Habsburgs’ empire if not ideal, was 
sufficiently strong to make Charles V the centre of European politics. As 
long as French energies were directed towards Italy, Charles had good 
allies there among the Italian city states. In spite of the total financial 
exhaustion experienced by both countries by 1559, they had not fought on 
their own lands and consequently no overriding need was felt to make any 
fundamental changes.
The horizontal link in fact puts the onus firmly on the French State. 
Powerful and relatively compact as it was, the Habsburgs had at their 
disposal the two financial centres of Italy and the Netherlands, the German 
banking houses, the American treasures and could rely on the superior 
financial capacities of Castille. France just could not match such 
resources without a radical increase of financial resources. Here 
over-extension was not an abstract concept. Although at the beginning of 
the century the French intendants were already extracting about ten times
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more revenue per capita than their English neighbours, they had difficul­
ties matching the superior financial resources of the empire. In order to 
raise more money, Francis I (1515-47) was moved to a massive sale of 
offices, a system which was in reality an ingenious extension of patronage
(Briggs, 1977) since the new officials were dependent on the king and his
18councils for support in the exercise of their powers. It was, as Anderson 
(1974) had argued, a new social pact between king and magnates. However, 
the Habsburg-Valois antagonism took on a particular twist when the 
extraordinary revenues from America (especially the second half of the 
century) began to make their impact. There was no way by which a feudal 
polity, re-invigorated or not, could master enough resources. Again France 
was rudely ejected onto a new course.
There is a question, of course, as to what a * feudal ’ polity is, and in 
what sense it is different from an absolutist State. The distinctions hark 
back to the theoretical question of what is the State. In liberal circles 
the tendency has been to think of the State as an identifiable social 
group. The State is discussed, therefore, as an administrative structure 
held together by political theories. However, for our purposes, the more 
factors that are taken into account, the better we understand the nature 
of a particular polity. Ultimately, the difference between the two types 
of States boils down to different configurations of class structure.
The essential characteristic of the feudal polity was the parcelling of 
sovereignty into a hierarchical structure. The king was more often than not 
a titular head surrounded by powerful magnates (Ranke, 1905). The 
’re-invigorated* feudal state (Anderson’s (1974) analysis of absolutism) 
were, by and large, typical of a new kind of clientele system. This was a 
’bureaucratic’ system forged by a massive sale of offices by the French 
State (which, when the silver from Potosi dried up, was aped immediately 
by the Spanish state). It amounted, not to a sale of sovereignty, as 
commentators of the time feared, but to a new, more ’organic’ mode of 
co-operation between the magnates, gentry, long- distance traders and the 
Crown. The State itself became perhaps one of the principal source of 
surplus-product extraction for the ruling classes (Comniel, 1986). 
Absolutism then, was a ’superstructural’ form uniting the landed nobility 
and the bourgeoisie under one roof. In France the ’solution’ eventually
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took the form of a 'fusion* of the two classes into one, with the State 
taking the lead in expropriating the peasants. This is the classical form 
of absolutism.
This horizontal link forced other states to find their own solution. In 
Spain and Germany the 'solution* was different. By uniting their forces 
under the leadership of Charles V, the landed nobility (with the church as 
the biggest land-holder) were able to defeat the incipient bourgeoisie in 
both places (these policies were major causes of the revolt in the 
Netherlands (Geyl, 1988; Parker, 1977). Later on, once overseas revenues 
began to make their impact, Spain was able to incorporate what Anderson 
calls a "bloated tertiary sector" (Anderson, 1974) into its system. The 
French method proved, nonetheless, more resilient in the long run because 
it did not depend on an external source of income.
The northern half of the Netherlands, on the other hand, developed a 
different solution to the same problem through a series of insurrections. 
Here, the method of incorporation of the ruling classes took the form of 
a loose confederation of oligarchic states ruled by the high nobility 
(Orange, Nassau) and a merchant class. This republican solution proved 
viable because Holland was the economic centre of Europe (Braudel, 1979, 
III; Wallerstein, 1974). At the same time, it opened up a new venue for 
state’s development which in time acquired importance through what we have 
termed the secondary line of horizontal structuration (Figgis, 1916).
The horizontal line, as stated above, puts the onus firmly on the French 
State because it was the second most powerful State in Europe. And indeed, 
France at that time experienced a series of measures meant to tighten the 
grip of the State. In 1515, under Francis I the office of c o n tro le u r des  
communs was created to exercise a supervisory role over municipal finan­
ces. Until 1523, revenue was administered by two sets of officials, the 
royal lands by four treasurers of France under the chargeur de tresor and 
the much larger 'extraordinary' revenue (gabelles, aides, tailles, traites 
et impositions foraines) by four receivers general of finance. From 1523, 
all revenues were combined under one central treasury, the tre s o ir ie r  de  
l ’epargne (This, as we have seen was already achieved in 1496 in Burgundy). 
In 1554 the office of the Controller-General ( which one finds in England
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only in the nineteenth century) was established. By 1542 a uniform system 
of 18 tax districts which the Spanish and English never managed to imitate 
was in place. From the 1550s, the masters of requests were employed as 
general watchdogs of the Crown with immense central and local administra­
tive powers. They were involved with financial, military, and ideological 
(problems of heresy) issues.
France was forging ahead in term of the efficiency of its bureaucracy and 
its ability to tax its people. The empire did not feel compelled to follow 
suit. If anything, it was England that came to resemble more closely the 
French * model*. The series of administrative reforms explored by Thomas 
Cromwell are better understood in conjunction with development in France. 
In 1534 the English privy council was transformed much on the French model. 
And in 1536, Cromwell, who had made the post of the secretaryship the all 
important one (the same occurred in France only in 1547), apparently made 
plans for an English standing army (Anderson, 1974). Finance was divorced 
from the king’s household, and in 1549 the Court of Star Chamber for 
administration and law was established. By 1554 the financial machinery was 
settled for a century or more, with control in the hands of the Exchequer, 
which handled nearly all royal revenues.
Nevertheless, the overall direction of the English State remained 
different. Some measures that can be interpreted as tending towards 
absolutism were agreed by Parliament: the reformation parliament greatly 
increased the financial resources of the monarchy by transferring to it 
control of the whole ecclesiastical apparatus of the Church; it also sup­
pressed the autonomy of seigniorial franchises by depriving them of the 
power to designates JPs. Furthermore, the monasteries were dissolved and 
their properties seized by the governments. However, the crucial difference 
with France and Spain was the absence of substantial military apparatus. 
The Tudor state did not need it because it was insulated from the mainland. 
The absence of war allowed the English aristocracy to dispense with the 
machinery of war (Anderson, 1974).
At the same time, when Henry VIII became embroiled in the French wars for 
the third time (1543-6), the attempt backfired dangerously. To pay for the 
adventure the state resorted to forced loans and debasement. More
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significantly, it dumped onto the market much of the agrarian property it 
had acquired from the monasteries, and by the end of the war the great bulk 
of these lands were gone. The transfer of assets weakened the state, and 
in the long-run strengthened the gentry who bought them up. Thus it had the 
most momentous consequence for the domestic balance of forces within 
English society.
It was the strength of the middle classes and the gentry, in itself caused 
partly by the massive transfer of land from the State, that forced England 
to part company with other European states. In Castille the revolt of the 
comuneros (1520/1) was crushed and with it the last vestiges of contractual 
relationships in the constitution of Castille were eliminated. The 
significant of this is that the towns and not the nobles were defeated. The 
French wars in Italy strengthened the French nobility which, indeed, 
finding themselves unemployed after the peace of Camteau-Cambresis (1559) 
became restless and started a religious civil war. Everything seems to 
support Anderson’s theory that it was England special g e o g r a p h i c a l  position 
which dictated the sort of domestic development more amenable to the 
development of the bourgeoisie.
9.3. The Seventeenth century
The religious strife which had tormented Europe for a century finally 
exploded in a major pan-European conflict, the Thirty Years War, which was 
allegedly the catalyst leading to the creation of a new system of states. 
However, there were little constitutional or administrative developments 
in the seventeenth century. Generally speaking, it was a period of 
affirmation and consolidation rather than revolution (Hill, 1967; 
Wallerstein, 1980). All the basic ’models’ of state development, the 
Monarquia, French absolutism, English parliamentary monarchy and the Dutch 
republic were left almost intact. The second half of the sixteenth century 
had seen the rapid spread of the new administrative and constitutional 
forms into Scandinavia, Eastern Europe and even Russia. In the Thirty Years 
War, these various organisations were pitted against each other, and the 
outcome was a much more synchronised Europe. What is remarkable from the 
point of view of the horizontal link, and indeed, this set the tone for 
development in the seventeenth century, was the speed by which the
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combatants learned to imitate each other, particularly in military matters.
Gustav Adolf, the king of Sweden who first set the tone of the war, To play 
a role in European politics, the king had to create an organisation able 
to compete with others on the same footing. As usual it all hinged on the 
ability to secure finance. In an effort to convert revenues in kind into 
cash, he was first moved to sell off or pawn the royal domains, then 
imposed new direct and indirect taxes payable in coin. Lastly, he induced 
foreign capitalists to invest in Swedish mining and industry. And with the 
help of a Dutch financier, De Geer, he imported Dutch techniques to utilise
IQ
Swedish iron. But perhaps more important, Gustav Adolphus imported Dutch 
techniques of military training. In 1619, Maurice organised the first 
European military academy. A graduate of the academy subsequently serviced 
under Gustav Adolf taking the new Dutch drill to the Swedes. Furthermore, 
the Swedes were first to use small field artillery pieces that could be 
manoeuvred by hand to create a shock effect of mass fire followed by pike 
and cavalry charges which they learned to use with cavalry to such an 
effect from the Polish. The success of the Swedes on the battlefield 
assured that the new drill spread to all the other European armies with any 
pretensions.
As war costs soared, each of the combatants had to apply new expediencies. 
In France the added revenues came from forced loans and the sale of 
offices. As a result, officials suffered the roost and they became the 
bearer of the social unrest which eventually led to the Frond. Plans for 
reforming the French monarchy (on the line of the council of Castile where 
level of taxation arrive to a new and higher pitch) were put to the 
Assembly of Notables of 1626 by Richelieu. However, they were rejected, 
save for the project for reviving commercial and maritime strength, which 
was partly a response to 01 iveras’ corresponding plans. The struggle 
against the Habsburg drove Louis XIII and Richelieu to a war dictatorship 
with an arbitrary, centralized, egalitarian government thereby unintention­
ally generating revolutionary changes. By the 1630s Richelieu had a free 
hand and was able to issue a declaration which effectively transferred all 
the duties of the financial officers, as well as ordinary jurisdictions in 
financial matters to the intendants. It was an opportunistic measure, but 
the war prolonged it and turned it into an institution. It was this new
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structure which eventually became the backbone of French absolutism.
The problem of financing the war was also felt in Spain. In 1621, Oliveras
found himself compelled to listen to the arbitristas, who sought to restore
the economy and the crown's credit by founding a national banking system.
Plans for banks to be managed by the municipalities were approved in 1599
by the Cortes, but nothing was done. A second attempt, in 1627 was more 
20successful. On the whole, however, the Cortes rejected the arbitristas' 
plans for reform, expressing instead an explicit preference for increasing 
indirect taxes which fell heavily on the poorer sections, and by implica­
tion chose the strategy of debasements and arbitrary measures. Indeed, 
Castille's indirect tax was much higher than France and included greater 
contribution from the clergy. According to Trevor-Roper (1970) this 
reactionary policy was the essence of the system of the p ax  h iap an ica.
The war also saw the first signs of emergence of Brandenburg as a power to 
be reckoned with. In 1619 there was no state of Prussia; there was only an 
assortment of territories united under the electorship of George William 
of the Hohenzollems (and Prussia was not among them). The nobility was 
everywhere asserting its rights and privileges. It was a system based on 
orders which the Huguenots sought to introduce into France. In 1648 
Frederick William I, who was educated in Holland, came back into his 
patrimony and began to implement a far-reaching reform plan. In 1652 he 
summoned a general Landtag of Brandenburg to institute a new financial 
system to provide for an army; the meeting ended with the 1653 Recess which 
consecrated the beginning of a social compact with the aristocracy and the 
king. The Prussian state became a curious phenomenon: a nobility based 
absolutist state.
How did this come about? The Recess was in fact another original 'solution' 
for the incorporation of the nobility into the state. This time by crushing 
the middle classes and enslaving the peasantry. As long as the electors 
kept to this entente they had the nobility on their side. In the meantime, 
through the various wars, the Great Elector was able to impose a permanent 
system of taxation and with each new emergency, he augmented the number of 
his troops so that the nobility, and in particular the towns, were less 
disposed to resist him until the next round arrived and the whole process
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started afresh. As Brandenburg/Prussia had the population of a small state, 
the Swedish pattern of conscription based on effective registers was 
introduced. There were traces of the French system, but on the whole it was 
peculiarly Prussian: an army-state where the army bureaucratic organisation 
became the main framework of the state’s bureaucracy.
9.4. The wars of Louis XIV, the technique of balance of power and the 
financial revolution
The defeat of the ’invincible’ Spanish army at Rocroi, in 1643, by the 
French under Conde, marked the beginning of the decline of the Habsburgs. 
With the defeat of the Frond and the coming of age of Louis XXV French 
absolutism arrived at its pinnacle. To end this story of the European 
ballet I will discuss only one point in this development, the intersection 
of the technique of balance of power with the financial revolution. The 
theoreticians of International Relations seem to be right about the 
development of a system of balance of power in Europe (Kennedy, 1986). 
However, balance of power is a treacherous analytical concept. It has meant 
different things at different times, and has reflected different condi­
tions. What it meant in the period under consideration has to be seen in 
the context of that period.
By the mid-seventeenth century all of the major European armies were more 
or less similar in structure. In one way or another all the major 
protagonists were able to incorporate both the bourgeoisie and the old 
nobility into their systems. The next stage of development, as Marx puts 
it in the Communist M an ifesto, was the advancement of the bourgeoisie from 
a dependent ruling class to a dominant position and the emergence of a 
capitalist class. This trend can already be seen to a century before the 
French revolution which, if anything, began a new trend of incorporating 
elements from the working-classes into the system (Wolfe, 1977).
In any case, with a rudimentary form these States were able to incorporate 
only the apogee of their societies, and in some cases at an enormous costs 
a sizeable middle class (Spain’s hidalgos) into their system. Thus while 
some battalions were better than others. Methods of fighting, organisation, 
armament, and defence, were more or less the same. Of crucial importance
236
was the number of men they were able to put into the fields. And perhaps 
more important, the number of men they were able to train for long periods. 
In short, it all came down to money again, but more money than ever, els 
armies grew in size and els hardware became more expensive. Coupled with 
the newly elaborated technique of balance of power, which meant that states 
did not really need to employ a huge army —  they only needed to deploy one 
in times of crisis. Financial resources therefore became the true mark of 
a power. Thus, and in consequence of the advent of Louis XIV’s wars, we see 
all over Europe financial and fiscal experiments, many * financial 
revolutions’ culminating in the famous English one.
**
The story of the European ballet is discussed here to illustrate the 
pervasiveness of horizontal links. All the major administrative, constitu­
tional , military and structural developments in the period between 1450 and 
1700 are understood quite differently in the context of the European 
competitive system. Just as with the vertical links, the horizontal links 
are never straightforwBLrd. Their effects can only be gauged through their 
ELrticulation with the domestic political process. However, the two notions 
that were developed in the Eight and Ninth chapters permit us to penetrate 
into what Marx calls, the determination of the phenomena, and possibly 
understand it better.
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NOTES
1. On competition and State policy see: Arandt, 1982; Berthelot, 
1983; Bauer & Cohen, 1985; Brenner, 1984; Burke et. al. 1988; 
Child, 1981;Hollerman, 1982;Lodge & Vogel, 1987; Mahon, 1984; 
Mueller, 1982; Peet, 1987; Pelzman, 1982; Perez, 1985a, 1985b; 
Tavitian, 1986; Zysman & Cohen, 1986;Zysman & Tyson, 1983.
Competition and local state: Duncan, & Goodwin, 1980.
On competition and innovation: Binswanger et. al., 1978 
;Davis, 1979; Ray, 1984.
2. The historical school following Leopold Ranke is unique in this 
respect. On the work of Ranke see Krieger, 1977. On Meinecke, see 
Sterling, 1958. See also Heintze, 1975.
3. On war and social structure see: Ashworth, & Dandeker, 1987; 
Creighton & Shaw, 1987; Finer, 1975; Mann, 1986; 1987a; Marwick, 
1974.
4. The principal material for the following discussion were the 
seven relevant volumes of The Cambridge New Modern History series 
(volumes I-VI). Otherwise I have consulted a number of textbooks. 
They include: Anderson, 1974; Braudel, 1972, 1979; Chaunu, 1982; 
Elias, 1939; Ergang, 1971; Frank, 1978; Hall, 1985; Hintze, 1975; 
Kennedy, 1988; Lockyer, 1974; Luard, 1984; Meyer, 1981; Mann, 
1986; MacKay & Scott, 1983; McNeill, 1974; Ranke, 1840; Shennan, 
1974; Tilly, 1974; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980; Woodruff, 1981. On 
war: M.S. Anderson, 1988; Black, 1987; Howard , 1976; McNeill, 
1983. On England: Hill, 1967; Myers, 1952; Smith, 1984; Wilkin­
son, 1964. On France, Barret-Kriegel, 1984; Braudel, 1986; 
Briggs, 1977; Mettam, 1977. On the Netherlands, Geyl, 1932; 
Parker, 1979. On Spain, Elliott, 1963. On the Habsburgs, Kann,
1974. Notations and backing refer only to this secondary 
material.
5. Thus any abstract statements concerning the relation between 
economics and politics, or for that matter, of the unfolding 
contradictions of a particular formation, need to come up against 
this phenomena of universal borrowing whereby the various 
’ superstructures ’ seemed to be nothing but an eclectic mixture 
of other formations’ superstructures.
6. "To be sure, the kings themselves cannot foresee, any more than 
their adversaries in this struggle, the new institution to which 
it will give rise. They do not really have any general intentions 
to ’increase their fiscal power’. To begin with they and their 
representatives want quite simply to extract as much money as 
possible from their dominion on one occasion after another, and 
the tasks and expenses necessitating this are always quite 
specific and immediate. No single man created taxes or the 
taxation monopoly; no individual, or series of individuals 
throughout the century in which this institution was slowly 
formed, worked towards this goal by any deliberate plan, 
taxation, like any other institutions, is a product of social 
interweaving. It arises —  as from parallelogram of forces —
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from the conflicts of various social groups and interests, until 
sooner or later the instrument which has developed in the 
constant social trials of strength becomes more and more 
consciously understood by the interested parties and more 
deliberately constructed into an organisation or institution" 
(Elias, 1939, p. 207).
7. In most works the European concept of liberty is associated with 
the independent role of the Christian church. Guizot (1985) 
traces the it to the fusion of the Germanic tribes* traditions 
with the independent political power of the Church. Others, 
McNeill (1974) maintain that the Church had the opposite effect 
in particular in the are of the Mediterranean.
8. One finds this interpretation in all of the major historian of 
political thought. See, Nisbeth, 1974; Pockock, 1975; Ullmann,
1975.
9. For modem partial attempts in the same direction see: Ashworth 
& Dandeker, 1987; Hall & Ikenberry, 1989; Zolberg, 1986. See also 
note (2)
10. This was a slow process of learning. By the end of the eighteenth 
century the relation between war and constitutional and ad­
ministrative reforms were clear to all. Nowhere was it more 
pronounced then with Maria-Theresa’s reforms. On the subject see 
Wangermann, 1965. On the Polish reaction in the same period see 
Lewitter, 1965.
11. "The critical legacy of the long ordeal of the Hundred Years ’ War 
was its ultimate contribution to the fiscal and military 
emancipation of the monarchy from the limits of the prior 
medieval polity. For the war was only won by abandoning the 
seigniorial ban system of knightly service, which had proved 
disastrously ineffective against English archers, and creating a 
regular paid army whose artillery proved the decisive weapon for 
victory. To raise this army, the first important country-wide tax 
to be collected by the monarchy was granted by the French 
aristocracy— the taille royale of 1439, which became the regular 
taille des gens d'armes in the 1440*s" (Anderson, 1974, pp.86,7).
12. "English dominance through the war... .was a product of the far 
greater political integration and solidity of the English feudal 
monarchy, whose administrative capacity to exploit its patrimony 
and rally its nobility was until the very end of the war much 
greater than that of the french monarchy, harried by disloyal 
vassals in Brittany or Burgundy" (Anderson, 1974, pp. 117,8).
In the battle of Crecy, the English used their knights as 
foot soldiers among the long-bowmen as they have learned to do in 
the wars with Scots and Welshmen. By doing so they created total 
havoc in the French camp. See on the subject, Howard, 1976, pp. 
11,12.
13. The Star Chamber was a development of a much more ancient 
institution. On the debate whether it was a new institution in
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old garment or whether it was merely a modification of the old 
one see: Anderson, 1974; Myers, 1952; Smith, 1984; Wilkinson, 
1964.
14. To be discussed later in the chpater.
15. The separate destinites of these formations is related to their 
class structure. On the reasons for their diverging class 
structure see Wallerstein, 1974.
16. The contention that the Habsburgs domains were divided into two 
for logistical purposes as it stands by itself is not convincing. 
Were the territories of Philip II which included the Iberian 
peninsula with the low countries more compact arrangement? I 
doubt it. At least Charles V could co-ordinate his attacks on the 
Ottoman empire both from Spain, Italy and Austria as he wished. 
It is clear that much of Philip II difficulties in the Nether­
lands stem from his inability to co-ordinate his relations with
the Ottomans. On the division see Elliott, 1963.
17. For different interpretation see Elliott, 1963. Elliott argues
that the Spanish kings from Ferdinand and Isabella to Philip II 
were genuinely intersted in keepin with the old privi ledges of 
each of their domains.
18. The system was invented according to Max Beloff, 1954, already in 
the 14th century, but came to its own because of these financial 
pressures.
19. It is interesting to note that Wallenstein used precisely the 
same methods: "Wallenstein formed what amounted to a partnership 
with Hans de Witte, the great international banker and merchant 
of Prague. De Witte advanced the needed money, and acted as 
supply agent and shipper for military supplies. The farms of the 
Friedland duchy were one of the chief sources for provisioning 
the army" (Beller, 1970, p.323).
20. By that time both Amsterdam (1600) and England (1601) had their 
own banks, Bom, 1984.
Chapter Ten —  Informal Interactions and Poulantzas * Scheme
240
Thus far a series of concepts which provide a bridge between the 
theories of the State and the study of International Relations have 
been presented. The unit of analysis of such a framework is the 
political process. The political process interact with the external 
world through vertical and horizontal structurations. The final chapter 
relates these three concepts together.
10.1. Vertical links —  the level of the structures
As discussed in chapter eight, situations whereby individuals, com­
panies, and organisations residing in one formation are attached by 
some common purpose or interest to a group residing in another are 
defined as vertical links. Quite often, but by no means always, these 
links create ties of dependence between these groups. In order to 
elaborate the manner by which the vertical links interact with the 
Poulantzasian scheme, let us imagine a hypothetical cause whereby a 
company 'a' residing in country 'A* and producing a product ’a* sells 
this product successfully in country *B*. What are the social and 
political dynamics of this transaction ?
In country ’A’ there are individuals whose livelihood depends directly 
upon the fortune of this company: employees, managers, owners.
Additionally there is a variety of individuals who depend in d ire c tly  
upon the company for their livelihood: raw material producers (with 
their own employees, managers and owners), services, etc. In country 
’B’ there is a group of individuals who earn their living ats importers, 
distributers, providers of related services, etc. —  a comprador class 
as they are ordinarily described. They are connected d ire c tly in a 
vertical tie to company *A*; a distant link is maintained between the 
consumers and the producers.
The effect of these vertical links on the social structures of the two 
countries, if ordinarily imperceptible, can be seen in relation to the 
Poulantzasian scheme of the political process. In country *A* one may 
expect the relative strengthening of the industrial sector where this
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company is situated. In other words, there will be a change in the 
structure. The successes of this company will most probably be 
accompanied by an expansion of its political clout. In turn, the 
relative strengthening of sector ’A’ in the economy will result in the 
relative weakening (again, imperceptible in most cases) of other 
sectors, 'B' and 'C', with a concomitant weakening of their political 
clout.
The relative strengthening (or weakening) of a sector, according to 
Poulantzas, entails a concomitant surge or reduction in the relative 
weight of the modes and stages of production within the social 
formation. This implies that the class structure is affected. Hence the 
class structure of any given society is constantly in a state of flux 
as it is disturbed by these informal links. The class structure is not 
simple modified, but becomes better attuned to class structures of 
other societies. It creates a world-wide process of synchronisation. 
The end result of these series of interactions is that countries seems 
to be specialising in the production of a few products; they find 
niches, so to speak, in the global economy.^
10.2. Horizontal links —  the level of the structures
Before we pursue this analysis further it will be useful to supplement 
it with the dynamics of the horizontal links. Horizontal links are 
instances whereby groups of peoples, and indeed societies, are linked 
to each other by the mere fact that they are competing with each other. 
The idea is that the one who competes tends to modify his behaviour —  
and in the case of an economic corporation or a state, its structure 
—  in order to improve its competitive position. Thus the competition 
itself becomes an 'input* into the domestic political process. The 
fiercer the competition is, the more it will alter the basic structure 
of the societies which are involved in it. Horizontal links behave 
,therefore, as channels by which societies structure each other —  
unintentionally, and in many cases without being aware of doing so.
Let us discuss again a hypothetical case of the same company 'a', this 
time producing similar goods to company 'c', which is located in
2 4 2
country *C*. They are competing with each other. Their economic 
competition may develop at various levels. There is the price of goods, 
their quality, the maintenance of services, prestige, and finally 
external factors such as political and commercial relations. Moreover, 
what goes into the price of goods depends on a combination of factors: 
productivity, the cost of labour, raw materials, capital, space, etc. 
In other words, the competition may be broken down into a series of 
tangible factors such as wages and the price of raw materials, as well 
as intangible factors such as willingness to work, skills, etc. In 
addition to this, not only capitalists are competing here, the workers 
too, the workers* organisations, and methods of production, and 
infrastructural facilities (education, transportation, financial 
facilities, etc.), are all important elements in commercial competition 
(Vogler, 1986). In essence, in each instance of competition it is the 
whole economic, cultural and political organisation of these societies 
which is ultimately involved.
It is possible to deduce certain general statements about the social 
effects of these links. In their competition, the companies either 
borrow new successful techniques and technologies and incorporate than 
into their formations where they spread all over their formations. 
Otherwise they may invent new ones which, if successful, will spread 
around the globe as other competitors follow suit. Thus, for example, 
when Japanese companies develop an advantageous system of consultation 
with unions, there is pressure on unions of other countries, if not to 
follow suit, at least to change their own arrangements in order that 
their companies may compete more efficiently. Once American or European 
Engineering or Auto workers unions agree to new arrangements, sooner or 
later other unions in the same countries will have to cane to new 
arrangements. The result is that Japanese labour relations, a sig­
nificant factor in the domestic political process by any account, have 
'structured* by an * invisible link* American and European polities.
Typically, the following factors are modified directly through the 
horizontal link:
a. models for the management and organisation of the firm;
b. organisation of the banking and credit systems;
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c. labour productivity;
d. technological innovation;
e. patterns of investments;
f. definition of optimal scale;
g. restructuring of inter-branch relationships;
h. regulation of the market;
i. relations with the State (Perez, 1985a; 1985b).
As demonstrated in chapter Seven, the articulation of the various modes 
and stages of production eventuates on the political, ideological and 
economic levels concomitantly. The ascendency of a specific sector 
signifies a change in the balance of forces between the political 
classes and fraction, as each class comes equipped, so to speak, with 
its own unique ideology and interests (Poulantzas, 1973; Therbom, 
1980; Wright, 1985). The individuals which are directly involved in 
this link tend, generally speaking, to vote for friendly relations with 
country ’B’, they support an open door policy etc. At the same time in 
country ’B’, apart from the ’comprador’ group which has gained in 
strength, one whould expect a certain antagonism to develop towards the 
relations with country ’A’, or protectionism on the parts of companies 
producing identical or similar goods, the latter try to elicit State 
aid in their struggle against the foreign intruders.
These connections are implicit in many empirical analyses —  the only 
problem is that, for one reason or another, they have not found their 
way into the theories of International Relations. These ideas lie 
behind the theories of monopoly capitalism (Jessop, 1982), they 
underpin Naim’s (1964) analysis of the British class structure 
(chapter 8). They sure to be found in Bettleheim’s analysis of Nazism 
(1979) where he attritues great importance to the difference between 
German heavy industries and the relative strengthening of the chemical 
industries afterwards.
10.3 Class structure
As social classes are not concrete social groups, it is possible to 
delienate how they become ’linked’ to others in a ’transnational’ link
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only by a theoretical reconstruction. The paradigmatic case of the 
vertical links are of course the various ' comprador ’ classes which were 
discussed in chapter eight. According to dependency theory these 
classes rely on external social forces to maintain their position 
within. They utilise their political power to pursue their interests 
and in the process subvert and distort the economic, political and 
cultural structure of their formations. In this way the links and the 
ties become structurations.
The horizontal links on this level are more complex. Classes as such do 
not compete with each other: their competition evolves through
'proxies* such as states, corporations, religious organisations, etc., 
competition, therefore, may be discussed only to the extent that it 
alter the balance of forces within the social formation.
10.4. The Political Scene
Informal interactions may occur also on the level of the political 
scene. An example of a vertical link of this type was the policy of 
indirect rule pursued by British and Dutch colonists. Indirect rule was 
a policy aimed at forging 'informal' class dependencies. The idea 
behind it was to utilise indigenous customs and laws in order to buffer 
the colonial structure. For this purpose, 'chiefs' were selected and 
delegated a semblance of power. Thus, on the face of it indigenous 
societies were left untouched. However, these chiefs' source of power 
and revenue lay primarily with the colonial adminstration. At the same 
time, the utilization of custom and culture in the foreign administra­
tion was only a transparent mask. Consequently, native societies were 
tom apart, as their economy, politics and culture lay completely 
disarticulated as a result of the link.
The horizontal links of these types are also well documented. Since 
the large majority of states nowadays are controlled by a capitalist 
class, commercial competition has become the main line of competition 
among modem societies. Indeed, unlike its counterpart from the 
classical age, the modem State’s paradigmatic model is not the army, 
but the economic corporation. It is for this reason that the primary 
concern of foreign/domestic policy is the maintenance of 'competitiv-
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eness', a concept that may be broken down into a series of factors such 
as know-how, labour organisation, control over markets and raw 
materials. Thus, ' competitiveness’ separate itself into a series of 
policy objectives which are the responsibility of various governmental 
and semi-governmental departments. Productivity, which has to do with 
wages, technology, management and in particular with labour relations 
is under the auspice of the departments of finance, education, labour, 
and trade. Knowhow or technology, under education and trade. Labour 
organisation, is under the jurisdiction of the home office, ministry of 
labour, education, justice. And competition over markets and raw-mater­
ial s is a matter for finance, war, foreign affairs, trade, etc.
The changes on the political scene reverberate all over the social 
formations in the manner described by Poulnatzas ' scheme of political 
analysis. While the picture is schematic and, as I am emphasising all 
the time, in most cases imperceptible because one link is far too weak 
to affect the whole national scene, the true significance of these 
links is that social formations affect, and indeed, structure each 
other in an * informal *, i .e. unplanned, in many cases unconscious, 
manner. Consequently, once the two lines of links (the vertical and the 
horizontal) are taken into consideration as a permanent feature of any 
country's normal activity, the domestic political process can be 
discussed independently only in a manner of speaking.
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10.5. Some concrete cases
It will be useful to survey briefly few examples of interaction between 
the informal links and the political process. The intimate connection 
between domestic politics and the informal interactions has been 
appreciated already by Marx who says
"In England the import of Netherlands commodities in the six­
teenth century and at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
gave to the surplus of wool which England had to provide in 
exchange, an essential, decisive role. In order then to produce 
more wool, cultivated land was transformed into sheep-walks, the 
system of small tenant-farmers was broken up etc., clearing of 
estates took place etc. Agriculture thus loss the character of 
labour for use value... At certain points, agriculture itself 
became purely determined by circulation, transformed into 
production for exchange value. Not only was the mode of produc­
tion altered thereby, but also all the old relations of popula­
tion and of production, the economic relations which correspond 
to it, were dissolved" (Marx, Grundrisse, p.257).
Let us relate this within our framework. Marx does not tell us why England 
imported Dutch commodities, nor does he relates who were behind this 
importation/ He relates one type of vertical link and describe its social 
consequences:
Netherlands England
export commodities --- > import commodities
leads to demand for wool
To produce more wool — > less agriculture
The system of small tenant-farmers was broken
structural change as agriculture dominated by circulation
Change of mode of production: the transformation to ’capitalism* 
is related to the informal link with the Dutch.
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Let us take another case. Rubinson (1978) discussion of German 
unification is a case in point:
"Bismarck was able to unify Germany by bringing the opposing 
interests of Junkers and industrialists together in a compromise 
that was initially minimally acceptable to both. The junkers 
grudgingly accepted it because it insured their political 
dominance within a united Germany; while the industrialists 
accepted Prussian rule because it gave their economic prosperity 
by establishing many elements of their economic goals. The 
peasants and urban working class, having previously learned that 
neither Junkers nor liberal were their allies, went along under 
the inducement social security and the vote ... this arrangement 
still very precarious, but with changes in the world economy 
favoured the coalition, the opening of american grain with trains 
etc..In order to maintain their economic position, the Junkers 
were forced into a policy of economic protection and political 
supports for grain. This worked in two ways. One, a policy of 
tariff protection to protect the heme market; and two, a policy 
of grain subsidies to allow Prussian grain to compete.. .This 
shift to agriculture protection allied the economic interests of 
the Junkers with the industrialists, who had always been for 
protection... This marriage of iron and rye became economically 
cemented with the Great Tariff if 1879, in which both interests 
combined around protection" (pp. 50-53).
In this analysis, Rubinson demonstrates the conjunctural intersection of 
domestic developments with a competitive stance in the world economy.
Junkers Industrialists
Opposing interests
Compromise accepted grudgingly
political dominance within gave their economic prosperity by a
united Germany establishing many elements of their
economic goals.
Social security and vote for peasants and working classes 
the opening of american grain with trains (Horizontal link)
Junkers forced into a policy of economic protection :
1.tariff protection
2.grain subsidies
industrialists always been for protection:marriage of iron and rye 
became economically cemented with the Great Tariff if 1879
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Anderson’s analysis of the fall of Spain in the seventeenth century (pp. 
205-6):
Spain dominance over America, (vertical link)
Leads to extraordinary income, inflationary pressure
1. Increase demand leads to the conversion of land away from cereal
production to wine and olives
2. Reinforced increasing tendency of monarchy to contract cereal
production
Spain major grain-importer by 1570s
The structure of. Spanish society becomes 
heavily tilted towards the tertiary sector
Accelerating inflation drives textile out of business
Dutch and English traders cream off the demand
Spain loses ’Great power’ status
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Naim and Hobson's analysis of Britain (pp.206,207)
City of London Industrialists
Export all over the globe (vertical links)
Pax Britannica,
Britain the 'world's banker'
The sterling too high -- >
Industrialists suffer as a result
Britain loses its privileged position in the world economy.
Many historical interpretations implicitly possess a theory of 
interactions of the domestic political process and one type of informal 
link. Once we are aware of that, we may take the theory a step further, 
we may regard the political process as the hub of many informal 
vertical and horizontal links. Indeed, such perspective is the natural 
extension of the modem theories of the State into the study of 
International Relations.
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NOTES
1. The significance of that is tremendous. It implies that the class 
structure of one society re-structure the class structure of 
another. Thus the informal links may open up a study of their 
global effects which sustains the world-economy.
To mention a few works on the subject: Almecija, 1986; 
Berberoglu, 1984; Fann & Hodges, 1981; Frank, 1967; 1978b;
Gibson, 1958; Levene, 1953; Patanik, 1986; Petras, 1978; Poulant- 
zas, 1975; Rhodes, 1976.
The subject will be discussed further in the Conclusions.
2. In spite of considerable work on economic and political competi­
tion within and between societies, as well as works on competi­
tion and restructurations, it is surprising how little attention 
has been paid to the concept ’competition’ itself. That competi­
tion causes change is rooted so deeply in our thought (probably 
because of evolution) that (as far as I know) no one in Interna­
tional Relations has bothered to acknowledge that competition 
create these informal links between societies. On competition 
and economic restructuration: see: Arandt, 1982; Berthelot, 1983; 
Duncan & Goodwin, 1980; Harrison, 1987; Mahon, 1984; Perez, 
1985a; 1985b; Peet, 1987; Tavitian, 1986; Zysman & Cohen, 1983; 
Zysman & Tyson, 1986. On the concept of competition see: 
Binswanger & Ruttain, 1978; Brenner, 1984; Burke et. al., 1988: 
Lodge & Vogel, 1987. Competition in International Relations see: 
E.L. Jones, 1981, Wesson, 1978.
3. On indirect rule see chapter 8.
4. On that subject see Braudel, 1979.
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CONCLUSIONS
A bridge between the theories of the State and the study of Interna­
tional Relations represents international relationships quite dif­
ferently from the presentation of the traditional literature. In this 
perspective international relationships are not simply the resulting 
friction of volitional self-propelled social entities. Nor are they 
merely class relationships as they occur within a global setting. They 
are these elements combined, and more.
I proposed a compromise between class-based and State-based schemes, a 
compromise that draws upon a vast literature which has not been 
utilized sufficiently in the discipline of International Relations. 
Because fundamental problems face the discipline of International Rela­
tions, namely the difficulties encountered in an attempt to concep­
tualise states and classes concomitantly, I simply adopted the solution 
which has already proved itself in political sociology, and con­
centrated on the political process.
The problem then was to articulate the status of the political process 
within an international setting. The political process is connected to 
its ’ environment ’ through two sets of links: through a variety of 
informal links and through governmental policies which, in themselves, 
are to some extent conditioned by informal links. The interrelation of 
the informal links with the political processes yields two patterns, 
vertical and horizontal structurations.
In this perspective, the world is seen not as an aggregation of 
discrete entities, nor for that matter is it considered as a vast 
socio-economic space, but as an accumulation of discrete/indiscrete 
entities, sharing many aspects (thus indiscretion) fundamentally 
divided because of the localisation of the political process. The study 
of International Relations, therefore, is not the study of ’relation’ 
between units, but the study of interrelations among processes. 
Ultimately, the study of ’society within societies’ must investigate 
the interactions between the various political processes.
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There is no point, however, in developing theories if they do not tell 
us something about the world we would otherwise not have known. It is 
for this that all theoretical enterprises need at some point to address 
the issues of prescription, determination and application. The 
framework presented here is no exception. Why should an abstract 
arrangement of concepts and ideas tell us something our sense-percep- 
tion could not? In other words, why do we need the mediation of an 
abstract realm to know things about the concrete?
There Eire two reasons to justify the adoption of such methods. It may 
either rest on the belief that the general chaos and diversity of 
events is prescribed to a certain extent by an underlying s tru c tu re  
which may be discerned through the existence of re c u r re n t  p a tte rn s. 
Theory in this case may be regarded as new knowledge because previously 
unsuspected phenomena are coming to light. Alternatively, it may be 
justified on the grounds that our biological capacity to deal with 
information is limited. Theory then, by the method of abstraction and 
generalisation, reduces information to manageable amounts. In this case 
theory does not provide new knowledge, it simply re-arranges it. It 
aims, as Lasswell puts it, "to make the obvious unescapable" (Lasswell, 
1977,p.82).
In an ideal world we should have been able to chose between the two 
alternatives. However, I do not know of any theoretical enterprise 
which does not combine a measure of the two. Consequently, the issues 
of prescription, determination and application have to be advanced with 
great care. It is important not to mistake mere generalizations for new 
knowledge and vice versa.
If there is any distinctive ’new knowledge’ presented in this work, it 
involves the discovery of the 'informal’ world of International 
Relations. By that I do not mean the discovery of its existence; 
diffusionism, modernization theory, development studies, interdepen­
dence, etc. have all noticed that. But it involves shifting the balance 
from formal to informal interactions because informal interactions may 
explain the formal, but not the other way around.
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To deal with the question of prescription and application, It is first 
of all essential to abandon the narrow pre-occupation with the 
activities of decision-makers. However, to do this is it imperative to 
understand why are they important? Is it because they are powerful? Is 
it because they represent society? Or perhaps is it because it is 
easier to write about their activities than about others? The answer 
contains all of these. Nonetheless, the essential point is that policy 
is a unique moment wherein society takes the form of a real entity. It 
is a moment when the concentrated power of the State, diligently 
accumulated through tax, monopoly over the means of violence, and 
ideological manoeuvres, is applied.
Thus whatever social scientists produce is ultimately directed towards 
the formulation of policy. But policies are not formulated in some 
esoteric ' cyberspace ’. What Apter, Easton and Poulantzas tell us in 
their unique way is that the overall social milieu is concentrated in 
the policy, but that in fact the social milieu is the determining agent 
—  if that is the right term to use. The overall social milieu, 
therefore, should at least receive an equal treatment in the discipline 
of International Relations as the study of policy formulation.
The first conclusion of this work, therefore, is that the balance 
between formal and informal interactions should be redressed: for too 
long the discipline of International Relations concentrated exclusively 
on the activities of statesmen. As a balancing act I might be accused 
of having concentrated too much on the social milieu and not on 
policies. But the attempt was to reconcile a super imposition of two 
realms, of the amorphism of social life and of the discreteness of the 
formal world, two spheres which I felt were far more intermeshed and 
fluctuating than is generally acknowledged. I have tried to demonstrate 
that this enormous, amorphous and chaotic realm of informal interac­
tions is best approached as a series of discrete patterns of informal 
interactions or restructurations. It is the informal sphere which opens 
the door to deeper investigations of the formal sphere, whereas, els 
discussed in the first chapter, the formal one is self-limiting.
Any framework for political analysis, however, suffers from one
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apparent drawback: it does not tell us about the nature of the
international system, it only presents a tool for analyzing politics. 
There is a philosophy to justify such an approach, the philosophy of 
structuralism according to which historical events cannot and should 
not be explained by a theory. Theory only presents a framework for 
appropriation. Some have argued that structuralism banished the 
subject, as indeed, in the cold, metallic world of structures, the 
individual appears to have no choice but to concur (Hindess and Hirst; 
Thompson, 1978). But nothing is farther from the truth, if the distance 
between theory and history is not maintained, how do generalization 
help us? They can only provide statistical knowledge that such and such 
an event has a greater tendency to occur than another event, and this 
is an unsatisfactory position to be in. Structuralism (that is, 
Althusser's structuralism, not Levi-Strauss’) maintains clear boun­
daries beyond which only historical knowledge is appropriate.
The second conclusion of this work is that if events are to be 
analyzed in their historical setting, than the theory of International 
Relations cannot determine in advance what the action of states, 
individuals, companies will be —  it can, and should, however, tell us 
how to think about these phenomena. But in order to do this, interna­
tional relationships cannot be conceived as an autonomous system, and 
consequently there can be no general theory of International Relations. 
To put it in other words, we cannot assume that all States wish to 
increase their power vis-a-vis others, but if they appear to do so at 
certain periods, we need to explain, not postulate, that.
The scheme presented here concentrated on form (the forms of the 
informal links and how they relate to other forms described by 
Poulantzas's theory of the State) to the exclusion of power relation­
ships, as well as of the content of the transmissions. The application  
of the theory to historical situations requires the inclusion of the 
content in its historical setting.
The benefit accruing from such a scheme is that it becomes possible to 
articulate a 'social map’ combining political, economic and perhaps 
cultural relationships of a given social formation in an international
255
context (See fig. V. p. 183). The factors that need to be known are: 
first, a good class analysis including an analysis of the 'political 
scene*; second, it is necessary to map at least the major vertical and 
horizontal links (which are potentially quantifiable); third, it is 
important to relate the resulting picture to the overall global 
political and economic context (only at this stage do we negotiate the 
subject of the system of States, the world-market and world-economy). 
By such a method, if we cannot predict what sort of policy or policies 
will be undertaken, it is possible to make informed guesses as to 
whether a policy once decided upon has
(a) a chance of success. As it is possible then to relate any policy 
('domestic' or 'foreign') directly to both its domestic context and its 
international aspect. Thus, the amount of meaningful information about 
the 'environment' of a policy is increased considerably.
(b) perhaps more important, it is possible within a strict limit, to 
articulate what sort of 'unintended consequences' will result because 
of the policy. Here again, the channels of informal links can tell us 
how it will reverberate through other formations and in turn how these 
reverberation will be echoed in the emitting social formation.
The framework may therefore provide a tool for foreign policy analysis. 
Yet it may be taken a step further. The same procedure may be trans­
ferred from the unit to the system: In the first chapter, I quoted 
approvingly Braudel' s concept of the world-economy as an enormous 
envelope. However, if the world-economy is not an 'organic' system, how 
does it hold together ? Braudel asks this yet is never able give a 
satisfactory answer:
".. .whether one considers a world-economy in terms of its area 
on the face of the globe, or in terms of its depth at the 
centre, one's astonishment is the same: the machine seems to 
work and yet (especially if one thinks of the earliest 
outstanding cities in European history) it seems to have such 
modest power supply. How was such success possible ?.... we 
shall never be able to give a categorical answer.... But 
perhaps I may be allowed to suggest one explanation, by the 
artificial device of an image. Think of a huge block of 
marble, chosen by Michelangelo or one of his contemporaries 
from the quarries of Carrara, an immensely heavy weight which 
was nevertheless cut out by primitive means and moved with 
very modest energy sources: a little gunpowder...., two or 
three levers, perhaps a dozen men if that, ropes, a haulage
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team, wooden rollers if it was to be taken any distance, an 
inclined plane —  and there it was. The whole thing was 
possible because the giant slab was helpless on the ground 
with its own weight: it represented a huge force, but one 
inert and neutralised. Cannot this analogy be applied to the 
great mass of elementary economic activities which was also 
trapped, imprisoned, unable to move from the ground, and 
therefore more easily manoeuvrable from above ?" (Braudel, 
1979, III, p.44).
I think that it is possible to go beyond the boundaries of the 
metaphor. We actually know quite well how the system holds together. 
Both Trevor-Roper (1970) and Wallerstein (1974), each from his own 
perspective, knew that ultimately it was a matching constellation of 
class structures all over Europe which held together disparate and 
quarrelsome units in some sort of order. What is lacking is precisely 
a knowledge of the mechanisms which cause this synchronism. These 
mechanisms, I would argue, are precisely these vertical and horizontal 
structurations els they are linked with the domestic processes. However, 
this will have to wait for another study.
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